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The dissertation presents findings from a comparative study of urban policies the provincial 
governments of Quebec and Ontario introduced simultaneously, yet independently, in the year of 
2006. Its central purpose is to resolve an unexpected paradox between the two cases. In 2006, the 
two provinces launched new policies in direct response to crises of urban violence that were 
steeped in racial stereotypes of deviant young black males. In defiance of its reputation for 
progressive social policy, Quebec embarked on a disciplinary strategy of law enforcement and 
detention. In Ontario, the government broke from the history of neo-liberal cuts and injected new 
funds into social provision for low-income youth. To answer the puzzle, the study combines data 
from interviews with respondents who participated in the policy process in each province and 
archival material. Findings show that the causes of the policy change were roughly the same 
across the two provinces, and reflected a convergence between exogenous pressures and the 
interests of political institutions. In each case, well-publicized incidents of gun violence became 
“focusing events” that created a window of opportunity for advocates to push through their 
preferred policy. In Quebec, those advocates were police chiefs, who lobbied successfully for a 
crime-fighting strategy against “street gangs.” In Ontario, black Liberal politicians and black 
community organizations in Toronto were instrumental in framing the policy agenda around the 
need to tackle poverty, inequality, and racial discrimination. To explain the source of these 
discrepancies, the dissertation develops an explanatory frame that centers on the interaction 
between political institutions and black political incorporation. It argues that the history of 
multiculturalism, decentralization, black political mobilization, and multi-racial coalitions in 





2005. In Quebec, black political mobilization remains low due to sub-state nationalism, 
centralization, and a politics of culture and ethnic identity that overrides race. The dissertation 
further concludes that Ontario’s policy of youth development has been more conducive to 
solving problems of urban distress and racial inequality; in contrast, Quebec’s policy of “street 
gangs” has reinforced negative racial stereotypes of black youth and racial inequality.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Background to the Study 
 
Decades of quantitative research have shown quite convincingly that welfare states 
constitute one of the primary defenses against the corrosive impact of market-based income 
inequalities and poverty on whole societies and vulnerable population groups. Cross-national 
studies have revealed that the size and generosity of welfare states bear a strong, positive 
correlation with a wide range of population outcomes, including employment and educational 
attainment, socio-economic mobility, homeownership, feelings of subjective well-being, physical 
health, and levels of life expectancy (Crul and Mollenkopf 2012; Pratt and Godsey 2003; Rogers 
and Pridemore 2013; Zuberi 2006). Depending on the scope of redistribution, state policies can 
keep disadvantaged groups (e.g., single mothers, the disabled) from falling into poverty or allow 
low-wage workers to secure a foothold into the middle-class (Brady 2009; Zuberi 2006). In 
Canada, the expansion of income transfers and increases to the minimum wage since the 1970s 
have kept poverty rates from increasing among low-skilled workers and single mothers, despite 
the steady growth in income inequality and job polarization in the country. For reasons that 
remain poorly understood, these reforms have not been enough to keep the poverty rate from 
increasing among recent immigrants, who are now more educated than ever (Picot, Lou and Hou 
2009). Relatively few Canadian studies have been conducted thus far to examine the 
effectiveness of social policies in remedying income inequalities due to race and immigration 
(Smith-Carrier and Mitchell 2015). Banting and Thompson (2016) conclude that racial income 
inequalities in Canada have remained high and persistent, largely because they have never been 





positive effects on the rate of immigrant citizenship acquisition and political participation; yet, its 
primary goal is to promote cultural equality and integration, not economic parity (Banting and 
Thompson 2016; Bloemraad 2005). Other federal policies developed to address employment 
equity, immigrant settlement, racism, and Aboriginal land rights and governance all fail to give 
due attention to racial inequalities in income and poverty in Canada.  
Given this political backdrop, the purpose of the present study was to examine a 
straightforward empirical question: what is the current capacity of Canadian social policies to 
remedy racial inequalities in income and poverty? What are their strengths and shortcomings and 
in what ways must they be adapted to meet the challenges? In order to explore the relationship 
between social policies and racial inequality, the study created a comparison between two 
Canadian provinces— Quebec and Ontario—that embody the starkest variations between a 
sturdy and extensive welfare state (Quebec), and one that is leaner and less robust (Ontario). 
Starting in the mid-1990s, the two provinces moved into completely opposing directions on 
social policy: Quebec enlarged the welfare state to an extent never seen before, while Ontario 
underwent its most dramatic neo-liberal transition that saw the welfare state shrink to an 
unprecedented level. Research showed that as a result of Quebec’s larger welfare state, the 
incidence of poverty had fallen significantly since the mid-1990s, whereas in the rest of Canada 
it remained unchanged (Fortin 2010). Over the same time period, the rate of income inequality in 
Quebec had remained stable, while everywhere else in Canada it had increased (Fortin 2010). 
Thus, the study predicted that Quebec’s larger welfare state would be more effective in 






A second purpose of the study was to examine the claim many in the academic 
community and non-profit sector in Toronto were expressing that a surge in urban violence 
among young black males in Toronto since the mid-1990s had been the unfortunate by-product 
of the neo-liberal cutback of the state, which had compounded already serious problems of 
poverty, income inequality, and racial residential segregation. Across Canada, Toronto is one of 
two Canadian cities, the other being Calgary, where income inequalities have been rising most 
rapidly and where they remain highest. At the time of the study in 2014, no crisis of urban 
violence seemed to be besetting young black males in Montreal. Hence, the study posited that the 
difference might be explained by the contrasts in their provincial social regimes. On the ground, 
reports indicated that low-income neighborhoods in Montreal were endowed with a higher 
density of public and community-based services than in Toronto. In the 1990s in Ontario, the 
Conservative administration had either eliminated or reduced the funding for non-profit 
organizations. In Quebec during the same period, the government moved ahead to grant 
increased recognition to non-profit organizations, by entering into formal service contracts with 
organizations and enhancing their access to stable funding (White 2012).  
In sum, the goal of the present study was to examine the relationship between provincial 
social policy regimes in Quebec and Ontario and the well-being and opportunities of black youth 
growing up in low-income urban neighborhoods, specifically in Montreal and Toronto. A 12-
month qualitative study was carried out in two well-matched neighborhoods in each setting. 
Among other criteria, the two neighborhoods were matched according to their rate of poverty, 
percentage of black families, and density of organizations and institutions. Within each 
neighborhood, multiple observations and informal and formal interviews were completed over a 





organizations so as to gain a grasp of the organizational scene and the flavor of local activities, 
and to chart the participation of black youth and their interactions with service providers. 
Surprisingly, results of the study proved to be contradictory to the hypothesis. Compared 
with Montreal, the research site in Toronto featured a higher density and breadth of community 
services for young people, and black youth were more significantly engaged in daily after-school 
and weekend programs. Black youth were particularly well-represented at three sites in the 
Toronto neighborhood—one public, the other two non-profit—that were operating after-school 
activities during the week and on weekends. In Toronto, black youth described how they could to 
turn to local organizations to satisfy just about any need, whether it was for personal counseling, 
help writing a resume and applying for a job, participating in fun and leisurely activities with 
peers, getting professional training and internships, finding a summer camp, joining a sports 
team, receiving free tutoring and homework help, and working with an adult counsellor to write 
scholarship and college applications. In Montreal, opportunities for adolescents to build 
relationships with adult mentors and counselors were in shorter supply, as were services for 
academic support, college preparation, internships, and extra-curricular activities. In Toronto, 
black youth also said they felt well-surrounded and supported by caring adults and professionals, 
especially at the largest youth organization in the neighborhood, a Boys and Girls Club, where a 
large team of full-time youth workers was based, many of them black. A community worker at 
the Club described herself and her colleagues as “surrogate parents” for the youth, because they 
fulfilled a variety of roles in the daily lives of young people. In Montreal, black youth did not 
have the same number of community workers to turn to for support, guidance, and problem-
solving. In Montreal, services for adolescents and young adults were more scattered across the 





instance, youth employment services were available in one site, homework help for primary 
school children in another, while after-school recreational activities for high-school aged youth 
were spread across a handful of public and non-profit organizations. The most popular non-
school program in the Montreal site was recreation and male sports teams, which left young 
adolescent girls particularly underserved. A couple of non-profit organizations, including one 
black-led organization, had created after-school programs specifically geared to young women 
and girls. One of the most innovative projects in the Montreal site was a student newspaper, run 
by a community organization operating in the basement of a local high school. 
 Another important contrast between the two sites was in the language that governed local 
youth programs; in Toronto, the key words were youth development and engagement, while in 
Montreal, the major object of youth programs was the prevention of “street gangs.” Compared 
with Toronto, the strengths of Montreal’s system of service delivery resided in the comparatively 
dense number of daycare centers and the services for families, which bear a direct relationship 
with Quebec’s policies of universal child care and early childhood development. In Toronto, 
parents and local community workers complained of a dearth of services for local families. Due 
to the shortage of state-subsidized services in the Toronto site, parents had little other option than 
to turn to the more expensive private sector for daycare. 
A final and unexpected result of the study was the role of the local police, which was 
significantly more integrated into the local organizational scene in Montreal than Toronto. Due 
to the widely publicized controversies over racial profiling and the gang raids of the “Toronto 
Anti-Violence Strategy,” it was expected that black youth in Toronto would be more inclined to 
report problems with the police. That did not turn out to be the case. Indeed, a similar proportion 





police. In the Montreal site, the local police department was deeply involved in collaborations 
with service providers, including youth-centered organizations. In the Toronto site, police 
officers tended to be more removed and working in isolation from local organizations. The site 
chosen in Montreal was known for having developed a practice of “community policing” for 
some years, which would explain the police’s higher presence in community activities. Police 
officers in the Montreal site were even running independent after-school programs. One highly 
popular program run by a black police officer, a Boxing club, was closed under suspicious 
circumstances. After it closed, he and his white fellow police officer parted ways and established 
separate after-school programs in different parts of the neighborhood. Many young people in the 
neighborhood regretted that the Boxing Club had been closed and described the black police 
officer as someone who was well-liked and who was making a difference in their lives. In a 
separate qualitative study conducted on racial profiling and policing in the Montreal 
neighborhood, it was found that cases of discriminatory policing towards black youth remained 
high, despite the community policing (Livingstone et al. 2018). Results further showed that the 
policy on street gangs had aggravated racial profiling in the neighborhood, by reinforcing 
stereotypes of black male deviance and justifying an intensive degree of police presence in 
public spaces. A majority of the youth in the study had been stopped at least once by police 
officers, either for random questioning, identity checks, or minor infractions (Livingstone et al. 
2018). 
 The multiple contradictions observed between the two neighborhoods begged for further 
analysis. Therefore, a second phase of research was undertaken in which to understand why 
Ontario’s neo-liberal state had yielded a more robust system of youth services in the 





punitive and disciplinary set of policies towards black youth. A series of interviews was 
conducted in each province with politicians, legislators, bureaucrats, community organizations, 
and private foundations. In addition, archival data on the policy context were collected and 
analyzed. Three questions were formulated for Phase 2 of the study: 1) why did the two 
provinces embark on the policy change in 2006 and why were they both motivated to act in 
response to incidents of urban violence? 2) why did the two provinces opt for such contrasting 
solutions to the urban violence when the symptoms of the unrest were arguably similar? 3) why 
did the trajectory of the policy process deviate so sharply from the province’s established social 
policy regime? For each province, the analysis described in the present dissertation proceeds in 
two stages: it first describes the causes of the policy change in 2006, and then moves onto 
examining the reasons for the policy variations and contradictions. 
Findings from the second phase of the study revealed a number of intriguing similarities 
and differences between the two provinces. First, both provinces underwent a sudden reversal in 
policy in 2006 and, in both cases, it was due to highly-publicized outbursts of gun violence in 
which young black males were depicted as the prime perpetrators and victims. In 2006, the 
Ontario government broke with the history of neo-liberal cutbacks and introduced the Youth 
Opportunity Strategies, through which to increase the quantity and scope of after-school 
programs and improve employment and educational opportunities for low-income youth in 
Toronto and across the province. In Quebec in 2006, the provincial government opted for an 
entirely different solution and chose instead to concentrate on fighting “street gangs,” with the 
lion’s share of the resources going into law enforcement and youth detention.  
 To understand why the policy-making on the urban violence did not correspond with the 





process. It borrows from the literature on historical institutionalism, constructivism, and interest-
based and actor-centered explanations for policy change. Based on that literature, the dissertation 
arrives at two separate and related arguments. Similar to previous studies, it concludes that the 
policy changes in each province were born out of a convergence between exogenous events and 
political and organizational interests. In each case, highly-publicized and explosive incidents of 
gun violence in urban areas became “focusing events” that generated a moral panic over black 
male deviance and crime and raised the pressure on authorities to respond and reassure the public 
that they were taking immediate action. The second argument is that the policy divergence 
between Ontario and Quebec in 2006 reflects the interaction between the culture and structure of 
local political institutions and the interest groups and perspectives they empower and favor over 
others. In each province, an entirely different cast of characters, institutions, and networks came 
together in the mid-2000s to shape the course of the policy-making. The most important contrast 
lies in the degree to which black political actors were represented (or not) in the policy process. 
In Ontario, black grassroots coalitions and black Liberal politicians played leading roles in 
advocating for policies that would address poverty, racism, unemployment, and the dearth of 
community services in low-income neighborhoods in Toronto. The combination of Ontario’s 
tradition of multiculturalism, decentralization in policy-making, a history of anti-racism 
organizing in Toronto, and black political representation in the Liberal party had long created 
openings for black political actors to intervene in policy debates and lobby authorities to 
implement race-conscious policies. In Quebec, black political mobilization and representation 
remains relatively low. Instead, police chiefs acted as the primary policy entrepreneurs in the 
mid-2000s and lobbied successfully for a crime-fighting agenda on “street gangs,” by which to 





neighborhoods, re-assert its control in the face of resistance from local youth, and appease the 
public’s anxieties about security. For reasons that are not fully understood, black community 
organizations in Montreal were excluded from deliberations over the policy on street gangs 
throughout its roughly 10-year existence, starting with Phase 1 of the plan in 2006 and into Phase 
2, which began in 2010 and ended in 2014. The dissertation posits that the structures of sub-state 
nationalism, corporatism, and centralization in Quebec have together inhibited black political 
mobilization and coalition-building in Montreal. Thus, the dissertation argues that the most 
important determinant of the policy process on the urban violence was not the province’s social 
policy regime, but rather its tradition of race policy. As the dissertation will explain in the 
chapters that follow, the racial politics and policies of the provincial government predicted 
whether or not a race-conscious approach to the violence was given consideration, and how and 
to what extent black political actors could participate in, and influence, the policy process.  
While the findings of the study are consistent with comparative studies of race policies 
around the world, they upset the standard conclusions of the Canadian literature on the social 
policy regimes of Quebec and Ontario. Previous comparisons of Quebec and Ontario have 
concluded that Quebec’s left-ward turn in 1996 was the result of a convergence between sub-
state nationalism, a tradition of corporatism, and the vibrancy and power of left-wing social 
movements in the province (Béland and Lecours 2011; Dufour 2004; Haddow 2015; Noël 2013). 
The dissertation proposes that these are precisely the same factors that have inhibited progress on 
race policy in the province. Quebec’s long-running nationalism movement has kept discussions 
of racial inequality and racism confined to debates about the preservation of the province’s 
French language and culture. As a result, race and ethnicity are presumed to be proxies for 





civic and ethnic vision of nationalism in Quebec has also impeded a constructive dialogue from 
taking place on the subject of racial inequality, as it perpetuates a seemingly intractable divide 
between the interests of the province’s white Francophone majority and racial minorities and 
immigrants, who are presumed to lie outside the boundaries of Quebec’s traditional community. 
Compared with Ontario, public policy in Quebec has yet to fully acknowledge racial and ethnic 
diversity as constitutive of the society rather than a trait of immigrants and “cultural outsiders.”  
One of the prime explanations for Quebec’s more progressive social policies compared 
with Ontario focuses on the province’s unique system of interest representation and the cross-
class coalitions it has facilitated between nationalist politicians, business, unions, and social 
movements (Haddow 2015; Noël 2013; White 2012). What these accounts overlook, however, 
are the realities of racial diversity and inequality in the province; as a result, they underestimate 
the weaknesses of Quebec’s system of corporatism and state-civil society relations in 
representing the needs and perspectives of disadvantaged groups.  
The dissertation concludes that the structures of multiculturalism, decentralization, and 
racial minority political representation in Ontario have produced a more favorable setting for 
race-conscious policies than in Quebec. In Ontario, the political discourse has evolved through a 
constant, often conflictual, yet arguably productive dialogue between concepts of 
multiculturalism, race relations, and anti-racism. Longstanding multi-racial movements for social 
justice in Toronto have stretched the boundaries of traditional policy by exposing the limits of 
multiculturalism and forcing the state to acknowledge the centrality of power, racism, and 
institutional processes in the reproduction of racial inequality. The establishment in 2017 of a 
new Anti-Racism Directorate in Ontario is the fruit of a long struggle waged by black grassroots 






Findings of the study are consistent with previous comparative analyses of race policy in 
the United States and Europe. Research has shown there is generally no inherent or linear 
relationship between the social policies of the state and its positions on racial inequality and 
racism. Indeed, the two domains of policy are frequently contradictory and inconsistent. This is 
illustrated in the variations between the United States, France, and Britain (Lieberman 2005). 
Lieberman (2005) shows that the United States has gone farther than any other western country 
in enacting race-conscious policies, because of the decentralization in policy-making which has 
allowed the federated network of black civil rights organizations to intervene at different points 
in the policy process and move legislation on affirmative action forward. In contrast, the 
centralized states of France and Britain have stayed relatively immune to outside influences and 
produced less far-reaching race policies, despite their stronger social safety nets. One could 
easily draw a similar comparison between Ontario’s decentralized and Liberal welfare state and 
Quebec’s more centralized political system and social democratic underpinnings. 
The present dissertation sets out to describe and explain the contradictions in the policy 
trajectories of Quebec and Ontario in 2006, using the data from Phase 2 of the study. Findings 
from Phase 1 of the study are briefly presented. Future publications will discuss those results in 
more detail. In the section that follows, the chapter reviews the empirical literature and 
conceptual schools of thought that were relied upon to form the analysis for the present 
dissertation. It pays particular attention to the body of work on historical institutionalism, 
constructivism, and actor and interest-based explanations for policy change. The chapter ends by 










 Policy change that is dramatic and sudden tends to be rare in the real world. In most 
cases, policy change occurs gradually over time and arises out of a convergence of multiple 
influences and a long-drawn out process of debate, negotiation, and conflict in which competing 
groups of political actors vie for control. When a sudden policy change does arise, it is usually 
prompted by some external shock or disruption to the system that upsets the status quo and 
compels actors to look for alternative solutions. Kingdon (1995) coined the term “focusing 
events” to refer to any abrupt, unpredictable, dramatic, and relatively rare event that raises 
concern about an issue that causes profound harm, or has the potential to cause harm, and 
subsequently casts a glare on the deficiencies of existing policy (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993; 
Birkland 1998; Kingdon,1995). A focusing event may be anything from an economic recession, 
an environmental disaster, a tragic accident, or a powerful political symbol that catapults an issue 
onto the top of the media headlines and the government’s priority list. While focusing events are 
not usually powerful enough on their own to stimulate policy change, they can alter the locus of 
political attention and propel action onto a problem that would otherwise go ignored (Kingdon 
1995). Focusing events create what Kingdon (1995) calls a “policy window” for advocates to 
push for their preferred policy proposal. As policy windows remain temporary, policy 
entrepreneurs must immediately seize the moment before the crisis fades from view.  
Generally speaking, a focusing event will only lead to policy change once it is joined 





put under consideration (Kingdon 1995). Ideas must be floating around that policy entrepreneurs 
can tap into and develop. Policy entrepreneurs might either turn to legislation that is under 
discussion or has been lying dormant for years due to a lack of political will, or they may turn to 
outside experts for advice, such as think tanks, interest groups, policy communities, and 
advocacy coalitions. In his theory, Kingdon (1995) proposes that policy change arises out of the 
joining of three distinct and inter-dependent streams: a) a problem stream (often, though not 
always, prompted by a focusing event); b) a policy stream (i.e., an existing set of ideas, solutions, 
and policy proposals), and; c) a politics stream (i.e., the individuals or groups of actors who 
come on the scene to push for a particular choice of policy). Kingdon’s (1995) theory offers a 
compelling explanation for understanding why and under what circumstances policy change 
happens suddenly and unexpectedly, as it did in Ontario and Quebec in 2006. Other well-known 
theories of policy change, namely Punctuated Equilibrium (Baumgartner and Jones 1993) and 
the Advocacy Coalition Framework (Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier 1994), are better at explaining 
change that is gradual, rather than abrupt. 
 In an article on the city of Toronto, Thompson and Wallner (2011) discuss the 
significance of the shooting death of a high school student in 2007 as a “focusing event” that 
created a policy window for local activists to advocate for an Afro-centric school, an idea that 
had been relegated to the back burner because of its failure to garner enough support. Thompson 
and Wallner (2011) argue that the death of Jordan Manners in 2007 sparked a policy debate in 
Toronto that turned the attention onto multiple and related issues of school safety, delinquency, 
and black students’ higher school dropout rates. In the midst of that climate, the Toronto District 
School Board launched a public inquiry into Afro-centric schooling and black community 





the School Board narrowly approved a bill for a three-year pilot project to establish an Afro-
centric school (Thompson and Wallner 2011; Thompson and Thompson 2008). 
Political crises often function to precipitate path-breaking and dramatic changes in social 
policy. In the United States, for example, the most ambitious period of growth and innovation in 
urban policy in 1960s coincided with the eruption of civil unrest across urban areas of the 
country. Media coverage of riots and black neighborhoods exploding in flames grabbed the 
attention of the public and focused attention on the dire problems of urban poverty and racial 
injustice (Baumgartner and Jones 1993). The Johnson administration responded to the unrest by 
asserting that the federal government had an obligation to fix the causes of urban discontent and 
improve living conditions for city residents. Out of this crisis moment came the ground-breaking 
legislation for the War on Poverty, model cities, subsidized housing, urban transportation, 




 In the scholarly literature, one of the major interpretive frameworks for understanding 
and explaining policy change, persistence, and variation is “historical institutionalism.” The term 
“institution” is used broadly to define “formal organizations and informal rules and procedures” 
that govern main political activities; this includes, though is not limited to, political parties, 
electoral rules, government bureaucracies, and unions (Steinmo, Thelen, and Longstreth 1992: 
2). Institutions affect policy-making in a variety of ways: a) they regulate the channels by which 
policies are debated, considered, and enacted; b) they affect how groups come to define and 





of the intellectual and conceptual debate over policy problems, and; d) they determine the 
likelihood that one solution (or idea) will be favored over others. In essence, institutions regulate 
the balance of power between competing groups of actors, organizations, and coalitions. 
Whether a policy proposal succeeds or fails will depend on the outcomes of the ideological and 
political struggle fought by competing coalitions of actors located within and outside the state 
(Steinmo et al. 1992). 
Generally speaking, institutions impose constraints on the possibilities for, and scope of, 
policy change; however, they can also be catalysts for reform. Due to their inherent bias towards 
stability and standardization, institutions generally constrict the possibilities for innovation and 
lead reforms down predictable paths. At the same time, institutions can create opportunities for 
actors to voice their interests and lobby legislators to accept a new version of facts and solutions 
(Immergut 1998). In her analysis of employment policy in the United States, Weir (1992) claims 
it has always represented a form “bounded innovation,” and largely because of the power of 
business lobbies who have been opposed to any policy that is not market-friendly. Thus, policy 
change necessarily always involves a compromise between the forces of resistance and change.  
The theory of historical institutionalism has been particularly useful in explaining the 
surprising persistence of European welfare states in the face of globalization, growing economic 
insecurity, and neo-liberalism (Immergut 1998; Pierson 2001). Cross-national studies have 
shown that the extent and form of welfare retrenchment in Europe has varied depending on the 
nature of the political institutions of the country and the relative power of interest groups. Even 
though the power of left parties and unions has declined, new groups of lobbies have been 
formed by beneficiaries of the welfare state—pensioners, the disabled, and health care users—





France, and Germany the institutional legacies of the welfare state have produced “lock-in” 
effects that systematically prevent any dramatic re-ordering of the welfare state from taking 
place, unless it is agreed upon by unions, business, and beneficiaries (Pierson 2001).  
 In research on race policy in the US, much has been written about the role of 
decentralization in policy-making in creating opportunities for state and non-state actors to enter 
into and influence the policy process. Depending on the circumstances, federalism has worked 
either to promote or impede change. When the New Deal was being written in the 1930s, 
politicians in the southern US demanded that the Social Security Act exclude agricultural 
employees and domestic workers, because these were jobs held primarily by African-Americans. 
Southern politicians feared the Act would loosen their grip on black labor by granting new 
freedoms to African-American workers. The Southern states wielded such enormous influence 
over the negotiations for the New Deal that the Act would not have passed had the labor 
restrictions not been approved (Lieberman 1995). When the balance of forces shifted in the post-
war period, the same structure of federalism gave civil rights activists and reformist politicians 
the opportunity to lobby for new race-based legislation. The ground-breaking civil rights statutes, 
including the Civil Rights Act, the Voting Rights Act, and affirmative action, would not have 
come about had it not been for the pressure brought to bear on the federal government by civil 
rights organizations, black politicians, and their Liberal allies in government (McAdam 1982).  
 An essential factor to consider in studying institutions is not just the way they reproduce 
and regulate class conflicts, but also how they shape racial and gender inequalities and power 
struggles. In one study, Hawkesworth (2003) presents an inside look at how processes of racial 
and gender discrimination in the US Congress create substantial obstacles for women of color to 





passed, because of the lack of support or outright opposition from their more numerous male 
colleagues. When repeal of the “Temporary Assistance to Needy Families” (TANF) was being 
debated in 1996, black women and other women of color in Congress mounted a well-organized 
effort to stop the legislation from being terminated. When the repeal was eventually voted in, 
these women turned their attention towards getting provisions approved that would have eased 
the transition for women to move from welfare to full-time work, for example, by making 
subsidized childcare and professional training available to recipients. These provisions were 
ultimately rejected, as the coalition was unable to persuade the majority of Democratic and 
Republican party members who were in favor of the repeal (Hawkesworth 2003). 
  Research shows that racial and gender representation in politics has variable effects on 
the pathways of policy change. Studies of state-level politics in the US have found that the 
passage of legislation geared towards under-represented and marginalized groups—be it women, 
racial and ethnic minorities, the disabled, or members of the LBGTQ community—is greater 
where these groups have allies in positions of power. Quantitative studies have found a 
significant positive relationship between the percentage of African-American in legislative 
positions and the odds a policy will be passed that is favorable to African-American voters 
(Griffin 2011; Preuhs 2006; Thomas 1991). Compared with their white colleagues, African-
American politicians are more inclined to vote for policies that are popular among black voters 
(Bratton, Haynie, and Reingold 2006; Griffin 2014). Similar findings emerge when gender is 
examined (Thomas 1991). Female legislators are more likely than males to initiate and vote for 








The constructivist perspective on public policy has emerged and developed partly in 
response to the limitations of historical institutionalism in explaining the causes of policy change 
and in accounting for the impact of ideas in the policy-making process. For the constructivist, 
ideas bear an independent impact on the policy process (Béland and Cox 2011). Any substantive 
change in policy, especially one that is sudden rather than incremental, necessarily involves a 
shift in ideas or perspective on a given issue or policy (Béland 2009; Berman 2001). By 
examining the role of ideas in the policy process, it is possible to gain a more complete grasp of 
why change occurs in the first place, why it takes one direction and not another, and how policies 
move from the stage of conception, to design, and adoption (Béland and Cox 2011; Berman 
2001). It is also crucial to note that even while ideas are often associated with a change in policy, 
they can also serve as constraints. The ideas that are dominant within an institution, group, or 
society, for example, may lend some schemes more legitimacy and value than others, while 
limiting the range of policy options put under consideration (Béland 2009). 
In the constructivist perspective, policy-making is viewed as an entirely socially 
constructed process; nothing exists “out there” in the real world that is not bound by cultural and 
social conventions. As Hay (2011) articulates, even actors’ self-interests are perceptions of 
interests, rather than purely objective and widely-agreed upon facts. Political actors may also be 
influenced by non-material interests and values. For instance, actors may possess non-economic 
beliefs (e.g., socialist, conservative, and religious fundamentalist) that trump or come into 
conflict with their economic status (e.g., factory worker, teacher, farmer). Like institutions, ideas 





discourse and set of cultural beliefs (e.g., equality, liberalism, or socialism), to more specific and 
narrow programmatic concepts and strategies (e.g., anti-poverty and employment) (Béland 
2009). In the literature, ideas have been variously defined as policy paradigms, policy narratives, 
frames, repertoires, programmatic ideas, and discourses (Berman 2013; Boswell, Geddes, and 
Scholten 2011; Campbell 2002). In the current study, the word “idea” is a broad term that 
encompasses broad-based ideologies (i.e., inter-culturalism and nationalism in Quebec versus 
multiculturalism in Ontario), cultural and technical constructs for social problems (urban 
violence and poverty), and policy prescriptions (enforcement versus prevention). 
 Cross-national studies of European welfare states have found that differences in cultural 
beliefs about the role families vis-à-vis the state can partly explain the variations in the extent of 
income redistribution (Esping-Andersen 1990). In social democratic Scandinavia, child care and 
maternity leave policies have grown out of a belief that the state bears a responsibility for the 
care and well-being of families (Campbell 2002). In corporatist Germany, such policies have not 
emerged, due to the belief that families can take care of their own needs. In a cross-national 
study of immigration policies, Favell (1998) proposes the concept of “philosophies of 
integration” to explain why Britain and France have adopted contrasting immigration regimes. 
The color-blind policies of France are consistent with the country’s Republican philosophy, in 
which immigrants are expected to assimilate national ideals of citizenship and set aside their 
particular ethnic and cultural identities, be they religious or other (Lépinard 2014). In Britain, in 
contrast, a policy of multiculturalism and minority rights protection was easily imported from the 
United States, because it was seen as compatible with the country’s tradition of Liberalism. 
In more practical terms, ideas may take the form of “road maps” or blueprints that policy-





In a seminal article, Hall (1993) contends that the shift from Keynesianism to monetarism in 
Britain in the 1970s was spawned by a period of “social learning” in which monetarism appeared 
to be the only practical solution to the financial difficulties of the period. The 1970 era of 
economic instability, rising inflation, and economic stagnation raised doubts about the 
effectiveness of Keynesianism. Monetarism “became the principal challenger to Keynesian 
doctrine, in significant part because it was the most coherent and plausible alternative at the time 
(Hall 1993: 286). In analyzing the trajectory of race policies in Britain and France, Bleich (2003) 
claims the two countries have maintained their distinct paths over decades, because national 
ideals about race and citizenship have become “cognitive frames” that policy-makers and 
bureaucrats rely on to resolve everyday problems of discrimination and anti-discrimination. The 
author claims the cognitive frame in France is color-blind and assimilationist, while in Britain it 
is more explicitly race-conscious (Bleich 2003). Finally, ideas may function as “discursive 
frames” that political actors use to advocate for, legitimate, make palatable, or even discredit 
specific policies (Béland and Cox 2011). In Canada and the United States, politicians have 
stirred opposition to the welfare state by employing discursive frames that paint welfare as a 
system rife with abuses and liable to create a culture of dependency and aversion to work. 
  
Actors, Groups, and Networks 
 
  For policy-making to take effect, and for institutions and ideas to have any influence, 
they must be led by people. As Béland and Cox (2011: 2) articulate, “there is no politics without 
human agency.” The policy-making process typically attracts and involves networks of 





concern with an issue of policy. Among state actors, the most influential groups are ministers 
and bureaucrats, with legislators (particularly in parliamentary systems) playing a secondary role 
(Howlett, Ramesh, and Perl 2009). As indicated earlier, a policy proposal often gains traction 
once it is championed by a “policy entrepreneur” (Berman 2003). Policy entrepreneurs “could be 
in or out of government, in elected or appointed positions, in interest groups or research 
organizations.” Their defining characteristic “is their willingness to invest their resources – time, 
energy, reputation, and sometimes money – in the hope of a future return” (Kingdon 1995: 122).  
   In designing policy, state agencies will often listen to and follow the advice of non-state 
actors, which may include think tanks, academics, professional associations, business lobbies, 
unions, social movements, foundations, and non-profit organizations. Exchanges between the 
state and non-state actors may occur spontaneously or haphazardly, as when legislators react to 
the pressure of social movements; it can also take place through more organized channels, such 
as in the form of state-sponsored expert committees, scientific investigations, and conferences 
(Dobrowolsky and Saint-Martin 2005; Hudson and Graefe 2001; Scholten and Timmermans 
2020; Scott, Hopkins, Newman and McLaughlin 2006). Dobrowolsky and Saint-Martin (2003) 
describe how national authorities in Britain and Canada reformed policies on child poverty in 
consultation with local think tanks, private foundations, and NGOs. Unlike Canada, however, 
women’s groups in Britain were more successful in persuading the government to integrate the 
needs of women into the policy, whereas in Canada, these groups were ignored and kept out of 
the policy process. Dobrowolsky and Saint-Martin (2003) conclude that non-profit organizations 
in Britain were more influential because of their closer and more cooperative relationships with 





  A variety of terms have been proposed to capture the forms of informal and formal 
communication that happen between the state and non-state actors such as, policy network, 
policy communities, issue networks, policy sub-systems, advocacy coalition, and epistemic 
communities (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; John 2012; Marsh and Rhodes 1992; Sabatier and 
Weible 2007). Despite the variation in labels, there seems to be a general agreement in the 
literature that a “policy network”—to use the generic term—usually forms around a particular 
issue or sub-area of policy, be it child poverty, agriculture, energy, housing, transportation, or 
health. Within a sub-area, the members of the network may cooperate loosely and informally, 
forming what some have called an “issue network.” In an issue network, members may share a 
common interest in an issue, though not necessarily the same view on the policy goals or 
strategies (Rhodes 2006). Alternatively, a policy network may also operate as a tightly-integrated 
group of actors, who interact regularly in a “policy community” or “advocacy coalition” and 
agree on the goals and methods to pursue (Sabatier and Weible 2007). Networks of academics, 
or “epistemic communities,” may also exert an influence on policy and behave in ways that 
either advance or deviate from the state’s position (Scholten and Timmermans 2010).  
 
Organization of Chapters  
 
 The next chapter of the dissertation moves into the methodology for the study. It 
describes in detail the research questions and techniques that were developed for Phase 1 and 2 
of the study. Chapter Three presents an analytical overview of the policy process in Ontario 
during 2005 and 2006, and offers a series of explanations for the timing of the policy change and 





policy change in that province in 2006, in addition to the factors that bore a direct and indirect 
impact on the policy design. In Chapter Five, the findings from the two provinces are blended 
together and compared. The chapter provides an explanatory frame for understanding the policy 
divergence between the two provinces; it focuses attention on the role of local political 
institutions, ideas, interest groups, and social movements in influencing the Ontario government 
to embrace a race-conscious policy and in driving authorities in Quebec to adopt a color-blind 
solution that ignored racial inequality and racism. Chapter Five makes the theoretical and 
empirical argument that the main factor that distinguishes Ontario from Quebec is the role of 
black political actors in the policy process. As the dissertation will show, black political actors 
were mobilized into coalitions in the early 2000s that lobbied energetically for a structural 
solution to the violence, one that would deal with poverty, inequality, racial discrimination, and 
government cuts to social programs. In Montreal, black political actors were neither visible nor 
mobilized during the policy process. Instead, policy chiefs took the driver’s seat and advocated 
for a crime-fighting agenda targeting “street gangs.” The dissertation offers some tentative 
explanations for the discrepancies in black political mobilization across the two provinces. 






Chapter 2: Methodology 
  
The methodology for the dissertation combines an in-depth study of two comparable low-
income neighborhoods with an analysis of the policy process that took place in response to the 
urban violence in Quebec and Ontario. In Quebec, the period under study stretches from 2004 to 
2006, and in Ontario it covers a slightly shorter time span, from 2005 to 2006. Each component 
of study was assigned its own research questions, methods, and analytical frames. Phase 1 
concentrated on the organizational context of low-income neighborhoods and the participation of 
black youth in two carefully selected settings across the two provinces. Phase 2 looks back to the 
period of the mid-2000s and explores the factors that caused the policy change to occur in each 
province and why it took the specific direction that it did, culminating in the Youth Opportunities 
Strategy in Ontario and the Street Gang Intervention in Quebec (or the “Plan d’intervention sur 
les gangs de rue” in French). For simplicity, the terms youth strategy or youth policy are 
employed in the dissertation to refer to the Youth Opportunities Strategy of Ontario. For Quebec, 
the terminology moves between Street Gang Intervention and street gang policy. 
  
Phase 1: The Neighborhood Comparison 
 
Phase one of the study consisted of a qualitative analysis of the organizational context of 
low-income urban neighborhoods in Ontario and Quebec, specifically in Montreal and Toronto, 
where most black Canadians reside. For a number of years, black community leaders in Toronto 
had been expressing concerns about the disastrous effects of rising poverty and cutbacks to social 





Liberal and left-leaning observers, the crisis of urban violence was seen as a direct result of the 
neo-liberal assault on the welfare state in Ontario during the 1990s, which had exacerbated an 
already serious problem of spiraling income inequality and poverty in Toronto. Using the 
literature on welfare states as a point of departure, the study sought to evaluate the claim that 
Ontario’s rollback of social programs had worsened circumstances for black youth and caused 
the crisis of violence. It did so by comparing the province of Ontario with Quebec, where the 
welfare state had grown rather than contracted during the 1990s. By matching one low-income 
neighborhood in Toronto with a similar one in Montreal, the goal was to assess the effects of one 
system where social provision has become sparse and one where it remains robust. 
At the outset, the neighborhood case studies were designed to answer the following three 
basic questions: 1) how do local institutions and organizations shape the well-being and social 
integration of young black males in late adolescence (15-19 years) who reside in low-income 
neighborhoods?; 2) to what extent do local systems of social provision attenuate or accentuate 
the consequences of racial inequality and poverty for black youth?; 3) how do neighborhood 
institutions and organizations influence general patterns of youth participation and integration in 
the neighborhoods? In general, the aim was to document and examine the full panoply of 
institutional and organizational resources in the neighborhood and the ways by which they reach 
and engage black families and young people. Knowing the troubled history of police relations 
with black youth in Montreal and Toronto, the study sought to explore black youths’ 
relationships not only with social services, but also with law enforcement in the neighborhoods. 
The methodology for the neighborhood study consisted of observations and qualitative 
interviews with youth, parents, and local institutions and organizations. The fieldwork was 





organizational dynamics of the two neighborhoods. The 12 months were to be divided into six 
months within each site, though delays in the start-up phase in Montreal in September 2014 
forced the time in Toronto to be cut short by a month. The research took place in Montreal 
between September 2014 and March 2015, and in Toronto from April to August 2015. In each 
setting, the first three to four weeks were spent getting acquainted with the neighborhood and the 
organizations, and meeting and interacting with young people in after-school programs. In both 
sites, it took some time and effort to find and recruit young black males willing and interested to 
participate in interviews. Participants were gradually recruited over a period of three to four 
months in each neighborhood. The original goal was to interview each young person twice over 
the twelve months; however, this was only feasible in the Montreal site. In the Toronto site, the 
second interviews were cancelled due to time constraints. When the research began in Toronto in 
April, only five months remained for the fieldwork. In the Montreal site, a research assistant 
hired for the study carried out the second interviews in the spring and summer of 2015, while I 
undertook the fieldwork in Toronto. A research assistant was also hired to do the youth 
interviews in Toronto, and he completed them on his own. It so happened the research assistant 
in Toronto was a fellow PhD student who had been leading a qualitative study on young black 
males in the city. The research assistant in Montreal had recently graduated with a Bachelor’s 
degree and was working for community organizations when he was recruited. Due to his relative 
inexperience in qualitative interviewing, the research assistant in Montreal was given some basic 
training and participated in and observed the interviews in the first wave before taking over the 
responsibility of holding the second interviews on his own. Black males were purposely hired to 
assist with the interviews because of the belief that black male adolescents would feel more at 





interviews with male youth, while my research assistant took care of the other half. In Toronto, 
the research assistant was responsible for the full set of youth interviews, while I handled the 




To examine the significance of the province’s social policy regime in shaping the 
organizational make-up of low-income neighborhoods, the study sites were chosen to reflect the 
systemic variations known to exist between Ontario and Quebec. In other words, the 
neighborhood in Toronto exhibited a low density of community-based organizations, whereas the 
site in Montreal possessed a relatively high density of institutions and organizations. In every 
other respect, the two neighborhoods were selected be as close as possible, starting with their 
socio-economic and demographic characteristics. By varying the level of organizational density, 
while keeping other factors equal, the assumption was that it would be easier to isolate the 
precise impact of neighborhood organizational density on the lives of young people, and to rule 
out (or at least minimize) the possibility of competing explanations. As Zussman (2004) has 
suggested, in small-n comparative studies one may select two or more cases that embody the 
hypothesized mechanisms in sharp relief: in this case, the density of local organizations. By 
employing this approach, one might more confidently assess if (or how) a study’s theoretical 
assumptions play out in real-life settings or if they are contradicted, and altered, by the evidence. 
It must be noted that certain fundamental differences between the two sites could not be 
overcome, most importantly, language. The province of Ontario is a primarily English-speaking 





two provinces partly explain the variations in their social policy regimes, as Chapter Five will 
explain. Despite this, the linguistic profile of the provinces does affect the composition of the 
local black population. Naturally, French-speaking black immigrants have tended to settle in 
Quebec, whereas English-speaking immigrants prefer Ontario. Due to the French language, 
Quebec attracts a larger share of immigrants from North Africa compared with Ontario. In 
addition, Ontario is home to older generations of black Canadians, among whom we find the 
descendants of African-Americans who fled the United States on the underground railroad.  
Table 1 summarizes the key demographic and socio-economic characteristics of the two 
neighborhoods. For the purposes of the study, the two neighborhoods had to have comparable 
proportions of black households. In the Toronto site, the percentage of black residents came to 
23%, while in the Montreal site it reached 32%. As a group, blacks constitute around 7% of 
Toronto’s population in 2006, whereas in Montreal it falls to 3%. In Toronto, several 
neighborhoods are home to significant proportions of black households and any one of them 
could have been suitable for the study. In Montreal, on the other hand, only two neighborhoods 
in the city possess equally large percentages of black residents. The one neighborhood out of the 
two that was selected for the study exhibited a higher density of local organizations and 
institutions. In addition to their racial diversity, the two neighborhoods were selected to have 
matching levels of low income. In Toronto, 30% of the population in the neighborhood was 
living below the “Low-Income Cut-Off” (LICO) of Statistics Canada; in the Montreal site, the 
percentage was 35%. It must be noted that the data below were obtained from local organizations 
and derived from the National Household Survey (NHS) of 2011. In the scientific community, 
concerns remain about the under-sampling in the NHS of First Nations, racial and ethnic 






Table 1: Demographic Profile of the Neighborhoods 
 Toronto site  Montreal site 
Persons below the Low-
Income Cut-Off (LICO)  
30% 35% 
Lone-parents 20% 43% 
Black residents 23% 32% (approx. 17,565) 
Racial minorities 62% 71% 
Immigrant-born 51% 49% 
Unemployment 14% 16% 
Education 22% without high school 35% without high school 
Total pop 23,042 54, 210 
Source: 2011 Canadian Census. 
 
As Table 1 reveals, the proportions of immigrants and racial minorities across the two 
sites were fairly equal. The extent of racial and ethnic diversity was especially pronounced in the 
Toronto site. In the Montreal site, the majority of black residents belonged to the first- and 
second-generation of the Haitian diaspora, the province’s largest group of black immigrants. 
African immigrants had slowly been trickling into the neighborhood, yet remained less 
numerous. Prior to the arrival of Haitian immigrants, the neighborhood had long been an enclave 
of the Italian-Canadian community, and its presence remains visible to this day. In more recent 
years, the percentage of immigrants from North Africa, South and East Asia, and Latin America 





than in Montreal; it included immigrants from English and French-speaking Africa and the 
Caribbean (i.e., Jamaica, Guyana, Trinidad and Tobago), and a small number of native-born 
blacks. The rest of the population was even more culturally and ethnically diverse. It included a 
community of First Nations Canadians, many white Canadians, in addition to immigrants from 
countries and regions around the globe such as, the Philippines, Middle East, India, Pakistan, 
Bangladesh, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, China, and Eastern and Western Europe. In Montreal and 
Toronto, the racial and ethnic groups appeared to be living peaceably together, although inter-
racial conflicts (while rare) were known to have flared up between high school students. 
As indicated above, the organizational density of the two site sites was matched to fit the 
study’s hypothesis about welfare states. Given Quebec’s larger welfare state, the Montreal site 
was endowed with a higher density of community services than the Toronto site. The Toronto 
site was situated in what are called the “inner suburbs” of the city, known for their high levels of 
poverty, concentrations of racial minorities and recent immigrants, and weak social service 
infrastructure. When the inner suburbs were built in the post-war period, they were expected to 
serve as “bedroom communities” for working-class and middle-class homeowners who would 
commute by car to and from work. As the cost of living in central Toronto has risen, an 
increasing number of low-income households have moved into the area, attracted by the lower 
cost of rent in the high-rise apartment complexes. The neighborhood selected for the study had 
several of these low and high-rise apartment complexes. A number of these complexes have been 
converted into subsidized housing, managed by the Toronto Community Housing. Indeed, 
reports indicated the Toronto site had the highest density of low-income public housing across 
the entire city. Despite their high levels of low income, the inner suburbs remain physically 





Public transportation has been a major source of complaint, because of the long commutes and 
multiple buses residents must take to get to and from work (Cowen and Parlette 2011).  
At the time of the study, the site in Toronto had about a dozen public and non-profit 
organizations that were open daily, visible from the street, and involved in a variety of activities 
and services. Many other agencies from outside the neighborhood would conduct “satellite” 
services on a part-time basis at one of the main non-profit agencies, which had become known as 
the neighborhood’s local “hub.” Given the neighborhood’s recent influx of low-income renters, it 
was only in the 1990s that community organizations and public agencies began to establish 
themselves in the neighborhood, after a team of public health workers and nurses came together 
and scrambled to meet the pressing needs of a refugee community that had been forced to settle 
in a local motel. The plans for the “hub” arose at that time, and the idea was that it would be 
simpler to create one central location where residents could access a variety of services, and 
where public and non-profit agencies could hold activities in the neighborhood without having to 
move their operations or invest in costly rents and the maintenance of premises.  
In the Montreal neighborhood, around 60 public and non-profit organizations existed, 
including several of the state-run universal programs such as, the “Centre Jeunesse Emploi” 
(CJE), the “Centre Local d’Emploi” (CLE), a community clinic, and recreation centers. In 
addition, many of these services had been in operation for some time. For example, one of the 
longest-running black organizations in the neighborhood had been in place since the 1970s. 
Despite their unequal levels of organizational density, the two sites were both reputed in 
their respective cities for being neighborhoods where local organizations were doing an 
exceptional job of cooperating together, despite the increasing pressure to compete for funding. 





acquired a reputation for being a place where local leaders demonstrated an exemplary capacity 
for cooperation, creativity and innovation. For these reasons, it was assumed that the two sites 
would be appropriate examples for comparison, because one could expect that local leaders in 
each neighborhood would have a particular talent for attracting funding and staying at the 
leading edge of policy. In other words, if one were to look for evidence where public policy is 
being implemented as intended, it would be in these neighborhoods rather than in others. 
Another criteria for the site selection was the neighborhood’s history with incidences of 
violence and homicides. Media reports indicated the research sites in Montreal and Toronto had 
both been struck by outbreaks of gun violence in the pivotal year of 2005. In Toronto, the study 
site was one of four neighborhoods that became the focal point for the controversial “Toronto 
Anti-Violence Strategy” in 2005. Residents recalled a period in the 2000s decade when the 
neighborhood was ravaged by conflicts between rival criminal networks. In Montreal, the site 
was also the focal point for the implementation of the anti-gang squads of the Street Gang 
Intervention in 2005. Over the years, the neighborhood had gained a reputation for being the 
scene of older and established crime networks and a new generation of youth gangs. 
 Several differences between the two research sites are worth noting. First, their 
population sizes were uneven. The population in the Montreal site was a nearly double the size 
of Toronto’s. Secondly, the geographic spread of the Montreal site was larger compared with 
Toronto. Finally, the cultural histories of the neighborhoods were quite unique. The 
neighborhood in Montreal had acquired a distinct identity of its own, built over generations and 
succeeding waves of new immigrants. In Toronto, the neighborhood boundaries were established 
by the City of Toronto as early as 2012. In informal conversations, residents often did not know 





and boundaries for the neighborhood after an outbreak of gun violence in 2012 that took the lives 
of two young bystanders. The neighborhood was created out of the merger of several low-
income tracts in the area, which were then set apart from the more affluent residential areas on 
the outskirts. Once the new neighborhood was formed, it became part of the City’s network of 




 Once the neighborhoods for the study were chosen, the next step was to find community 
organizations willing to accommodate a researcher. In each site, a partnership was formed with 
two different organizations: a youth-serving organization and a multi-purpose organization with 
services and activities for adults, children, and youth. Approval for the research was obtained 
from the directors of the four organizations and each one signed a consent form.  
Through the five months of fieldwork, the data collection involved spending time in the 
agencies, usually for 2 or more hours at a time, helping with a variety of activities such as, team 
meetings, supervision of after-school programs, and the planning and coordination of events. My 
volunteering activities were more intensive at the youth organizations than the multi-purpose 
agencies. At the site in Toronto, the manager of adolescent programs asked if I would assist him 
and his team in developing an evaluation framework, which I happily agreed to do. In the 
Montreal site, I voluntarily organized two teams of students in the local high school to write 
articles for the student newspaper. The youth organization where I was volunteering operated an 
after-school program in the basement of the high school. It had also obtained funding from the 





we formed two groups of students to work on two articles covering different subjects. The 
groups ended up being segregated by gender, because the students preferred to work with their 
friends. The all-female team worked on an article describing the contributions of Haitian 
professionals to community development in the neighborhood, which drew on interviews with 
key informants that the students organized together with the research assistant. The all-male team 
wrote an article revolving around the local vernacular of youth, in which words and expressions 
in Haitian creole, French, and other languages (i.e., Arabic, Spanish) are interspersed. In return 
for their participation in the student newspaper, the students received school credits.  
As indicated, the sources of data for the study included observations and semi-structured 
interviews, in addition to many informal conversations. The semi-structured interviews were 
organized with four main groups in mind: black male youth, their parents, public service 
employees (including school personnel, public health workers, and police officers), and non-
profit workers in each site. Each one of the interviews was tape-recorded, once the respondent 
had granted his or her consent. Otherwise, the data from observations and conversations were 
recorded in a notebook.  
 The original goal was to hold up to two interviews with 30 black male youth across the 
two sites. The sample ended up being comprised of 31 young males, including 13 in Montreal 
and 18 in Toronto. The number of respondents was unexpectedly higher in Toronto, because two 
mothers came forward to ask if their sons could participate in the study because they believed it 
would be a positive experience for them. A total of 6 interviews with the mother and/or father of 
the young males were completed in Montreal, and 10 in Toronto. While it would have been 





be difficult in several cases. Interviews with young males were easier to schedule, because a 
majority of them would visit or attend after-school programs in the neighborhood.  
In order to participate in an interview, each adolescent had to obtain parental consent, 
unless he was 18 years and older, in which the youth could independently consent to an 
interview. Once a parent had granted his or her consent, a youth was asked to give his assent. To 
protect the confidentiality and anonymity of respondents, only pseudonyms were kept, instead of 
real names. In addition, recordings of the interviews were transferred to a password-protected 
computer within 24 hours of the appointment. Once the recording had been saved, the original 
recording on the tape recorder was deleted. To thank the youth and parents for their participation 
in the study, young males received compensation of $20 and parents were given $25. The 
compensation was handed at the end of the interview and enclosed in a thank you card.  
A special interview protocol was developed for the interviews with youth and their 
parents. Similar themes were covered in the two sets of interviews. Parents and youth were asked 
about their personal experiences with local organizations along with their views on the services 
and the needs and challenges of black youth. The interviews lasted between 45 minutes and two 
hours. Interviews with parents tended to be the longest, between one hour to three hours.  
In the Montreal site, all 13 of the youth were of Haitian origin; an even number were born 
in Quebec and Haiti. Two had moved to Montreal after the devastating earthquake of 2010. One 
of the young men was bi-racial, with one black and one white parent. A sincere effort was made 
to recruit and interview African-born youth, but to no avail. Two young African-born males 
agreed at first to participate in an interview, but their parents declined to give their consent. In 
Toronto site, the young people recruited for interviews had varied national and cultural 





In both sites, the youth participants were recruited mainly through contacts with 
community organizations and schools. Recruiting young males who did not participate in 
community organizations was considerably more challenging. In Montreal, a vice-principal from 
a local high school agreed to lend a hand and to put the researcher in contact with several classes 
of students. In the Toronto site, a black male youth worker who had grown up in the 
neighborhood was hired to assist with recruitment. He and I did the rounds of places where 
young people hang out after school, such as convenience stores, the local McDonald’s, and 
parks. Surprisingly, the strategy yielded no interviews. Even after a youth had expressed an 
interest in participating in the study in these impromptu meetings, it was difficult to re-establish 
contact with them or with their parents. A visit to a local church on a Sunday provided an 
opportunity to recruit a black father and his son and both participated in an on-one-one interview. 
 For Phase 1, semi-structured interviews were also organized with a representative sample 
of local professionals and organizations. The purpose was to learn about the organizations 
themselves, as well as gain insights into the neighborhood as a whole such as, its history of 
community development, the strong and weak points about service provision, and the conditions 
for, and participation of, black youth and families. No compensation was offered to 
organizational employees, although each respondent was asked to sign a consent form. Each 
interview was tape-recorded, on condition the respondent granted his or her consent. In Toronto, 
a total of 10 interviews were held with local institutions and organizations. This included: the 
director and a manager at the largest youth organization, the director and youth programs officer 
at the local “hub,” staff at the municipal recreation center, a basketball coach, a pastor, and a 
member of the coalition that founded the “hub” in the early 1990s. In the Montreal site, a total of 





community organizations, a basketball coach who doubled as a youth worker, a school monitor 
(a black male who was close with youth and involved in raising funds for youth programs), a 
school coach, teacher, former school principal, a community development officer in the local 
health center, the commander of the local police station, two youth workers from different 
organizations, two program officers from agencies serving mothers, and a couple of 
representatives of a local committee working on racial profiling in policing. 
 
Phase 2: Policy Analysis 
 
 Phase 2 of the study began in December 2015, once a preliminary set of research 
questions had been written and a handful of interviews were scheduled. Two primary methods of 
data collection were used:  a) interviews with actors who had participated directly or indirectly in 
the policy process in each province between 2004 and 2006, and; b) archival research. The 
following research questions were formulated for Phase 2: 
 
1) Which individual actors, institutions, and organizations participated in the policy process and 
how? What precise roles did they play? What were their respective goals, motives, and 
perspectives? 
2) How did debates about the urban violence and the policy solutions unfold in the media and in 
the political arena?  
3) What conceptual frames and policy repertoires were articulated and by whom (e.g., youth 





4) What barriers and opportunities did policy-makers confront in writing the policy and having 
it approved? 
 
A total of 20 open-ended interviews were completed with policy-makers, heads of 
government departments, politicians, and community organizations across the two provinces. 
This included 11 respondents in Ontario and 9 in Quebec. Each interview was organized to cover 
a pre-determined set of questions, yet the process was kept flexible in order to allow respondents 
to lead and open spontaneous lines of questioning. The interviews were held in either French or 
English, transcribed, and then analyzed line-by-line. The analysis was geared to answering the 
four questions highlighted above.  
The sampling of respondents for Phase 2 proceeded in several stages. First, a list was 
drawn up of the government officials who had been most directly responsible for writing the 
policy, namely the policy’s authors. This information was gathered in meetings with officials in 
each province. Once these respondents were contacted and interviewed, snowball sampling was 
used to identify and locate other individuals who had helped conceive, write, or advocate for the 
policy. The first group of “policy authors” in each province, whom we might call the “nucleus” 
of the policy design team, provided the names of up two government colleagues with whom they 
had written the policy in 2005. Once the members of the nucleus were interviewed, a second list 
of respondents was drawn up of individuals and groups who had played indirect roles in the 
policy process, either as members of committees, meetings, grassroots coalitions, and NGOs.  
The aim of the snowball sampling was to reach and interview every person who had had 
a front row seat in the policy process (i.e., policy authors, policy entrepreneurs) and then move 





could still speak knowledgeably about the policy’s origins. Among respondents in the latter 
group were non-profit organizations in Toronto and Montreal who had taken part in the closed-
door deliberations on the policy, lobbied for its passage, or were involved in the policy’s 
implementation. As much as possible, an effort was also made to find and interview individuals 
of varying backgrounds who might have contrasting opinions on the policy process.  
In Quebec, interviews were completed with two officials from the Ministry of Public 
Security, including one who had recently retired; both had been part of the “nucleus” of the 
policy writing team in 2005. In addition, two government officials who came on board a few 
years later and helped write and lead Phase 2 of the Street Gang Intervention (2010-2014) were 
interviewed separately. An attempt was made to reach and interview two other career bureaucrats 
from the Ministry of Public Security who had been identified as part of nucleus and both refused 
to be interviewed. In general, contacting officials in the Ministry of Public Security, getting 
approvals for interviews and securing access to documentation was a significant challenge. 
People either took long to reply to email and voice mail messages or never answered. For an 
entire year, communication was sent to the Ministry of Public Security with a request for the 
names or titles of individuals in the social service departments of the provincial government who 
had participated in a special inter-ministerial committee for the policy. The head of the 
appropriate department promised to reply and never did, even after repeated messages were sent. 
The names of these committee members were finally obtained via another contact, but it was too 
late for the present study. Fortunately, a former colleague working for a separate government 
agency and based in Montreal knew some of the key individuals who had worked on the Street 





of not only establishing a personal contact with respondents, but also securing approval for 
interviews.  
The failure to interview representatives of social service ministries who sat on the inter-
ministerial committee represents one unexpected limitation of the study. It is conceivable that 
these interviews would have elicited points of view and pieces of information overlooked in the 
interviews with officials from the Ministry of Public Security. However, the difficulty in finding 
and locating these actors can be explained, in part, by their apparently tepid interest in the policy 
process, as Chapter Four will explain. Despite these limitations, interviews were held with 
representatives of the social service agencies most active in the Street Gang Intervention, namely 
the child welfare department and the Ministry of Immigration, Diversity, Inclusion. Finally, three 
additional interviews were carried out with an NGO in Montreal that had long been collaborating 
with the Ministry of Public Security on the Street Gang Intervention, a former employee of the 
Montreal police department who had been in charge of the department’s office for community 
relations and diversity in the 1990s, and a retired detective from the same department who had 
lobbied for the policy and took part in the high-level meetings during the early and mid-2000s. 
In Ontario, a total of three interviews were carried out with government officials who had 
formed part of the nucleus of the policy design team. This included a head of department, a 
deputy minister, and a former politician. In addition, three separate interviews were completed 
with the leaders and authors of a governmental commission on violence, which resulted in the 
publication in 2008 of the highly-lauded “Roots of Violence Report.” Among these interviews 
was one current and one former black politician associated with the province’s Liberal party. 
Additional interviews were carried out with representatives of two well-established black 





had been part of the grassroots coalition formed in the 2000s to put pressure on the government 
to act on the urban violence and release funds for social and community programs. 
The purpose of the archival research was to locate and analyze documentation written 
about the urban violence of 2005 and the policy, so as to gain a fuller appreciation of the actors, 
debates, and political circumstances of the period and their impact on the policy design. The 
archival material included: press releases, newspaper articles, program evaluations, and 
proceedings of conferences and legislative debates. In 2016, a formal request was submitted to 
the Ministry of Public Security for copies of items such as meeting minutes, lists of committee 
members, presentations to Cabinet, and program evaluations. In an email, an official from the 
Ministry replied that the documents remained confidential and could not be released. 
Altogether, the two phases of the research were carried out over a period of about 15 
months, starting in September 2014 and ending in July 2016. The interviews for Phase 2 were 
carried out between December 2015 and July 2016. Due to the unexpected shift in the study’s 
theoretical foci and the large quantity of data gathered, the present dissertation focuses its 
attention on summarizing and interpreting the results from Phase 2 and presents only a brief 
sketch of the findings obtained from the two neighborhood sites. Future publications will discuss 
the results from Phase 1 in greater depth. The next chapter moves directly into the data analysis 






Chapter 3 : Ontario’s “Youth Opportunities Strategy” 
 
The present chapter discusses the agenda-setting and policy-making process that led to 
the creation of the Youth Opportunities Strategy, a policy introduced by the Ministry of Children 
and Youth Services (MCYS) of Ontario in February 2006. Though the chapter places the 
attention on the youth strategy, it was not the only action the Ontario government undertook in 
response to the violence of 2005. The youth strategy was, however, the broadest of the initiatives 
and the only one designed to assist young people across the province. Apart from the youth 
policy, the Ontario government created the Youth Challenge Fund in the winter of 2006, a multi-
million-dollar fund for new or fledgling non-profit organizations in the city of Toronto, 
specifically those desiring to create youth-led and youth-focused programs. The United Way of 
Toronto was given the responsibility of managing the YCF in 2006 and raising the matching 
funds of $15 million dollars, which brought the total to $45 million for five years. In response to 
requests from Toronto’s black faith leaders in 2006, the Prime Minister made an additional $3 
million dollars available to the Greater Toronto Area Faith Alliance. In 2006, the group was led 
by a black Pentecostal minister in Toronto who had gained a rather controversial reputation for 
his controversial remarks about the deficiencies of black families in causing the violence. 
Today, the Youth Opportunities Strategies has been folded into a general Youth Action 
Plan for the province, which brings under one umbrella the activities of the different government 
agencies responsible for families and children, including the Ministry of Children and Youth 
Services. Since 2006, the Youth Challenge Fund has been closed and replaced with a province-
wide fund called the Youth Opportunities Fund. At the time of the study in 2015, two non-profit 





several million dollars in the neighborhood from the Youth Opportunities Fund. The grants from 
the YOF are awarded on a competitive basis and allocated to community organizations across 
Ontario that offer services to disadvantaged families, children, and youth.  
 The purpose of the present chapter is to answer the following two questions: 1) why was 
the Youth Opportunities Strategy created in 2006?; 2) how and why did the government of 
Ontario opt for a solution to the violence that revolved around youth development, jobs, and 
community programs? In examining these questions, the chapter takes a step back in history to 
study the events that arose in Toronto in 2005 and 2006, the political climate of the period, the 
groups, organizations, and actors that played pivotal roles in the policy change, and the ideas that 
germinated and circulated at the time on the causes and solutions the violence. 
As the chapter will show, episodes of gun violence in low-income neighborhoods of 
Toronto played an outsized role in dramatizing the sense of crisis and precipitating changes in 
policy at the municipal, provincial, and federal level. The City of Toronto was the first to act in 
2004 and again in 2005, with the establishment of the Community Safety Plan (CSP), followed 
by the Strong Neighborhoods Strategy (SNS). In 2005, the Toronto Police department introduced 
the Toronto Anti-Violence Strategy, which would come under heavy criticism for increasing 
police practices of racial profiling and executing aggressive gang raids in low-income 
neighborhoods that swept many innocent and unsuspecting residents into the snare of the 
criminal justice system (Siciliano 2010). The provincial government came onto the scene a year 
later and embarked on two separate initiatives: first, it funneled resources into law enforcement 
in Toronto and a “guns and gangs” Task Force; secondly, it launched the Youth Opportunities 





The pages that follow begin with an analysis of the causal factors that drove the Ontario 
government to introduce the Youth Opportunities Strategy in 2006. The second section explains 
why “youth development” became the central plank of Ontario’s solution to the violence. 
 
Causes of the Policy Change 
 
No other issue seems to have done more to spark sudden changes to urban policy in 
Ontario than gun violence in Toronto. Unlike other crimes, gun violence tends to occur more 
frequently in public spaces where the safety of bystanders is at risk. It has also tended to garner a 
disproportionate amount of intensive and often sensationalist media attention. Prior to 2006, 
many in the voluntary sector and philanthropic community in Toronto had been warning 
government authorities about the increasing and debilitating toll of income inequality and 
concentrated poverty in the city. Yet, it took more catastrophic events, namely incidents of 
deadly gun violence, for policy-makers to take note. Between 2003 and 2006, a flurry of activity 
took place at the municipal, provincial, and federal level, and nearly always in response to 
outbursts of street violence in Toronto. While violence in general in Toronto has not increased, 
the percentage of homicides committed with a gun has been rising since the mid-1990s. It has 
also been generally assumed that black males constitute the majority of victims and perpetrators 
of gun homicides, yet, no accurate data have yet become available to support such a claim. In 
one study, it was found that blacks represented 23% of the 951 victims of homicide in Toronto 
between 1988 and 2003 (Thompson, 2013).  Such a figure certainly exceeds the proportional 
representation of blacks in Toronto, who represent about 7-8% of the city’s population, yet it is 





homicide during 1988 and 2003 was male (83%), and close to half (or 47%) was under 34 years 
of age. 
As indicated, the City of Toronto was the first to act on the violence and enact new 
policies, starting in 2004 with a Community Safety Plan, followed a Strong Neighborhood 
Strategy in 2005. The provincial government came onto the scene nearly two years later, after a 
gun fight in a busy downtown shopping center of Toronto on Boxing Day in 2005 that took the 
life of a young white female and injured six other individuals, all of whom were innocent 
bystanders. The suspects caught up in the gun fight included five black males and two white 
males; however, only the black males were accused of the crime and later handed jail sentences 
(Arvast 2016). In the aftermath of the Boxing Day tragedy, the Liberal Premier of Ontario, 
Dalton McGuinty, authorized government agencies to develop a program of action focusing on 
issues of youth employment and social provision. Before moving on to describe the turning point 
in December 2005, it is worth taking a brief detour to analyze the actions the City of Toronto 
took on its own prior to 2006. As will be explained later in the chapter, the stances of the 
Toronto Mayor and City administration played some role in shaping the discourse that would 
emerge about the need for anti-poverty solutions to the violence. 
In 2003, the City of Toronto held an election and a social democratic candidate, David 
Miller, won the Mayor’s seat. Within his first few months in office, several gun shootings 
erupted in Toronto and the Mayor found himself facing fierce criticism from conservative City 
Councilors and the mainstream press who argued he was not doing enough to control the 
violence. One article in the Toronto Star boldly said, “Wanted: A Mayor to Fight Crime” (James 
2004). David Miller was a self-professed social democrat and the only one of three candidates 





Mayor Miller continuously resisted the pressure to embrace a hard line on the violence. When 
the police chief of Toronto came forward with a request for funding to hire more police officers 
in 2004, Mayor Miller turned him down. In a published interview, Miller commented on his 
preference for tackling the violence through prevention rather than law enforcement, he 
explained: “The police can deal with guns…but jobs are not something the police can produce. 
One of the important components of our Community Safety Plan, one of the pillars, is the 
neighborhood phase, and the second pillar is that it focuses on the real needs of young people, 
and an important part of that is employment” (International Observer 2005). When Mayor Miller 
announced the new Community Safety Plan in March 2004, he explained that its purpose was to 
“balance enforcement with prevention” (City of Toronto 2004). He maintained that the policy 
would complement the work of police officers by addressing the root causes of crime through 
prevention initiatives for “at-risk” youth. In his address to City Council in 2004, the Mayor 
articulated: 
 
“Even though overall crime has actually decreased in many areas, we cannot 
ignore the tragic loss of life and serious injury that has resulted from the increased 
prevalence of guns in our city. The causes of crime are a complex mix of social 
and economic factors. Thus, solutions must also be multifaceted. To be successful, 
the City’s approach to improving community safety must balance enforcement 
with prevention. The central role of the Toronto Police Service in enforcing the 
law must be complemented by an effective blend of programs and services—






Early in his tenure, Mayor Miller’s opinions on crime and public safety were 
characteristically left-of-centre. He would later be accused of capitulating to the right-wing when 
he joined the call for heightened security and policing (Siciliano 2010). In the words of one City 
administrator who was interviewed in Horak (2010), Mayor Miller launched the Community 
Safety Plan in part to quiet his critics who said he was too “soft on crime,” all the while 
channeling the funds into social and community programs. The City Council approved the Plan 
in March 2004 with a budget of $28 million for four neighborhoods of the city most affected by 
the urban unrest. Due to the City’s own cash-strapped budget, the Community Safety Plan would 
depend on significant contributions from outside partners, including business, school boards, 
colleges, non-profit organizations, the United Way of Toronto, and provincial ministries. A fair 
amount of the City’s own contribution to the Plan would appear to have been funds re-allocated 
from existing budgets. The policy was written with nine inter-related strategies in mind. This 
included: 1) the creation of a Mayor’s Advisory Panel on Community Safety led by the then 
Attorney General, Roy McMurtry, and composed of representatives from youth groups, labor, 
education, academia, and community organizations; 2) opening of a permanent office for a 
“Community Safety Secretariat,” 3) financial and technical assistance for neighborhood residents 
to work together to devise “neighborhood action plans” aimed at enhancing prevention and 
community development; 4) money for community-based youth programs; 5) discussions with 
government about amending gun legislation (e.g., a ban on handguns); 6) implementation of a 
federally-funded pilot initiative on “gun use and gang involvement”; 7) partnerships with 
business to create jobs for youth; 8) strengthening the City’s “Community Crisis Response” 






The external contributions to the Community Safety Plan included an annual budget of 
$20 million from the Toronto District School Board (TDSB) to keep schools open for 
recreational activities beyond regular school hours. In addition, various colleges, unions, the 
police, and local non-profit organizations arranged short-term internships and jobs for young 
people from the four selected neighborhoods (City of Toronto 2004). The United Way donated 
$250,000 to finance the activities of its member agencies who were already active in the 
neighborhoods. The largest financial contribution came from four provincial ministries who 
together allocated $500,000 to support a summer program, called “Jobs For Youth”. The four 
ministries included: the Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services, the Ministry 
of the Attorney General, the Ministry of Children and Youth Services, and the Ministry of 
Tourism and Recreation. Another $212,000 was diverted from the provincial Ontario Works 
Incentive Fund to fund a “Life Skills in the Community” program run by a community agency in 
one of the four neighborhoods. Finally, the federal government contributed close to $5 million 
through the National Crime Prevention Centre (NCPC) to pay for a three-year pilot initiative 
focusing on “gang exit” and wrap-around services for young people (City of Toronto 2008).  
The ideas that went into the CSP were not only those of a social democratic Mayor, but 
also of a City administration in downtown Toronto that had a record of taking progressive and 
Liberal stances on issues ranging from housing, urban development, and the environment 
(Mahon and MacDonald 2009). The city’s Social Development Strategy, for example, written 
and approved in 2001, was conceived by a Steering Committee that included the well-known 
left-wing politicians Olivia Chow and the late Jack Layton, both prominent members of the 
National Democratic Party (City of Toronto 2001). In addition to laying out a set of core 





that would continue to be part of policy discussions on urban poverty as time went on; that is, 
strengthening community capacity, investing in comprehensive social infrastructure, and 
expanding civic leadership and participation (Bradford 2005; City of Toronto 2001).  
In the summer of 2005, a new outbreak of gun violence occurred in Toronto and grabbed 
local and national attention. By the end of the year, 80 men and women had lost their lives, 
including 52 with a firearm, the highest percentage ever of gun homicides (Sheptycki 2009). The 
summer was dubbed the “Summer of the Gun,” because of the record number of shootings. 
According to one study, the spike in gun violence that summer was the tragic outcome of a gang 
raid conducted by the police in a low-income neighborhood in 2004 (Siciliano 2010). Siciliano 
(2010) reports that among police officers and local public officials in Toronto, the violence 
erupted after the leaders of a local drug network were arrested and the vacuum left behind 
prompted younger males to compete with each other, often violently, for a share of the market.  
Months before the summer of 2005, Mayor Miller had launched a Task Force on Strong 
Neighborhoods, in collaboration with the United Way of Toronto. The Task Force was set up 
after the United Way released a research report on poverty in Toronto, called “Poverty by Postal 
Code,” which highlighted the sharp and widening gap in income between the city’s affluent 
downtown core and the outer suburbs, where poverty rates are high. In the weeks after the 
shootings of the summer, Toronto’s City Council approved the recommendations of the Task 
Force. The legislation would consist of a Strong Neighborhoods Strategy (SNS) aimed at 
building-up and revitalizing the organizational infrastructure of 13 neighborhoods of Toronto 
with the highest poverty rates. The City’s financial contributions to the plan remained relatively 
modest. From its reserves, it allocated a budget of $13 million for bricks and mortar (i.e., 





private contributed an additional $37 million between 2006 and 2009 (Horak 2010). The largest 
donation came from the United Way of Toronto, which allocated $209 million across a seven-
year period (2005 to 2012) (United Way 2012). In response to the crisis of the summer, Mayor 
Miller also shifted his position on policing and agreed to hire 150 new police officers (Police 
Accountability Bulletin 2005). Of the estimated budget $12 million dollars for these new 
officers, the city would pay 60%, while the province would pitch in the remaining 40%. 
Up to the winter of 2006, the City of Toronto had acted mostly on its own in response to 
the urban violence. Mayor Miller was quoted several times in the press calling on the federal and 
provincial governments to do more and to invest in social and community programs. One of the 
recommendations laid out in the report of the Task Force on Strong Neighborhoods was for a 
trip-partite agreement between the city, province, and federal government to make much-needed 
resources available to the City of Toronto. Discussions for such a tri-partite agreement were 
underway in 2005, yet came to a complete halt once the Conservative party of Stephen Harper 
won the federal elections and immediately abolished plans for national urban policy. 
In October 2005, a year before the federal elections and coinciding with the urban 
uprisings in the Paris suburbs, the Liberal government of Paul Martin announced it was making a 
multi-million-dollar budget available for the provinces to fight against youth gangs and the 
spread of illegal guns in urban areas. In interviews with government informants, it was said that 
the federal funds went directly into law enforcement and had no bearing on the youth policy. 
When the Boxing Day shooting occurred in December in downtown Toronto, the 
political and public clamor for government action on the violence boiled over. The episode was 
said to have sparked an outcry like nothing the city of Toronto had ever seen before. For the first 





the larger public was now seen under threat. Stories about the shooting were on the top of the 
news for days and months. In recalling the events of that winter, a senior policy-maker in the 
MCYS described the public reaction in the following way: “The city went crazy. And it was one 
of these things…where for me I have to say…I was a bit taken aback, quite frankly. That we had 
78 young men die in this city, and then on Christmas day, when a young white girl got killed, the 
city went crazy. All of sudden we had to do something. That, in itself, was a reflection of the city. 
There was no question in my mind that race was front and center. The events of a young white 
girl, getting caught up in gang warfare, that actually precipitated all the political interest and 
political will to get in there and create action.” In another interview with an official from the 
MCYS, one of the authors of the youth policy corroborated the claim that the Boxing Day was a 
turning point. Though officials in the Ministry had been persuaded by the “Summer of the Gun” 
to begin looking for solutions to the urban violence, the sense of urgency reached a peak after the 
Boxing Day shooting; the respondent explained, “what really got the political attention and led 
to the investment in a very immediate way was definitely the Jane Creba piece.” 
The consensus among respondents interviewed in government and community 
organizations in Toronto was that Jane Creba’s death completely altered the political significance 
of the gun violence, because she was a young white female and the shooting happened in the 
city’s business district and nerve center. In interviews, respondents deplored the racially 
disparate treatment that was accorded to Jane Creba versus the youth of color who had died from 
gun violence in the months and years before. A black community worker and now government 
administrator recalled, “it is widely acknowledged at the community level, part of the tipping 
point was the shooting of Jane Creba…Because many of the incidents happened in social 





in the Toronto Globe and Mail in 2006, a spokesperson for the Coalition of African-Canadian 
Community Organizations (CACCO) asked, “why is it that we must wait for the crime and the 
violence to extend beyond the borders of the African-Canadian community to get some kind of a 
response?” (Gray 2006). The Mayor of Toronto and federal prime minister both refuted claims 
that the political reaction to the Boxing Day shooting had been racially biased (Doolittle 2006). 
While racially stereotypical and inflammatory media images of black males involved in 
violence and crime were not new, the coverage of the Boxing Day shooting grew louder and 
harsher in tone (Buffam 2009; Saberi 2017; Sheptycki 2009). Words such as “brutal” and 
“senseless” were used to describe the behavior of the young black men. In one especially 
extreme example, a columnist in the Toronto Star describes the suspects of the shooting as 
“urban savages” who showed a “callous disregard for life” (DiManno, quoted in Saberi 2017). 
Throughout, the media never (or rarely) showed the faces of the white male suspects, only the 
black male suspects. The following commentary in the Toronto Star provides an illustration of 
the sense-making that happened around the Boxing Day shooting and how it came to be seen as 
an event that was different from all the other episodes of gun violence. 
 
“Across this city, since Jane Creba died on Monday, people are asking the same 
questions. What will it take for enough to be enough? Are we there yet? The 
answer, Toronto, is that the time is now. There is a powerful sense among the 
residents of our city that this week is different. Partly it's because, at 15, she could 
have been anybody's daughter, sister, friend. Partly, it's because she was mortally 
shot on Yonge St., in the heart of the city, simply because she happened to go 






Scholars who have studied the media coverage of the Boxing Day tragedy describe a 
tense atmosphere in which the resounding call was for an intensified law-and-order response and 
more stringent punishments for gun offenses (Buffam 2009). Occasionally, voices from the left 
could still be heard affirming an alternative view, in which the stress was on the need for 
government to fix the structural roots of the violence and undo the neo-liberal cuts of the 1990s 
(Buffam 2009). Thus, while the clamor for law-and-order grew louder and more impatient after 
Boxing Day in 2005, it was not the only opinion circulating in the press. The bi-partisan 
discourse on the violence would come to characterize the provincial government’s response in 
2006, which consisted both of a heightened role for law enforcement and new financing for 
crime prevention and youth development. 
In the days after Boxing Day, leaders at all three levels of government (municipal, 
provincial, and federal) spoke out in favor of more restrictive and punitive laws for gun offenses. 
The incident went on to become part of the campaign platform of all three major national 
political parties. The three party leaders, even the traditionally left-leaning Jack Layton of the 
National Democratic Party (NDP), articulated the need for harsher penalties for youth who 
commit offenses with guns (Watt 2006). In a conference call on December 31st, the Premier of 
Ontario Dalton McGuinty, the federal Prime Minister Paul Martin, and Toronto Mayor David 
Miller agreed to introduce “reverse onus” bail conditions, which would require individuals 
accused of gun crimes and incarcerated to demonstrate why they should be released (Benzie and 
Byers 2006). The federal Conservatives wanted to go further by amending the Criminal Code to 
transfer young offenders to the adult criminal court, and impose mandatory minimum sentences 





being too “soft” on crime, agreed to hire another 100 new police officers and assign 300 more to 
street patrols (Gray 2005). In keeping with his earlier position, Mayor Miller maintained that the 
provincial and federal government had to do more to alleviate poverty and reduce the violence 
by investing in social programs in high-poverty neighborhoods. 
In reflecting on the impact of the Boxing Day shooting, a senior government 
administrator in the MCYS who worked on the youth policy indicated the Premier, Dalton 
McGuinty, was “very seized in the new year of 2006 with wanting to deal this issue that 
happened at Christmas.” He acknowledged, with some regret, that “it wasn’t until a white girl 
seemed to get killed and got caught up in it. All of this political will came around. All the 
political will to make any kind of change. The Prime Minister asked us to develop what we 
eventually called the Youth Opportunities Strategy.” Another member of the policy design team 
volunteered that the decision to accelerate the youth policy in late 2005 came directly from the 
Premier. In is words: “[The decision came] definitely from above. Like our impression at the 
lower level was definitely between the Premier’s office, the Minister and the Minister’s office. 
Again, our senior leaders had the foresight to have us start thinking about youth and Positive 
Youth Development (PYD) ahead of that. But the actual, “go do this now,” kind of direction, that 
came from above.” The official went on to explain that in the days after Boxing Day, “we 
marshalled the research that we did, and we put together the Youth Opportunities Strategy.” 
In addition to launching the youth strategy, the Premier of Ontario authorized a new and 
even larger budget for law enforcement, and promised at the time to invest $51 million dollars to 
bring in new police officers, prosecutors and judges, as well as boost the “Guns and Gangs Unit” 
and Toronto Anti-Violence Strategy (TAVIS). Though it remains to be confirmed, it is quite 





funds for police forces in October 2005. It has also been reported that the intensification of law 
enforcement and “gang raids” in low-income neighborhoods in Toronto since 2005 has made 
young black males even more vulnerable than before to racial profiling and police abuse (Cowen 
and Siciliano 2011). The next section lays out the structure of the youth strategy before going 
into a discussion of the factors that motivated provincial authorities to adopt a policy of “youth 
development.” 
 
Outline of the Youth Opportunities Strategy 
 
On February 14th 2006, the Minister of the Ministry of Children and Youth Services, 
Mary Ann Chambers, officially announced that the provincial government would invest $28 
million dollars to finance the first three years of the new youth strategy. The implementation 
would begin in the 13 Priority Neighborhoods of Toronto, which were already the focus of the 
municipality’s Strong Neighborhood Strategy. Starting in year two, the youth strategy would be 
expanded to other areas of the province (MCYS 2006). In a press release, Minister Chambers 
indicated the main purpose of the youth policy was to “expand programs that help youth succeed 
in life,” via efforts that bring jobs, internships, community services, and better educational 
opportunities into low-income neighborhoods (MCYS 2006). She added, “young people are 
telling us that they need more opportunities to help them overcome the significant challenges 
they face to achieve success.”  
Ms. Chambers was a black Liberal politician and the youth policy’s most senior leader 
and advocate in 2006. When she unveiled the policy in February 2006, she had been Minister for 





“Ministry of Training and Community Colleges.” Her appointment to the MCYS came not 
longer after the “Summer of the Gun” and she and her team immediately began thinking about 
ways the Ministry could respond to the violence. Minister Chambers’ sense of urgency about the 
problem only grew with time, especially after November 2005, when another young black male 
was fatally shot while attending the funeral of a friend who had died from gun violence. At that 
point in time, it was no longer a question in the mind of Minister Chambers or her staff whether 
the MCYS would act on the violence, but exactly how and to what extent. 
When the Boxing Day shooting occurred, Prime Minister McGuinty asked Minister 
Chambers to produce a policy that he could announce to the public in the spring of 2006. The 
team responsible for drafting the policy wound up taking less than six months to prepare it and 
obtain Cabinet approval. According to a couple of respondents, Minister Chambers and her co-
authors on the youth policy worked at frenetic pace immediately after Boxing Day to convene 
meetings with stakeholders, consult with other departments, iron out the contributions of 
different agencies, agree on budgets, select projects to support, and write a Cabinet submission. 
The policy was written fairly rapidly and with relatively few complications. The speed with 
which it was produced was likely a function of the time pressures, the preparation the staff at the 
Ministry had already made ahead of time before Boxing Day, and the political support the youth 
policy enjoyed at senior levels of the government and in the NGO community. Even though the 
order for the policy had come from above and there was a consensus among senior heads of 
government that action was urgently needed, Minister Chambers still had to invest time and 
energy into championing the idea of a youth strategy and convincing partners in other 





personally convened a meeting with a representative group of black community organizations in 
Toronto to hear their perspectives on the violence and the strategies to solve it.  
In the quote below, a senior administrator who oversaw the legislative process sums up 
the many and varied steps the authors of the Cabinet submission had to complete within a few 
short months: “First, my folks started to do their policy work. They started looking at what other 
jurisdictions had done to grapple with this situation…So we send people out to talk to people, 
talk to the agencies, see what’s going on and then start to talk to young people…Obviously we 
have a strong focus on only making investments in what we know will work. So looking at the 
evidence of what works, talking to people, looking at communities, talking to providers. Trying to 
understand what some of the issues are, trying to understand where there are gaps and how or 
what is the right combination of things to put together in order to see a result. As we would be 
doing this work we would have put it into a Cabinet submission. We would have done inter-
ministerial consultations, where we would have gone to see what other programs people were 
using. And through that we would have to brief our Deputy and our Minister, and get our 
Ministers on board. We would have had to gone and brief central agencies: Treasury Board and 
all those kinds of folks. We would have had to have a policy committee…” 
The $28 million announced for the youth strategy in 2006 was devoted to six separate 
projects. These included: a) the recruitment of 39 full-time “Youth Outreach Workers” who 
would reach out to young people on the street, build relationships, and connect them to 
organizations and services; b) a “Summer Jobs for Youth program,” to provide jobs to 750 youth 
in Toronto in the first year, and raise the number to 1650 in the second year; c) a “Youth and 
Policing Initiative” for young people to participate in summer internships working for police 





program to enable students to gain employment experience while accumulating credits for their 
high school degree, and; f) a “youth opportunities” website to provide information on youth 
services and programs across the province (MCYS, 2006). Around the same time as the youth 
strategy, the MCYS announced it would be collaborating with other provincial Ministries to 
enhance academic and professional training opportunities for young people. This included a $1 
million grant for a Youth Science and Technology Outreach Program to encourage students to 
choose careers in science and technology, operated by the Ministry of Research and Innovation.  
In the pages that follow, the discussion turns to the ideas that undergirded the youth 
policy. The aim is to explain how and why policy-makers in the MCYS determined that the 
concept “youth development” constituted the best solution to the urban violence. For the 
government of Ontario, the concept of “youth development” may have been new in 2006, yet it 
represents an idea that has long been in germination in the United States and the subject of 
numerous scientific studies and technical publications (Catalano et al. 2004; Sukarieh and 
Tannock 2015). For an institution like the MCYS, one dedicated to children and youth, the 
concept of youth development would seem to be a natural fit. However, its adoption in Ontario in 
2006 must also be understood as a reflection of political and historical factors. The concept was 
viable in 2006 because of the arrival of a new Liberal government, which was open to a style of 
reform that fitted the Canadian model of social investment (Jenson and Saint-Martin 2003). Its 
introduction in 2006 was consistent both with the perspectives of elected leaders and officers in 






Explanations for the Policy Design 
  
 The first factor to note in assessing the policy design is that the concept of “youth 
development” has, according to Sukarieh and Tannock (2015), spread around the world and 
become the subject of many national policies. As indicated above, Ontario was not acting out of 
the ordinary but rather taking a direction that had been gaining ground in international circles for 
some time, due in part to its endorsement by American foundations and international agencies 
like the World Bank. Sukarieh and Tannock (2015) assert that policies of “youth development” 
have been anything but ideologically-neutral, and represent a version of neo-liberal policy in 
which the accent is on youth entrepreneurship, self-reliance, and economic integration. In 
Canada, the popularity of youth development in Canada may be a function of international and 
local tendencies. In Canadian scholarship, it has been written that the trend in social policy 
reform in Canada has been to move away from family policy and towards targeted services for 
children and youth. The belief is that children and youth represent the “next generation” and that 
policies must work to prepare them for their future roles as contributing citizens, with policies 
such as early childhood education all the way to post-secondary training (Dubrowolsky and 
Saint-Martin 2005). Jenson and Saint-Martin (2003) describe this shift in Canadian social policy 
as the new “social investment state,” which is taking the place of the social rights of citizenship 
that were guaranteed under the Keynesian welfare state. The primary goal of a social investment 
state is to invest in human capital development and the economic integration of citizens. For 
Jenson and Saint-Martin (2003), the approach subscribes to a “Third Way” path of reform that 





Given the political rise of social investment in Canada, it may not be surprising that an 
official from the MCYS described the advent of youth policy in 2006 as a near “inevitability.”  
He explained, “there was a certain inevitability to taking this approach. We also had at the time 
a very active stakeholder environment. Again, a minister who saw the benefit of this. It was 
definitely a catalyst [the Boxing Day shooting] or incited the investment decision at that time, 
but because we had been asked to start thinking about some of that work ahead of it, was 
definitely something that was “in the making.”” In other interviews, respondents spoke of the 
youth strategy as reflecting a political consensus that arose in 2005. A participant in a black 
community coalition remembers, “So [the] consensus was built around, “Yeah, we need a youth 
strategy. It has to be provincial…and it has to address systemic issues.” Another official from 
the MCYS spoke of how the idea for a youth strategy was supported by senior government 
heads, black Liberal politicians, and prominent black community organizations. He said, “Our 
Minister [Minister Chambers] really, really, both at the Cabinet level and at the level of 
advocating with her colleagues, felt very, very strongly that there should be a preventative, youth 
development focused element of this, and I know in particular she had a very sympathetic 
partner in the Premier and the Premier’s office…At the time it’s important to note, and there 
were people closer to this who had a better recollection. The political folks were definitely the 
ones having the stakeholder conversations so it came from above but from outside as well, if that 
makes any sense. For example, there were some very active community organizations that were 
saying government needs to do something. People like Margaret Parsons at the African-
Canadian Legal Clinic, Donna Harrow now with the African-Canadian Coalition of Community 






Black Political Participation 
 
As elected politicians, organizational leaders, individual activists, and public servants, 
members of Toronto’s black community played leading roles in advocating for a systemic and 
preventative approach to the urban violence. Though the black community in Toronto was not 
the only one touched by the gun violence in those years, the common perception among black 
community leaders and activists was that young black males were among the prime victims. 
Between 2001 and 2006, organizational leaders within the black community came together in 
coalitions and gradually formed a unified front on the issue, enough to produce a joint action 
plan that the Coalition of African-Canadian Community Organizations presented to the three 
levels of government during 2005. One of the remarkable features of the black political 
mobilization of the period was the sheer number of groups and individuals involved—the 
membership of the CACCO included 37 independent organizations in 2005—and the strategic 
positions that black professionals held as politicians and public servants, not infrequently in 
positions of seniority and influence. In the mainstream press coverage on the urban violence in 
the early 2000s, it is common to find articles and editorials in which black organizational leaders, 
activists, and coalition representatives are either being quoted by a journalist or speaking with 
their own voice about the causes and solutions to the urban violence.  
In the months leading up to and after the critical events of 2005, the black Liberal caucus 
of the provincial party and black organizational leaders in Toronto worked independently and 
collectively to pressure the three levels of government into financing and expanding social 
provision and educational programs for black youth. As already indicated, Mary Ann Chambers 





such as Alvin Curling and Ken Jeffers, held their own private conservations with Prime Minister 
McGuinty to express the need for action on the violence. With the support of the Prime Minister, 
Alvin Curling would go onto to lead a major government inquiry into the violence, in partnership 
with the Honorable Roy McMurtry, former attorney general and longstanding advocate for racial 
justice in Ontario. That inquiry would result in the publication of the well-known and widely 
circulated “Roots of Violence Report,” released in 2008. As early as 2001, a black-led coalition 
called “Building Hope Coalition” held a forum to which it invited it Jean Augustine, a black 
female politician with the federal Liberal party and Minister of State for Multiculturalism during 
2002 and 2004 (Palmer 2001). At the meeting, Ms. Augustine told the audience that several 
federal ministries were preparing to release a new budget to support programs for black youth. 
When the federal funds did come through a year later, an amount of $8.5 million was awarded to 
145 organizations situated across Ontario and not only black community organizations.  
Between 2001 and 2006, black community leaders and activists held community forums, 
made regular appearances in the press, published editorials, and requested face-to-face meetings 
with provincial and federal Ministers in Toronto and Ottawa. In looking back on the activities of 
the black community in 2005, a black community worker in Toronto recalled, “I think there was 
a mobilizing of some of the leaders in communities. Louis Marsh, Margaret Parsons, Dudley 
Laws, Alving Curling, Nneke Kafele, and there were many others…The key figures who would 
meet fairly regularly to strategize and then to plan, and then would reach out to politicians, 
request meetings with ministers at provincial and municipal level [in order] to advocate for 
additional resources or to urge the government to act.” A former member of the black-led 
coalition remembers the role of the black Liberal caucus in this way: “They [the black Liberal 





unemployment as the broader goal and then, if we can address that, then we will solve a lot of 
the issues with crime. There was also a talk…[about] three pieces; youth unemployment, 
tackling anti-Black racism…And the talk was to develop strategies around the trades, skills 
trades, which include apprenticeship and peer apprenticeship programs.” 
 In their media pronouncements, black political actors consistently maintained the same 
general argument about the causes of the urban violence, by drawing attention to the deepening 
crisis of poverty and inequality in Toronto, the drastic cuts to social programs during the 1990s, 
and enduring racial discrimination. One of the major grievances articulated by the black 
community coalition in the early 2000s was the effect of the Conservative government’s cuts on 
the disappearance of many vital community programs for black youth. In one interview, a former 
coalition member who was still an active community leader in Toronto, described how black 
activists and leaders shifted the conversations on the violence onto to broader questions of 
poverty, racial discrimination, and government neglect.  He explained, “they [black coalition 
leaders] were looking at poverty, you know, structural poverty. They were looking at immigration 
policies that had kind of…from Federal level to Provincial level. It was focused and skills and 
what you bring to Canada. Some people were very critical that the immigration policy had 
turned a blind eye to family separation, you know, family needs, family issues. And so the 
conversation around crime, you know, was the central focus. People were bringing attention to 
other structural issues of marginalization, of alienation, of community neglect, you know? Of 
people not feeling that they have any kind of social support, educational assistance. So it 
implicated a lot of other systems.” In a second interview, another longstanding black community 
organiser and now government professional expressed a similar view when he said, “when 





that as a symptom of larger systemic issues that were manifesting in that way. [It was] The 
culmination of the school-to-prison pipeline, unfair immigration, employment, criminal justice, 
housing problems. All of these problems created an ongoing sort of crisis that lead to summer of 
the gun, and continues to this day.”   
In the policy debates around the violence, black political actors seem to have done more 
than any other group to direct the agenda-setting onto problems of racism and institutional 
discrimination. This was not a new development. Organizations such as the Black Action 
Defense Committee (BADC) and the African-Canadian Legal Clinic had been leading a vigorous 
grassroots campaign against racial profiling and policing for decades. A representative of the 
Jamaican Canadian Association described the BADC and its long-time leader, Dudley Laws, as 
having been one of the fiercest and most vocal critics of the government’s failure to deal with 
racial discrimination. He recounted, “They [the Black Action Defense Committee] were making 
public statements, holding press conferences, challenging various government Ministers to not 
only talk, but to act in the best interest of the Black community. So, they were at the forefront.” 
The analysis that black community organizations brought to bear on the urban violence was 
grounded not only in their own observations, but also built on the input of residents they had 
spoken to in community forums the CACCO carried out in the early 2000s. According to a 
respondent, one of the major comments s/he remembers hearing from concerned parents and 
community members in those forums was the need for programs to enhance young people’s 
educational and professional opportunities. One of the oft-repeated suggestion was for schools 
and community organizations to widen access to vocational training in high school. 
Findings from the study show that black political actors and community organizations 





expertise on community programs was also decisive in the deliberations over the youth policy of 
2006. Two sub-components of the youth policy—the youth employment program and the “Youth 
Outreach Workers”—were grounded in the expertise of black community organizations and 
workers based in Toronto. When the Ministry of Children and Youth Services was exploring 
ways to assist with youth employment, it turned to Tropicana Community Services, one of the 
oldest and most established black community organizations in Toronto. At the time, Tropicana 
was operating a youth employment program that had already proven to be effective and was seen 
by the Ministry as an exemplary model. The Ministry recruited Tropicana to be the primary 
coordinating agency for the summer jobs program in Toronto and to train non-profit 
organizations outside Toronto to implement the same model in their own locales, in cities such as 
Hamilton, London, and North Bay. In the following quote, a policy-maker in the MCYS 
describes how the decision to adopt Tropicana’s youth employment program transpired: “it was 
really clear that summer employment at that time was highly popular in the literature and here 
we had this great local version of the program being delivered by an agency that was legitimate 
to the communities we were targeting.” Under the youth strategy, the Ministry subsidizes the 
wages of young people and sub-contracts Tropicana to find and maintain contact with employers 
in Toronto. Minister Chambers described the methodology in this way: “the government would 
subsidize the wages for the summer, so that the employer’s role was to provide the work 
experience. If they wanted to top off the salary they could do so. The agency [the community 
agency] would make the connections with employers and find positions for these youth. The 
agencies also had to deliver pre-employment training.” In a joint interview, two professionals 
from Tropicana claimed that one of the ingredients of the youth employment program’s success 





the most vulnerable youth who come for summer jobs often need more than just an income, but 
also assistance in meeting other basic needs and developing the right set of work-related skills. In 
the interview, it was mentioned that the young people who seek jobs with Tropicana may be 
homeless or come from families struggling to make ends meet. Thus, the agency frequently helps 
young participants satisfy their basic needs so that they can hold down a job, either by paying for 
meals, supplying bus tickets, arranging for housing, or offering moral and social support. 
According to Tropicana, the agency has arranged up to 1000 summer jobs for young people since 
2005. On average, over 90% of the youth complete the program successfully. Employers have 
reported back to Tropicana to express their satisfaction with the program and have even been 
known to hire young people for permanent positions after the summer contracts ended.  
The second component of the youth policy that was founded on the expertise of black 
community organizers is the Youth Outreach Workers (YOW) program. The idea for the YOW 
arose in a conversation that Minister Chambers had with a veteran black community organizer in 
Toronto who had expressed to her that the most effective way to connect young people to social 
services is to reach them where they spend their leisure time after school, in parks, fast food 
joints, shopping malls, etc. In the opinion of the community organizer, it was not a shortage of 
services that was the problem, but rather the capacity of organizations to build durable 
connections with adolescents and young adults. As Minister Chambers explained it, the concept 
of the YOW is of a community worker whose office is his or her “backpack”, who spends time 
strolling the streets and visiting public spaces to meet and form relationships with young people, 
provides referrals to services, and acts as a mentor and friend. Minister Chambers’ remembered 
the community organizer describing the aim of YOW in this way: “Minister, teenagers are not 





Outreach Workers find them where they are, whether it is a subway station, or basketball court, 
wherever.” Another observation from the community organizer that solidified the case for the 
YOW was the idea that the team of youth outreach workers would retain the flexibility to meet 
the various needs of young people, without having to be constrained by the rules and restrictions 
typical of most funding packages. In the 2005 meeting, Minister Chambers recalls the 
community organizer explaining to her the following: “when we [community organizations] get 
money for programs we have to adhere to the terms of that agreement. We can’t necessarily do 
what we need to do for that young person. We have to deliver the services that we were funded 
for. A Youth Outreach Worker has the flexibility to do what is necessary.”  
The view expressed by the black community organizer to Minister Chambers in 2005, 
that community services for young people were in sufficient supply, seems contrary to the 
consensus that had formed around the need to fill urgent gaps in the social service infrastructure 
of low-income neighborhoods and undo the cutbacks of the Conservative government (Cowen 
and Parlette 2011). One wonders if the view of the community organizer and Minister Chamber 
was preferable to a Liberal administration that had vowed not to raise income taxes. 
The influence of black community organizations and front-line workers on the policy 
process began with the agenda-setting, shifted to the policy design, and continued with the 
implementation. Once the YOW was set in motion, black community organizations worked to 
ensure that they would be among the agencies selected to coordinate the program in Toronto. 
The fear at the time was that black community organizations would be overlooked and that larger 
and more powerful mainstream organizations would be handed the contracts. The Jamaican 
Canadian Association (JCA), one of the oldest black immigrant organizations in Toronto, 





winning the contract, but not without encountering significant problems. Once the contract was 
awarded, the JCA faced relentless pressure from a program manager at the Ministry who 
continuously and for no apparent reason would ask the agency to submit financial and 
accountability records. In an interview, a senior organizer with the JCA suggested the Ministry 
employee may have been uncooperative because s/he had wanted another organization to win the 
contract or because s/he was harboring racial biases and did not have confidence in the 
organization’s capacities. The organizer painfully recalled what it felt like for the JCA to work 
with the government officer at the time, claiming “[s/he] was dedicated to try and destroy the 
JCA…eventually she was ordered out and into retirement quietly.” 
One of the other sub-components of the 2006 youth policy that most bore the personal 
imprint of Minister Chambers was the Youth and Policing Initiative (YPI), which she decided 
upon in a meeting with the Toronto Police Chief and the President of the Police Services Board. 
In November 2005, Minister Chambers participated in a meeting at which the Toronto police 
chief had invited members of Toronto’s leading black organizations to discuss a recent fatal 
shooting. The meeting was apparently heated and tense and produced no tangible results. In light 
of the meeting, Minister Chambers invited the police chief to meet with her privately at the 
Ministry. When they met, the police chief presented a proposal in which he was requesting 
funding to finance 50 annual summer internships for young people to work in their local police 
stations. Minister Chambers was eager to find a way to mend the strained relations between 
black youth and the Toronto police and saw the police chief’s proposal as the perfect fit; in 
response, she offered to double the number of internships and pay for up to 100 per year.  
Since 2005, the YPI has been expanded and developed in other cities of the province. It 





others regard the program as an unqualified success. Apparently, over 1000 youth apply each 
year for the limited number of internships offered. Of those who participate, 40% regularly 
express an interest in becoming police officers. An increasing number of police officers have 
also taken an interest in being mentors. Minister Chambers claims her faith in the YPI was 
rooted partly in the fact that her own son has had a successful career in the Ontario police 
service. Many in the black community, on the other hand, were not as wholly supportive and 
some were even openly opposed to the idea of having black youth work with the police. To this 
day, the YPI remains somewhat controversial. One independent study on the YPI concluded that 
many of the young people who participate in the summer internships walk away with positive 
feelings about the police; however, the authors caution that while the program may succeed in 
changing the attitudes of young people, it does little to address the institutional practices that 
reinforce racial discrimination in policing (Chapman-Nyaho, James, Kwan-Lafond 2011).  
 
The Politics and Policies of the City of Toronto  
 
As indicated earlier, the City of Toronto began acting on the urban violence two years 
before the province, starting with the Community Safety Plan in 2004 and followed by the Strong 
Neighborhoods Strategy in 2005. Though the two policies have been criticized for being limited 
in scope and reach (Cowen and Parlette 2010; Horak 2010), they nevertheless reflected the 
general tone of opinion in policy circles in Toronto and appear to have had some impact in 
shaping the consensus in the mid-2000s around the need to fill gaps in the service delivery 
system of low-income neighborhoods. As a rule, the City of Toronto wields considerable 





central Toronto has been a hub of left-wing activism, contrary to the suburbs where voters are 
more likely to vote Conservative (Kipfer and Keil 2002). Before the city and suburbs were 
amalgamated in 1998, the downtown municipality (previously known as Metro Toronto) had 
acquired a reputation for taking progressive and Liberal stances on issues ranging from housing, 
urban development, to the environment (Boudreau, Keil, and Young 2006).  
The administration of Toronto also seems willing to stake out independent positions on 
social policy even if these go against the wishes and priorities of provincial and federal agencies. 
Mayor Miller was openly critical of the Conservative Harris government, as were other social 
democratic city politicians such as, Jack Layton (Campion-Smith 2006). Though Jack Layton 
came under criticism for backtracking on his left-wing positions and speaking out in favor of 
tough-on-crime policies after Boxing Day, he was quoted in one newspaper as saying the 
violence in Toronto was “completely predictable because of government decisions to cut back on 
assistance to immigrants, educational opportunities for young people and affordable housing” 
(Campion-Smith 2006). Even as neo-liberal wave of the Harris regime swept the province in the 
1990s, the municipality of Toronto continued to hold onto its Liberal and social democratic 
traditions (Boudreau et al. 2006). Examples of policies touted as evidence of the municipality’s 
progressive credentials include its child and youth policy, which defines child care as a basic 
right (Mahon and MacDonald 2010). In 2013, the City also ruled that undocumented immigrants 
had the right to public services without having to show an ID. 
It is noteworthy that the youth policy arose at a time when a chorus of voices from the 
philanthropic sector, business community, and municipality was asserting the need to build the 
public infrastructure and organizational capacities of low-income suburbs, because this had been 





the City, the United Way of Toronto, and the Toronto City Summit Alliance (TCSA)—a coalition 
of political, civic, and economic elites—that all underscored the dire consequences of escalating 
poverty and residential segregation, the fiscal crisis brought on by the downloading of state 
responsibilities onto the municipality, and the urgent need for the provincial and federal 
governments to assist the City of Toronto in coping with its new administrative responsibilities 
and the changing demographics of the population. The TCSA 2002 report was entitled 
“Toronto’s Quiet Crisis: The Case for Social and Community Infrastructure Investment” 
(Clutterbuck and Howarth 2002). In the report, the authors speak of Toronto’s decaying 
infrastructure and warn of a crisis in the city’s system of child care, recreation, public health, 
libraries, environmental protection, immigration settlement, and community programs. The 
report goes onto to suggest that the municipality pour resources into its physical and social 
infrastructure, stating “City Council and civic leaders must recognize social and community 
infrastructure as a priority that is as important to the quality of life in Toronto as physical 
infrastructure” (Clutterbuck and Howarth 2002: 15).  
In each one of the above reports, the central recommendation for solving Toronto’s fiscal 
crisis and worsening socio-economic divides was to get the provincial and federal government to 
agree to a tri-partite agreement with the City of Toronto, in which they make additional funds 
available to off-set the municipality’s deficit. In its well-publicized report called “Poverty by 
Postal Code,” the United Way stated, “governments at all levels must make a commitment to 
reverse the spiral of growing neighborhood distress and disadvantage by delivering improved 
economic prospects and jobs, safer neighborhoods, decent and affordable housing, accessible 
community programs and services, and by fostering a renewed involvement and commitment in 





Neighborhoods released its report in June 2005, it repeated the call for a tri-partite agreement, 
insisting that it was urgent to support revitalization efforts in the city’s Priority Neighborhoods. 
Under the federal Liberal government in 2005, discussions for a tri-partite agreement got 
underway, but they were ended abruptly in 2006 when the Conservative government of Stephen 
Harper won the election.  
 
The 2003 Election of the Liberal Party 
 
The youth policy arose under the Liberal government of Dalton McGuinty, which 
replaced the Conservative party after winning the 2003 elections. It is unlikely the policy would 
have been approved under the previous Conservative administration. When the Conservative 
party was in power, tensions between the government and members of the black community had 
reached a breaking point. In one instance, the Premier Mike Harris found himself in a heated 
public confrontation with black activists in Toronto when he attended an event to promote the 
“Crime Stoppers” program. When the activists told the Premier that he ought to be working on 
tackling poverty, rather than crime, he replied, “we will not foster programs that create 
dependency” and refused to say anything further on camera (Boyle 2001). Given that racial 
minorities and immigrants in Ontario tend to vote overwhelmingly for the Liberal party, the new 
McGuinty administration may have felt under some pressure to listen to and respond to the 
concerns of the black community. One black activist suggested in an interview that the Liberal 
government could ill afford to ignore the concerns of the black community in 2005. He explained 





Liberal governments in Ontario have a greater scrutiny around their response to racial 
minorities.” 
The previous Harris administration had ended its time in power with low approval ratings 
and widespread unease among voters, unions, and public sector workers. There were few areas 
of policy that the Harris administration had not tried to cut or privatize. Among other things, the 
government introduced a 27% reduction in welfare payments, imposed “workfare” and a freeze 
on the minimum wage, undid labor standards, cut spending in public education, cancelled funds 
for public housing, supported a controversial Safe Streets Act and Safe Schools Act, relaxed 
environmental regulations, and repealed corporate taxes. By 2000, the number of public sector 
workers had fallen from 90,000 in 1990 to 60,000. The wage gap had also steadily widened over 
the period (Evans and Smith 2015). Shortly before the 2003 election, the Conservative 
administration faced its worst crisis when several residents of a town in Ontario died after 
drinking contaminated water, and the fault was laid on the repeal of environmental regulations.  
When the Liberal party took over in 2003, it came in on a promise to safeguard and 
rejuvenate public services. The party also vowed to rebuild public services and without raising 
taxes. Within the first few years, the new administration engaged in a flurry of activity. Several 
new ministries were opened, including the Ministry of Children and Youth Services (MCYS), 
which brought together a handful of independent agencies and departments (youth justice, child 
welfare, child care, early childhood learning and mental health). Other new Ministries were set 
up to oversee science and technology, business and entrepreneurship, and public infrastructure. 
One of the largest areas of public sector growth would occur in post-secondary education, where 
the budget was nearly doubled in four years (Evans and Smith 2015). In other words, the post-





innovation. When the MCYS was formed, therefore, it had room to innovate and proceeded to 
introduce a number of reforms. An official from the Ministry recalls, “because of newness of the 
Ministry and mandate, there was a lot existential probing, there were a number of discussions 
about who we were what our value was.” Government records show that during 2006 and 2007, 
the MCYS would not only launch the youth strategy, but also introduce several other new 
initiatives. This included: new funding for children with autism, a new accreditation and 
licensing system for child care workers, the first-ever child benefit, expanded services for 
children’s mental health, and new action plans for Aboriginal children and for children with 
special needs.  
The heightened period of reform begun by the Liberal government in 2002 suggests it 
may have been eager to distinguish itself from the previous administration and chart a new 
course, one that struck a compromise between neo-liberalism and social democracy (or the 
Liberal welfare state). Thus, the political climate under the Liberal administration in 2005 was 
ostensibly more favorable to the inception of the youth policy. In the following quote, an official 
from the MCYS claims the political climate of 2005 left little doubt that the government would 
undertake some kind of response to the urban violence and that it would take the form of “youth 
development”: “There wasn’t…I have to tell you…At the level of questioning, should there be a 
youth development, prevention focused element to this, there was very little debate. Even coming 
down to us [from the Premier], to ask us to do the work. That was explicit. My role really wasn’t 
in that instance…wasn’t sort of to make the case at the level…it was really to begin to formulate 
a framework for how we might do that. The political environment at the time I think was 
significant. So, it was fairly recent into the Liberal government mandate, and prior to that there 





they had reduced the programming and supports that would have kept kids out quote unquote, 
“out of trouble.”” 
 
Canada’s Social Investment Paradigm 
 
 A final word about the design of the 2005 youth policy was its grounding in the technical 
and academic literature on “Positive Youth Development” (PYD). According to respondents, the 
concept was adopted because it resonated perfectly with the government’s objective of creating 
programs for young people that would be preventive as well as non-stigmatizing. At the heart of 
the concept of PYD is the notion that young people grow and learn best in environments that 
positively reinforce their identities, skills, and talents, rather than try to fix or change “problem 
behaviors.” In announcing the youth strategy in 2006, Minister Chambers indicated: “research 
studies confirm that young people are more likely to make positive choices if they are given the 
right supports and opportunities in their own communities early and when they need them. The 
Ontario government's Youth Opportunities Strategy will help build stronger communities by 
expanding community programs that help troubled youth choose a brighter future for 
themselves.” Another official claimed that while Minister Chambers may not have had the 
precise terminology of PYD, she did express to her staff a “philosophical orientation that we 
needed to build these kids up rather than take a remedial or punishment approach.” The same 
official went on to say: “Our sense at the time, on youth violence, was that our role was to take 
the approach of prevention and thinking of lifelong outcomes. That led us to Positive Youth 
Development, and to programmatic research in jurisdictions. We were interested in the crime 





In addition to the literature on Positive Youth Development, policy-makers at the 
Ministry of Children and Youth Services reported that they borrowed ideas from the scientific 
literature on child development when conceiving the youth policy. One respondent spoke of the 
government-sponsored study on child development, known as the “Early Years Report” 
(Musterd and McCain 1999) as having had a major impact on his thinking about the significance 
of social contexts in shaping children’s life chances. He expressed : “What I liked about this 
whole thing [the Early Years Study] is it took a more developmental perspective: we are all 
human…and there are clear developmental ages and stages of things. And context makes a 
difference, in terms of how one develops. But context does not have to be the barrier for positive 
outcomes in young people... Not all young people have same equal opportunities. If the goal of 
Ontario in creating the Ministry was about creating prosperous, healthy, vibrant young people 
who are going to be tax payers, if I can be so crass. There is a social policy agenda here that 
says, no. 1, we want to focus on…the positive development of kids.” In another part of the 
interview, the same respondent asserted that the strengths of the youth development approach is 
its commitment to enhancing the environments and abilities of young people at different stages 
of life, rather than trying to fix young people’s problem behaviors such as, delinquency. He 
explained “it [the youth policy] was really from…the policy perspective of development and 
developing the opportunities of the young people. That’s the kind of basis upon which we looked 
at the Youth Opportunities Strategy, which is why we would not have looked at it as a “guns and 
gangs” kind of a thing. If that had been the case, we would have had our youth justice wing lead 
it. But it was really important that we not put it in the “problem” kind of areas. It was about 
putting it into the policy lens of “what could we do to better support the developmental 





 Another issue that policy-makers in the Ministry of Children and Youth Services say they 
were mindful of in designing the youth policy was the position of black youth and the ways in 
which they are impacted by racial inequality and discrimination. One respondent explained that 
consideration was given to “subsets of young people, such as black young people who are from 
challenged communities, and think about what are the opportunities and what are the kinds 
things we need to give these young people in order for them to meet their full potential.” 
In another interview, a Ministry official explained that s/he pushed him/herself to think about the 
solutions the government could put into place to interrupt the school-to-prison pipeline, a 
comment that is surprising coming from a bureaucrat and one we usually associate with 
grassroots circles. In conceiving the youth policy, the official said s/he regularly asked 
him/herself the question: “How could we [the Ministry of Children and Youth Services] cut off 
the school-to-prison pipeline for those kids. What could we do so that in 5 or 7 years these kids 
aren’t getting into trouble?” It is safe to say from these and other comments from respondents 
that the youth policy of Ontario was race-conscious, although it remains debatable to what extent 
and how well the policy dealt with racial inequality and racism. In 2006, the major thrust of the 
youth policy was to assist black youth and other disadvantaged youth in overcoming barriers in 
their way and finding support to succeed at school and in the labor market. In other words, the 




The chapter has sought to explain the reasons why the Ontario government established a 





the urban violence. Secondly, it has sought to explain the government’s motives for singling-out 
“youth development” as the preferred strategy for solving the problem. The answer to the first 
question begins with the Boxing Day shooting in December 2005, which became a triggering 
event that unleashed public dissatisfaction with the government’s apparent failure to prevent the 
tragedy from happening and protect public safety. For the first time, the gun violence had 
reached into mainstream Toronto and was no longer confined to low-income neighborhoods. The 
Liberal government, only two years in power, could ill afford not to take decisive action, or at 
least be seen to be taking the problem seriously. When the Liberal government was elected in 
2003, it immediately began embarking on a spate of reforms, possibly in an effort to distinguish 
itself from its predecessor, the Conservative government, which had ended its time in power with 
low approval ratings. Thus, the policy change arose due to the combination of a “focusing event” 
and window of opportunity for reform and the electoral incentives of the Liberal administration.  
The factors that drove the Ontario government to opt for a policy of “youth development” 
are distinct from the causes of the policy change, though undeniably related. The goal of the 
second half of the chapter was to trace the origins of an “idea,” that is youth development, and 
examine where it came about, why it resonated with policy-makers, and why it was embraced. 
Results indicate that the idea was consistent with the perspectives of black political advocates, 
social democrats in Toronto, and the Liberal party. The concept of “youth development” 
provided a solution that resonated with left-wing currents in the city, was politically palatable, 
and had some scientific merit. The chapter has argued that the lobbying by black political actors, 
the history of social democratic politics in downtown Toronto, and the presence of a Liberal 
party inclined to strike a “Third Way” path between neo-liberalism and social democracy may 





decentralized structure of decision-making in Ontario, black political coalitions in Toronto were 
able to participate directly in the policy debates and meet in person with elected leaders and 
policy-makers when the events unfolded in 2005 and 2006. The political and economic 
significance of Toronto on the provincial stage and as a setting for much policy innovation in 
Ontario cannot be ignored. The consensus among politicians, business elites, and philanthropies 
in the City of Toronto that improvements to the social infrastructure of high-poverty 
neighborhoods were urgently needed may have given the provincial government greater 
incentive to approve a policy of prevention and community-based social provision. Finally, 
policy-makers in the Ministry of Children and Youth Services incorporated concepts from the 
scientific and technical literature on child and youth development when formulating the youth 
policy. The idea of youth development certainly seems logical given the Ministry’s mission; yet, 
its arrival blends in with a general trend towards social investment in Canadian social policy, in 








Chapter 4: Quebec’s “Street Gang Intervention” 
 
The Street Gang Intervention of Quebec (or “Plan d’intervention Québécois sur les gangs 
de rue”) was an inter-ministerial policy led by the province’s Ministry of Public Security, in 
collaboration with several government agencies and non-profit organizations in the province. 
The policy was approved in December 2005 and carried out in two successive three-year plans, 
one created for the period of 2007 to 2010, and the other for 2011 to 2014. Although the policy 
was only formally introduced to the public in 2007, police departments received the 
authorization to proceed with the deployment of new anti-gang squads in 2006, not long after the 
Prime Minister and his Cabinet endorsed the policy in late 2005. In comparison with Ontario, 
Quebec’s solution the urban violence was more singularly punitive and disciplinary. The 
financial support for prevention and community-based programs was meager in comparison with 
the investment in policing, prisons, youth detention, the courts, and intelligence services.  
Though Quebec’s strategy emphasized a disproportionate role for criminal justice as 
opposed to social provision when seen in comparison with Ontario, in both provinces the policy 
change was a direct reaction to incidents of urban violence in which blame was laid squarely on 
the behavior of young black males. In Quebec, racial stereotypes about the urban violence played 
a central role in elevating the sense of panic about the urban violence, feeding the social 
construction of lawless “street gangs,” and justifying an aggressive clampdown on crime. In 
contrast with Ontario, black community organizations and black political representatives played 
no visible role in the policy-making process in Quebec, whether in behind-the-scenes 
negotiations or public consultations on the urban violence. Only hand-picked organizations with 





consulted about the policy. The centralization of decision-making at the headquarters of the 
Ministry of Public Security in Quebec City resulted in a policy process that was dominated by 
the interests and perspectives of police chiefs in Quebec. Well before the policy process began in 
2004, police chiefs had been actively lobbying the government to launch a full-scale assault on 
street gangs in Montreal.  
Ultimately, Quebec’s policy on street gangs was short-lived and lasted an official seven 
years, ending abruptly and unexpectedly in December 2015. While state administrators and some 
stakeholders were hoping the policy would be renewed in 2015 for another three year-term, the 
proposal failed to secure the support of Cabinet. The precise reasons for its closing remain 
unclear, though it can be said that the political climate had altered completely since 2005 and the 
subject of street gangs was no longer dominating the news as it once did. Despite this turn of 
events, certain elements of the policy remain in place. The multi-million-dollar investment in 
police departments has likely provided a long-term boost to policing operations in Montreal and 
the regional police squads. It is also worth noting that in 2016, the Ministry of Public Security 
approved a new three-year governmental plan against “sexual exploitation,” in which one of the 
goals is to stop the apparent involvement of street gangs in the commercial sex industry in 
Quebec.  
The present chapter discusses the policy-making process that culminated in the Street 
Gang Intervention in Quebec and explores the reasons why enforcement and punishment became 
the preferred solutions to the urban violence. It analyzes the historical backdrop to the policy 
process and illustrates how significant events at the federal, provincial, and city level all 
combined to lead the policy-making down one particular path, rather than another. The chapter 





multiple, inter-related factors that forced the government to act, especially when incidents of gun 
violence spilled over into mainstream public spaces and threatened feelings of public safety. The 
chapter proceeds in two stages: it first describes the factors that caused the policy shift to occur 
in 2005; secondly, it examines the role of political institutions, organizational interests, and ideas 
in shaping the design of the policy, including its structure and objectives. 
 
Causes of the Policy Change 
   
Respondents from the Ministry of Public Security interviewed for this study all 
expressed, in differing ways, that the policy change was not caused by any single factor, but 
rather by a combination of forces building up over time. The first movement began with the 
lobbying by police chiefs in 2002, who made repeated requests to elected officials in the 
Ministry of Public Security and the Ministry of Justice to support a provincial strategy against 
street gangs and finance regional anti-gang police units, one for Montreal and adjoining cities 
and one for Quebec City. On the two separate occasions when the police departments of 
Montreal and Quebec City made independent funding requests g to the Ministry Public 
Security—the Ministry under which they operate—they were denied. Only on the third occasion 
were they successful in obtaining the Ministry’s approval, and not coincidentally because of an 
outbreak of gun violence in Montreal a few weeks earlier. At this stage, the Minister of Public 
Security agreed with police chiefs to begin the process of developing a provincial policy against 
street gangs, though no financial commitments were made until months later.  
A total of three focusing events occurred in the early 2000s and played a role in fueling 





sensational media articles connecting crime to racial stereotypes of black males followed, as 
reports indicated the primary offenders were black males. The three episodes were: 
 
1) A police operation known as “Scorpion” in 2002, in which the Quebec City police 
arrested the leaders of a child prostitution ring operating in the city. The event caused 
panic and anger in the media and was followed by public protests in Quebec City. 
The arrests focused on the identities of the black males involved in the network. The 
affair also stirred considerable controversy because it was found that several male 
clients of the prostitution ring were well-known members of Quebec City’s 
francophone entertainment and business elite. 
2) A gun shooting in 2003 an after-hours club in a suburb on the outskirts of Montreal, 
in which several people were injured. 
3) Another outbreak of gun violence in the summer of 2004 in a busy street of 
downtown Montreal, where tourists and residents congregate in bars and restaurants. 
 
Across 2002 and 2005, there was a flurry of political activity around the subject of street 
gangs both at the provincial and federal level. Officials from law enforcement and criminal 
justice in Quebec were regularly attending closed-door meetings and consultations in Quebec 
City and Ottawa where the conversation was centered on the apparent increase in “street gangs” 
in the country and the possibility of forming a policy for the province as well as the country. One 
administrator in the Ministry of Public Security remembers the period immediately preceding the 
policy change as a moment of “effervescence” in which street gangs were constantly being 





national level. In another interview, a respondent who had worked on the first policy in 2005 
recalled, with some degree of cynicism, that the topic of street gangs had become rather 
fashionable and may even have sparked a race for federal dollars. S/he declared: “At one point 
you look at the federal level and you see that it’s a fashion. It’s how you will get money, like 
when terrorism arrived. You know you will get funding. Well, you saw people who were seeing 
terrorists everywhere. It was the flavor of the day, the employee of the day.”   
From interviews with policy-makers, administrators, and police officers who were 
knowledgeable about the origins of the policy, several distinct influences can be distilled: a) an 
increasing interest in street gangs as an issue of public policy at the provincial and federal level; 
b) focusing events and a spike in media coverage on street gangs in the early 2000s; c) growing 
anxiety among law enforcement officials, especially in Montreal, that the problem of gun 
violence was beyond their control and that gangs were extending beyond the city and into other 
regions of the province. In the following interview, an administrator who helped devise the plan 
in 2005 reflects on the broader political climate of the period: “There were events [gun 
shootings], particularly in Montreal, that well, made the issue of street gangs more tangible, a 
little more concrete. The media started to talk about the phenomenon of street gangs, and it was 
arousing a bit of anxiety. People were talking about it, the media was saying that we were 
starting to import this model from the United States, and that it would be important to attack it. 
On the other hand, the police departments were worried as well, and it was a phenomenon that 
was new, and they were having difficulty grasping t, comprehending it. So, they turned to the 
Ministry [the Ministry of Public Security] to say, it would be important to do something.” The 
quote below from another respondent in the Ministry reinforces the claim that a multiplicity of 






“[There was the information] the police were demonstrating in relation to the 
reality of street gangs. There were many conferences, at which the Minister of 
Public Security even participated. It was not just employees who were reporting 
the information [on street gangs]. The Minister was sitting in the room and there 
was a conference by the SPVM [Montreal police service], by the Quebec police 
service, and other organizations that were the most affected by the problem of 
street gangs. And then there were the gun shootings. Well, there was an 
effervescence, there was pressure. For a problem of that kind, media pressure also 
has an effect.” 
 
Another important factor not highlighted in the above quotes was the decisive influence 
of the Prime Minister of Quebec, who came to the decision in the fall of 2005 that street gangs 
would be a top government priority and who subsequently authorized the Ministry of Public 
Security to devise a three-year action plan that could be renewed indefinitely. When the Prime 
Minister handed down his decision, the policy moved from being an initiative solely of the 
Ministry of Public Security to becoming a full-fledged effort, in which a host of ministries were 
expected to contribute. As a respondent explains in the following quote, the Prime Minister’s 
decision gave policy-makers in the Ministry of Public Security the authority to deploy the 
resources of the state and to call upon fellow ministries to invest their resources. She explained: 
“What is important to understand with governmental plans is that, irrespective of the problem, it 





everyone is a partner in the plan. It motivates people to act, and it permits us to use existing 
structures or existing funding programs and to color them with the theme street gang.” 
As indicated in Chapter Three, in the fall of 2005 the federal government was preparing 
to release a multi-million-dollar budget for provincial police forces to fight against “youth 
gangs” and the spread of illegal weapons in urban areas. It is not known if the Quebec’s Prime 
Minister was influenced by this federal transfer. It may be safe to say that the $42 million-dollar 
budget promised to Quebec in 2005 was one incentive for the Prime Minister of Quebec and his 
advisers to move ahead when they did and to raise street gangs to a top priority. Months before 
the federal announcement, the Quebec government had not yet determined how it would fund the 
policy. Elected officials in Quebec had only agreed to invest $30,000 annually in the hiring of a 
provincial coordinator on street gangs. This was to be the Quebec portion of the salary, and the 
other part would be paid for by the federal government. Prior to 2005, the expectation was that 
the policy would not require any substantial new funds. For example, for the anti-gang squads 
requested by the police departments of Montreal and Quebec City, the tentative goal was to re-
deploy the same units that had been created in the 1990s to squash a conflict between “biker 
gangs” (popularly known in French as the “Motards”).  
It is worth remembering that Canada has been living under a political climate of financial 
austerity for years and administrators claim that politicians are chronically averse to spending 
new money and will only do so under compelling circumstances. When the policy first came 
under discussion in the mid-2000s, the government was led by the Liberal party, which had 
campaigned only a few years before in 2002 on a promise to “re-engineer” the state and radically 
cut-back public finances. The party’s campaign quickly fell apart, due to large and organized 





draft the policy in 2004, the instruction was that they should limit spending and utilize existing 
budgets and programs as much as a possible. When the multi-million federal transfer arrived in 
2005, it not only relieved Quebec of the burden of finding money to pay for the policy, but also 
allowed authorities to set out an ambitious strategy, one that would have otherwise been 
impossible to finance. For example, instead of two anti-gang squads, the Ministry of Public 
Security went on to create six, and in regions with no evidence of any similar problems.  
In an interview, an administrator in the Ministry of Public Security played down the 
significance of the federal transfer in driving the policy change, and insisted the Ministry was 
already well-advanced in developing a policy by the time October 2005 arrived. It is true that by 
the fall of 2005, officials in the Ministry of Public Security had been working on a policy on 
street gangs since the Minister had given his support a year earlier, and policy-makers were 
gearing up to produce a second draft of the policy after receiving feedback from partners. The 
respondent stressed that the policy change was due not to any single factor alone, but to a 
convergence of historical forces. In the quote below, s/he points out key moments in the policy 
process: the federal funding, the Prime Minister’s authorization, public opinion, incidences of 
homicide in Montreal, and the police’s operation against a child prostitution network uncovered 
in Quebec City (i.e., Scorpion). In the opinion of this respondent and others, the Prime Minister’s 
authorization and the federal funding did not cause [italics mine] the policy change; rather, the 
effect it had was to accelerate a policy-making process that was already underway and to 
increase the size and scope of the policy. The following is a quote from this administrator: 
 
“I would say it was a whole assortment of factors that came together. It’s certain 





Minister. The fact that the Prime Minister was also a supporter of the strategy for 
youth [Stratégie action jeunesse]. He wanted to make sure the generation of 
young people was doing well. Public opinion in all of that, it’s certain it plays a 
role. There were homicides. There was Scorpion. It’s an amalgam of a whole 
bunch of things.” 
 
  When the policy was being considered for a second renewal in 2015, the political 
climate around the subject of street gangs had completely altered. The appetite for a 
large-scale strategy had died down, street gangs were no longer receiving the same 
amount of news coverage, and outbursts of gun violence had grown infrequent. 
Administrators claim that even when the first renewal of the policy came under 
consideration in 2010, it was a challenge to get elected officials to approve it. The policy 
process was not as automatic as it had been in 2005 and considerably more energy and 
time had to be invested in convincing deputy ministers and the Minister of the policy’s 
relevance. In the following quote, an official from the Ministry of Public Security 
describes how it was an uphill battle to get the plan renewed in 2010 for another three-
year term: “it was a hard work to get the plan renewed. It is a lot of negotiation at the 
political level. At the level of the image. [The questions are] Do we or do we not 
continue? We have other things to worry out. Is it always a priority? How much money 
do we put into this?” When the second renewal was being considered in 2015, the sense 
of urgency and political support had disappeared, said one official: “they didn’t see the 





knew there was less interest [in street gangs] in the media. There were fewer shootings or 
anyway, there were few events that disturbed the population.” 
  In 2005, the Street Gang Intervention did not have to go through all the usual 
steps any piece of legislation or policy must go through to be tabled and accepted. 
Respondents from the Ministry of Public Security described the 2005 policy as an 
“order” from the Prime Minister, which quickly speeded up the approval process. In the 
following quote, a respondent explains how the policy-making process was shortened in 
2005 once it became a priority for the Prime Minister: “the policy-making process is 
sprinkled with obstacles. It’s deliberate. There are many, many, many stages, 
requirements. You have to have all the necessary tools, everything required… You have 
to be particularly motivated…However, when the order comes from the Minister, well, 
then it’s much easier. We don’t have to do any convincing internally. But even in this 
case you still have to pass through the same stages…it’s a minimum of six months.”  
  The following historical narrative illustrates the step-by-step process by which the 
policy change came about, and the key moments and turning points in the years leading 
up to 2005. The information offers an illustration of the larger political context that was 
building around the subject of street gangs and how specific events helped to catapult the 
issue of urban violence to the top of the policy agenda, first in 2004 and again in 2005. 
  
2002 
• Six people are injured in a gun fight at an after-hours bar in a middle-class suburb of 
Montreal. The perpetrators are alleged to be member of rival street gangs. The Minister of 





Minister and police chiefs agree to develop an action plan on street gangs for the regions of 
the province most affected. Police chiefs also propose the creation of two regional police 
squads: one for the cities of Montreal, Laval and Longueil, and a second for Quebec City. 
• Days later, the police chiefs meet separately with the “Securité du Québec” (SQ), the 
provincial law enforcement agency. The SQ proposes the establishment of a provincial 
coordinating committee on street gangs to facilitate cooperation between police departments. 
• The Montreal and Quebec police departments submit funding proposals for regional anti-
gang policing to the Ministry of Public Security. The two proposals fall through the cracks, 
due to a change in leadership, and the funding is not awarded.  
• The Quebec City police department formulates its own policy against street gangs and 
presents it to the Ministry of Public Security. The Ministry refuses to award any funding to 
the plan. In the same month, the Montreal police submits a second funding proposal for a 
regional anti-gang squad, and it too is turned down by Cabinet. 
• A federal committee that comprises law enforcement and criminal justice representatives 
from across Canada meets and decides that youth gangs will be a new strategic priority. The 
special committee on organized crime of the federal government also decides to create a 
working group on youth gangs, which is then asked to put together a plan for the country. 
• Controversy and public protests erupt in Quebec City after the police expose and dismantle a 
child prostitution network active in the city, an operation called “Scorpion.”  
 
2004 






• The Minister immediately calls the association of police chiefs to a meeting to discuss the 
gun shootings. The police chiefs once again press the Minister to fund their anti-gang police 
squads.  
• The deputy minister of the Ministry of Public Security instructs administrators in the division 
for policing and prevention to establish a sub-committee on street gangs, which would then 
draft an action plan and outline possible funding scenarios for the Ministry. 
• The Montreal police department unveils its own policy against street gangs and presents it to 
the new provincial sub-committee on gangs.  
 
2005 
• In spring, the sub-committee on street gangs receives and evaluates the first draft of the 
provincial policy. Representatives of social service agencies on the committee criticize the 
policy for being “too repressive.” Policy-makers are asked to make revisions. A few weeks 
later, a second draft of the policy is submitted to authorities in the Ministry of Public 
Security. 
• In the fall, the uprisings explode in the Paris suburbs following the fatal police shooting of 
two young racial minority men. After consulting with administrators in the Ministry of Public 
Security, the Prime Minister of Quebec declares street gangs a priority of his administration 
and instructs policy-makers to fast-track the policy.  
• Simultaneously, the federal government announces it will transfer a multi-million-dollar 
budget for the provinces to fight against street gangs and illegal guns. 
• In December, policy-makers in the MPS submit a final version of the policy and it is 






Focusing Events and the Media  
 
 Across the interviews, respondents from the Ministry of Public Security were unanimous 
in asserting that media coverage of the urban violence in 2004 and 2005 played a direct role in 
building the sense of political urgency around the urban violence. Had the urban violence not 
become such a heated and public issue in the early 2000, it is not altogether certain the policy 
process would have gone as far as it did. As already indicated, it was only after gun shootings 
broke out in public spaces, when the safety of the larger public became a primary concern, that 
politicians were persuaded to act. Media coverage of urban violence and acts of delinquency and 
crime committed by racial minority youth had been gathering pace since the 1990s, although the 
quantity of the coverage is said to have exploded in the 2000s. One respondent claimed the 
intensity of the media coverage at that time made it nearly impossible for the government not to 
act or at least be seen to act (my italics). S/he stated, “there was an obligation there. I believe the 
government did not have the choice but to do something.” In another interview, a respondent 
claimed the media coverage of gun shootings in those years significantly intensified the sense of 
political urgency. S/he indicated: “I believe it was highly publicized, at some point. It was really 
an issue that was well-publicized and seized the public at the same time as politicians, and the 
necessity of acting…[and then] we had the money [from the federal government]. That’s it, the 
government told us to act. You go ahead and sweep criminals off the street, and you do 
prevention. It was easy. It accelerated the process, and made it easier to get funding.” 
 It is not an overstatement to argue that a moral panic emerged around street gangs in the 





concerned about the violence, the intensity and dramatic nature of the media coverage appears to 
have outweighed the true extent of the problem. Respondents from the Ministry of Public 
Security themselves asserted that the media coverage was frequently sensationalistic and 
inaccurate. An official in the Ministry of Public Security recalled, “it was crazy how the media 
was interested and would distort the problem.” Another governmental official who was involved 
in the policy, though from a different ministry, remembers a period of media frenzy in the mid- 
to late 2000s when news articles about street gangs were being published on a daily and weekly 
basis. Researchers who have studied the media coverage on street gangs in Quebec speak of a 
strong and consistent pattern of racialization of street gangs, in which black and Latino males 
were made out to be the main culprits (Brousseau, Guay and Fredette, 2015; Symons 1999; 
Laramée, 2012). One study also concluded that the mainstream media would routinely select the 
most dramatic and violent of incidents to publish (Laramée 2012). 
  The academic literature outlines four criteria by which to define a moral panic and all 
four were visible in the media coverage on “street gangs” in the early 2000s in Quebec (Laramée 
2012; McCorckle and Miethe 2002). First, a moral panic always concerns the behavior of a sub-
group within society that is stigmatized and/or seen as deviant and outside the norm. The more 
marginal and powerless the group, the easier it is for a moral panic to catch on and spread. 
Secondly, a moral panic exists when media coverage of an issue is overblown; in essence, the 
perceived magnitude of the issue is disproportionate to its actual scale. Thirdly, a moral panic 
tends to be short-lived and waxes and wanes in tune with changing political circumstance. 
Finally, a moral panic is most often manufactured by law enforcement, in collaboration with the 
media (McCorkle and Miethe 2002). For law enforcement agencies, moral panics allow them to 





gatekeepers for news about crime, and so journalists are inclined to stick to the same storylines 
as law enforcement (Laramée 2012). McCorkle and Miethe (2002) claim that under a moral 
panic, law enforcement will tend to portray a crime threat as imminent and liable to get out 
control if not immediately controlled. These were precisely the claims police chiefs in Quebec 
articulated to the Ministry in the early 2000s.  
In addition to the general media climate on street gangs in the early 2000s, distinct 
“focusing events” had a disproportionate impact on the decision-making of elected officials 
in the Ministry of Public Security. As discussed in Chapter One of this dissertation, a 
“focusing event” is a sudden, often explosive incident, that generates intense media and 
public attention because of the danger it is seen to pose to a society or a community. 
Focusing events, according to Kingdon (1995) create “policy windows,” an opening for 
policy entrepreneurs and interest groups to compete for their favored policy to be considered. 
The first focusing event in Quebec happened in 2003, when several individuals were injured 
in gun fight at an after-hours bar in a suburb of the Island of Montreal. Within the same 
week, the Minister called the police chiefs to a meeting to discuss the shootings. At the 
meeting, they agreed that a provincial strategy for the regions of Quebec most affected by 
street gangs ought to be created, yet nothing firmer came out of the meeting. In the 
meantime, the police departments of Montreal and Quebec City submitted proposals for 
funding to pay for new regional anti-gang police squads. The Ministry denied them the 
financing. Little progress was made on the policy until September 2004, when gun violence 
broke out again in Montreal and the Minister convened a second meeting with police chiefs. 
The gun violence on this occasion seems to have elevated the sense of alarm, because the 





people congregate every day. At this second meeting, the Minister and police chiefs agree to 
deploy the resources of the state in order to better understand and grapple with the problem. 
The policy-making process begins in earnest and a first draft of the policy is completed 
several months later in spring 2005.  
Another turning point in the policy process occurred in October 2005, when the 
uprisings up in the Paris suburbs exploded due to the fatal police killing of two young racial 
minority males. Upon seeing these events, the Quebec Prime Minister turned to his advisers 
and asked if a similar crisis could unfold in Montreal. The response from advisers was that 
such an eventuality was unlikely in Montreal, but that a provincial strategy against street 
gangs was still worth pursuing in order to prevent problems from worsening. After receiving 
this advice, the Prime Minister took little time to declare street gangs a priority of his 
administration. At this pivotal stage, a focusing event (i.e., Paris) did not exert an immediate 
effect on the agenda-setting, although it did persuade politicians, principally the Prime 
Minister, to pay closer attention to the issue. The Prime Minister ultimately based his 
decision on the advice of administrators in the Ministry of Public Security, the same team of 
administrators that had been busy drafting a policy for already a year.  
The third focusing event that bore an indirect impact on the policy was the public 
controversy over the child prostitution network uncovered in Quebec City in 2002. While the 
child commercial sex operation was not controlled by youth nor by a so-called street gang, 
the media portrayed it in that light. When the controversy broke out, well-connected 
individuals from Quebec City went knocking on the doors of officials, demanding they do 
something about sexual exploitation. In addition, local organizations made vocal appeals in 





an administrator from the Ministry claims local non-profit organizations would sometimes 
make strategic use of the media to turn the spotlight onto their issues and pressure the 
government into releasing funds. S/he reflected: “[There are] citizens, organizations who 
like to feed the media. Recently we saw it with sexual exploitation. It was covered a lot in the 
press. But there were community organizations that were saying yes, we receive teenager 
girls who are engaged in prostitution and we don’t have the means to assist them. But the 
game that’s going on behind that is, we know, maybe there is an action in the works and 
there will be money. Therefore, in terms of media coverage, the street gang issue was 
nourished quite a lot.” 
Throughout the interviews, respondents suggested the Ministry of Public Security is 
caught in a constant battle with the press, either trying to stay ahead of scandals or taking direct 
action in response to criticisms and incidents reported in the media. One respondent went so far 
as to say that most of the Ministry’s policies arise in reaction to media coverage, rather than the 
reverse. S/he cited the recent case of the policy against sexual exploitation, which had been 
raised to priority status and fast-tracked after the high-profile press coverage of young women 
who had absconded from detention centers after being supposedly saved from commercial sex 
work. The press cried foul and government authorities were held responsible for allowing it to 
happen. The same respondent explained that only days before, the Ministry had been forced to 
react once again to an article in a French daily accusing the Quebec police of being less effective 
than in Ontario in controlling the commercial sex industry. In the following quote, the 
respondent describes how the Ministry was forced to issue an immediate public statement, 
reassuring the public that it had established a policy to deal with sexual exploitation. S/he 





exploitation of young women]. That it had policies in place. That strategies were already being 





Observers from within Quebec were more likely to emphasize the impact of local events 
and actors on the policy change, and diminished the significance of the federal transfer of money 
in 2005 as a factor that was “in the picture,” so to speak, but not necessarily pivotal. It is true that 
the policy change was already well underway by the time the federal transfer came about in the 
fall of 2005. However, it is hard to believe that the policy discussions happening on street gangs 
at the federal level during those years did not give Quebec officials some incentive to push 
forward when they did. In addition, no one knows if the Prime Minister of Quebec would have 
been as ready to declare street gangs a priority in October 2005 if the federal government had not 
been preparing to release a multi-million-dollar budget. One thing is certain: the Street Gang 
Intervention would not have been as extensive or as ambitious without the $42 million-dollar 
budget from the federal government. As indicated earlier, by the spring of 2004, elected officials 
in Quebec had committed to paying only $30,000 for the salary of a provincial coordinator on 
street gangs, with the rest covered by the federal government. In light of these factors, it might be 
said that the federal government’s influence on Street Gang Intervention was at once ideological 
and instrumental; it lent legitimacy to the fight against street gangs, and bolstered and broadened 





  It is also worth noting that the subjects of public security and crime are ones that seem to 
involve a characteristically high level of multi-level collaboration between municipal, provincial, 
territorial, and federal authorities in Canada. As described earlier in the chapter, law enforcement 
officials from Quebec sit on federal committees in which they meet regularly with national 
representatives to share information and plan policy. In other areas of public policy in Quebec, 
such as health and education, provincial agencies possess greater independence vis-à-vis the 
federal government. The policy process on street gangs in Quebec was surprisingly similar in 
timing and substance to discussions that were happening at the federal level at the time. For 
example, in a meeting of federal, provincial, and territorial agencies in 2002, participants agreed 
to establish youth gangs as a new strategic priority in the fight against organized crime in 
Canada. The federal government then immediately launched a committee, which was given the 
responsibility of drafting a national policy against youth gangs. By December 2003, the 
committee had finished a first draft of the federal action plan. By May 2004, a second version of 
the federal policy was ready to be examined and approved. Though the final contents and 
execution of that strategy remain unknown, it is interesting to note that the broad outlines of the 
federal policy on youth gangs and Quebec’s own strategy were roughly similar. In both cases, 
the main objectives were: 1) creation of a communication strategy to inform the broader public 
about gangs and engage local communities in mobilizing against gangs, 2) formation of multi-
disciplinary teams in which law enforcement, immigration and border security collaborate 
together (similar to the anti-gang policing and investigative units of Quebec), 3) a national 







 The ultimate power to approve, delay, or reject any given policy rests with the Treasury 
and Cabinet. Before any policy even reaches that final stage, it must first be accepted by the 
deputy Ministers and the Minister of Public Security, who then take it upon themselves to 
present it to the Cabinet. As shown earlier, the idea of launching a provincial strategy against 
street gangs did not originate with elected officials in the Ministry of Public Security, but rather 
with police chiefs, who began lobbying the Ministry in the early 2000s, at least a couple of years 
before the Minister finally agreed to authorize it in the fall of 2004. The Minister seems to have 
been convinced of the need for a policy against street after an outbreak of gun violence in the 
summer of 2004. As indicated earlier, prior to the events of that summer, the Ministry of Public 
Security had, on two separate occasions, refused to approve the funding requests submitted by 
police chiefs from Montreal and Quebec City.  
In the fall of 2004, the precise scope of the policy and its budgetary allocations were still 
uncertain. The Minister agreed with police chiefs to look at ways of paying for the salary of a 
provincial coordinator and re-distributing existing police units towards street gangs, though no 
further financial commitments were made. Everything changed when the Paris uprisings 
occurred in October 2005 and the province’s Prime Minister suddenly took notice. The Prime 
Minister was told that while violent protests were unlikely to occur in Montreal, the situation 
could easily get out of hand if something were not done to prevent it. The Prime Minister 
subsequently authorized the Ministry of Public Security to form an action plan. In the quote that 
follows, an administrator within the Ministry of Public Security explains how the order for the 
policy came first from the Prime Minister, who then delegated the responsibility to the Minister 
of Public Security, and he then instructed his deputy Ministers to take the lead. The Deputy 





the policy. S/he recounted: “The preoccupation came from the Prime Minister. It was an order 
from the Minister. The Minister sent the order down to the associate deputy ministers. Then, it 
landed on our desks. When it falls on our desk, we come up with a response that builds on 
actions that were already exploring or pursuing and that align with the government’s agenda.”  
Around the time the policy for Phase 1 was being discussed, it so happened that the 
deputy ministers of the Ministry Public Security had both spent their careers in the police 
service. According to one respondent, the backgrounds of the deputy ministers may have made 
them more willing to support the Street Gang Intervention, because of their former ties to police 
services. More than once, respondents indicated that once elected, elected officials in the 
Ministry will try to promote and advance their “pet projects.” The current Minister is apparently 
a fan of prevention and has taken every opportunity since he was appointed to speak of his 
commitment to strengthening the Ministry’s involvement in prevention. The following quote 
from a respondent sums up these observations: “Depending who is there [in office] and his/her 
beliefs about intervention…here we had an associate deputy minister and deputy minister who 
were both from the police force, so it oriented things a bit. The priority was more on police 
during the first and second plan. It’s the first time we see such a great interest in prevention 
[with the current Minister]. And he [the Minister] says it every time he goes out, that he wants 
more for prevention and that we can expect to see actions.” In another interview, a respondent 
pointed out that when police chiefs were lobbying the Minister of Public Security and Minister 
of Justice for the policy in the early to mid-2000s, they were acting in collaboration with deputy 
ministers. In other words, the deputy Ministers from the Ministry of Public Security and Ministry 
of Justice—both of whom had risen through the ranks of the police force—were on the side of 





In Street Gang Intervention, career bureaucrats within the Ministry of Public Security 
played a role in convincing the Prime Minister to approve it in the fall of 2005. As permanent 
staff, administrators in the Ministry of Public Security claim their role is strictly advisory and 
they possess neither the authority nor the capacity to influence policy decisions. Yet, they 
explained that they will often keep several dossiers active and prepare themselves for the 
possibility that new issues will come up on the Ministry’s policy agenda. When the Prime 
Minister turned to his advisers to ask if uprisings like the ones in Paris could occur in Montreal, 
administrators in the Ministry of Public Security who had already been busy drafting the policy 
were asked to render their advice. A respondent described the moment in this way: “Instead of 
telling the Prime Minister that we don’t have any problems at home, that it should not happen, 
we took the occasion to say that despite this, there are things happening among youth that are 
important and it would be a good idea to put in place an action plan against street gangs that 
would simultaneously address components such as the circulation of guns, intimidation…The 
dossiers on which we were already working.” In another interview, a respondent insisted on the 
crucial role of one top administrator at the time, a person who was well-connected in and outside 
the Ministry and who had been outspoken in recommending a full-scale strategy against street 
gangs in her/his meetings with senior officials. S/he explained, “And it is a bit [name of the 
administrator and department head] who initiated, who had the will to say, “we have to 
intervene on street gangs” and it is him/her who started to take steps so that we could attack the 
problem.”  
 Although the Street Gang Intervention would never have seen the light of day had it not 
received the go-ahead from the Prime Minister and his Cabinet, the very idea of a provincial 





role as policy entrepreneurs, the subject of the urban violence might have been interpreted and 
handled in entirely different way and not received the amount of high-level attention.  
Within the Ministry of Public Security and Ministry of Justice, the police chiefs’ 
association holds a privileged position vis-à-vis Ministers and deputy Ministers and regularly 
advises them on issues requiring attention and action. Police chiefs are viewed as being at the 
“frontlines” in the fight against crime and best placed to know when issues are worthy of 
attention or not. One respondent described the police chiefs as holding a position that is “very, 
very, very present” at the political level. In his own words, “the association of police chiefs, at 
the level of the Ministry of Public Security and Ministry of Justice, is very, very, very present. It 
is they who must alert the authorities. You cannot follow the parade. You have to be ahead of the 
parade.”  For one official who was part of the lobbying effort organized by police chiefs, s/he 
credits the policy change to what s/he called “the base,” that is, the police chiefs’ association and 
deputy ministers. When questioned about the influence of the Prime Minister on the policy 
change in 2005, the same respondent claimed that when the policy was announced, the Prime 
Minister received the credit, but the real work of conceiving and advocating for the policy came 
from “the base.” The following is the respondent’s comment in full: “At the political level we 
were told, “ok it’s alright, the Prime Minister is responsible for the policy.” But the Prime 
Minister did not see the problem of street gangs in his tea cups…in his tea leaves in the morning 
over breakfast. It came from the base, and the base brought it up [to a higher level].” He added, 
“it is the Minister of Justice and Minister of Public Security who made the recommendations, 
[and] who pressed for the policy.” 
Throughout the early to mid-2000s, police chiefs were actively lobbying and briefing 





integrated provincial strategy that would allow police departments to cooperate more closely. 
Police chiefs were convinced that the same inter-departmental strategy that had been used in the 
fight against “biker gangs” in Quebec in the 1990s would work successfully with street gangs. In 
the 1990s, police departments had formed “regional squads” in which to allow teams of federal, 
provincial, and municipal police officers and intelligence personnel to work together in 
surveilling and clamping down on the “biker gangs.” An official from the Ministry described 
how the model of the regional squads was re-deployed for their fight against street gangs: “So, 
we took the successful method with the biker gangs and the “mixed regional police squads,” in 
which you can have in the same team, someone from the Montreal police, the Quebec provincial 
police, the [Canadian] Royal Mounted Police, and another body from the municipal police 
services. In other words, mixed teams. We wanted them to take off their organizational identities, 
“blue,” “green,” or “blue and black,” and work as a team. Thus, it’s a way of doing things that 
is effective. They develop their network and gain confidence in each other.”  
In the years leading up to 2005, police chiefs were pressuring the Ministry to initiate a 
province-wide scheme, because they insisted it was the only way for them to manage the issue, 
as one official remembers, “We started to talk about it in 2004. The [police chiefs] knew not to 
wait until it spread [street gangs]. It was really necessary to control them, to intervene, and to 
give ourselves tools to act…because it was starting to spread. It was attaining a certain 
importance. And then, well evidently, we had to equip ourselves.” Among police chiefs, the most 
vocal and active in lobbying for the policy were those from the police departments of Montreal 
and Quebec City, the two departments most eager to obtain funding for their own strategic plans 
on street gangs. One respondent claims the Ministry even modelled its policy on the Montreal 





she explained: “The four axes of the plan, it is copied from what Montreal was already doing for 
three or four years. It is copy and pasted. It’s literally that.” Both the Ministry’s policy and the 
Montreal police department’s policy were built around the following four axes: repression (or 
enforcement), intervention, communication, and research. 
 
Outline of the Street Gang Intervention Plan 
 
The previous section described the factors that led up to the Prime Minister’s decision to 
authorize a provincial policy on street gangs in 2005. The present section shifts the attention onto 
the second phase of the policy process, when policy-makers elaborated the finer details of the 
policy. The policy writing team was made up of no more than three or four bureaucrats from the 
division for policing and prevention in the Ministry of Public Security, who worked in 
collaboration with an inter-ministerial working group formed in 2004 to lead and supervise the 
policy. When Phase 2 of the policy was being written in 2009, the social service agencies on the 
inter-ministerial committee had dropped out and officials from the Ministry of Public Security 
found themselves working alone to defend and advocate for the policy’s renewal.  
  Before policy-makers could present the draft policy for Phase 1 to Cabinet, it first had to 
be reviewed and endorsed by the members of the inter-ministerial working group. On the 
working group were representatives of the provincial and municipal law enforcement agencies, 
the criminal justice system, and social service ministries. The list of social service ministries on 
the committee for Phase 1 included: 1) the Ministry of Health and Social Services, 2) the child 
welfare department (which falls under the Ministry of Health and Social Services); 3) the 





Leisure, as it was known at the time. Among the representatives from the child welfare 
department were senior researchers attached the agency’s research unit, called the “Institute for 
Research on the Social Development of Children.” The Ministry of Immigration, Diversity, and 
Inclusion (or the Ministry of Immigration and Cultural Communities as it was called then) joined 
the inter-ministerial working group only in 2007, after it had attracted the attention of policy-
makers in the Ministry of Public Security for publishing a research report on the black 
community in Montreal. Once it came on board, the Ministry of Immigration, Diversity, and 
Inclusion received a special budget of several million dollars from the Cabinet to distribute to 
community organizations working with racial minority and immigrant youth in Montreal. It was 
the only Ministry on the inter-ministerial committee to have been given a pot of money from the 
Cabinet and not expected to rely on its own reserves. 
  In forming the inter-ministerial working group, the Ministry of Public Security was 
hoping the social service ministries would take on the role of leading and financing prevention 
activities on street gangs, yet this did not materialize, at least not to the extent that policy-makers 
had envisioned. Apart from the Ministry of Immigration, Diversity, and Inclusion, the other only 
active government agency on the working group was the child welfare department. The 
remaining three partners—employment, health and social services, and education—contributed 
little or nothing to the policy. In particular, the Ministry of Employment and Social Solidarity did 
not supply any funding, was the least involved of all the Ministries and the first to drop-out of 
the working group. The department of education funded the production of a couple of 
pedagogical tools for primary and secondary schools on the theme of “street gangs.” The 
Ministry of Health and Social Services agreed to dedicate one of its health periodicals to the 





gradually stopped coming to meetings and essentially dropped-out of the working group. By the 
time Phase 2 arrived, the Ministry of Immigration, Diversity and Inclusion was the only 
government agency still showing up for meetings. Given the limited involvement of social 
service agencies, the policy was not the full-fledged inter-ministerial effort that it was expected 
to be. In the end, the leading proponents and participants in the policy were the state’s coercive 
institutions—the same agencies that stood to gain the most materially and strategically from the 
policy—that is, law enforcement, prisons, courts, and child welfare.  
  The policy process for Phase 1 and 2 was a noticeably closed-door affair, open only to 
state agencies and a few well-connected non-profit organizations. Even the existence of the plan 
was kept quiet, because black community leaders interviewed for the present study were 
surprisingly unaware of its existence and could not recall ever having been invited to any 
meetings to discuss the policy. One of the few community organizations to have had any say in 
the policy process is a non-profit group involved in street outreach or “street work” (“travail de 
rue” in French) and with a presence in several neighborhoods across Montreal. One cannot help 
but wonder if the secrecy around the policy was deliberate, so as not to arouse any controversy or 
opposition. Had black community organizations been made aware of the policy, it is quite likely 
they would have raised concerns about its likely discriminatory impact on black youth. In the 
end, the policy did sour relations between the police and racial minority youth in neighborhoods 
where the anti-gang squads were deployed. In fact, the introduction of the anti-gang squads may 
be said to have played a causal role in precipitating an uprising in one neighborhood in 2009, 
after a police officer fatally shot an innocent young minority male. Quantitative data for the post-
2006 period also showed that the proportion of black citizens randomly stopped and arrested by 





  In Phases One and Two of the Street Gang Intervention, up to 70% of the budget ($42 
million) went into law enforcement and the criminal justice system. The next most important 
component was “intervention,” which was managed by the child welfare department and 
consisted largely of clinical and counselling services to assist young people in avoiding or 
desisting from gangs. The budget for prevention came in third place, with a total of $1.5 million 
per year allocated to non-profit organizations working on the prevention of juvenile delinquency 
and sexual exploitation across the province. A separate budget for prevention, of approximately 
$3 million, was allocated to the Ministry of Immigration, Diversity and Inclusion for Phase 1 and 
2, and it awarded the funds to community organizations working with immigrant and racial 
minority youth in Montreal. The fourth component of the policy, research and communication, 
came with a budget of $800,000. A veritable explosion of publications on street gangs would 
follow, produced by university faculty and by doctoral and masters’ students.  
  The support for law enforcement and criminal justice consisted of the following : 
 
1) Creation of six regional investigative and police squads on gangs, modelled on the squads 
developed to end the conflict between so-called biker gangs in the 1990s. The squads 
were assigned to several major cities of the province, although the largest budget went 
towards the police departments of Montreal and Quebec City; 
2) Appointment of a provincial coordinator on street gangs; 
3) Recruitment of an “information officer” on street gangs for the province’s bureau for 
investigation; 





5) Training to educate prosecutors and expert witnesses on ways to detect and manage cases 
of crimes committed by street gangs; 
6) Creation of a provincial database on street gangs; 
7) Training for prison personnel on managing the presence of gang members in jails; 
8) Organization of an international conference on street gangs. 
 
Explanations for the Policy Design 
 
The following pages describe the key actors, perspectives, ideas, and organizational 
interests that played a role in the policy-making process. The findings suggest that the policy’s 
focus on enforcement and detention was the end result of four key variables: a) the policy’s 
institutional home in the Ministry of Public Security; b) the centralization of policy-making in 
Quebec; c) weaknesses in the inter-ministerial coalition, and; d) the backgrounds of the 
institutions and organizations with a strategic interest in the policy. The most active and 
enterprising groups on the inter-ministerial committee were police chiefs and the child welfare 
department of Montreal, two agencies that stood to gain financially and strategically from the 
policy. The child welfare department would go on to lead a multi-million dollar clinical and 
research program on street gangs. The absence of any significant cooperation from social service 
ministries on the committee produced a plan that was weak on prevention. These factors 
combined allowed the Montreal police’s expertise on “street gangs” to be accepted as factual, 






Law enforcement and the Ministry of Public Security  
 
  From the outset, the chief goal of the Street Gang Intervention was to control the gun 
violence in Montreal. In the press and governmental circles, the incidents were framed above all 
as problems of public security and crime that were best handled by law enforcement. One official 
from the Ministry of Public Security recalled, “it [the gun violence] was seen as a problem of 
public security. That is why it [the policy] started from the Ministry of Public Security.” In 
another interview, an official claimed the resounding call from the media and the public at the 
time was for the government to be tough on crime and to swiftly arrest and punish the offenders. 
Inside the Ministry of Public Security, the conversation was slightly more nuanced and policy-
makers understood that it was not enough to apprehend offenders if the violence was to be ended 
for good. The respondent stated: “The question was posed in terms of...there was media pressure. 
There were injured victims. There were gun shootings. It was a question of public security. [The 
message was] Go ahead and sweep them off the streets, arrest them and put them in prison. And 
this was to some extent what the population was demanding. But, our discourse [as policy-
makers] was to say, it’s good to arrest them, but there will be others. It is necessary to attack the 
roots of the problem.”   
  Concerns with public security, whether real or imagined, were not the sole motivating 
factor for the policy, at least for the Montreal police. At the time, law enforcement in Montreal 
claimed it was struggling to comprehend and deal with violent conflicts that were erupting not 
only between rival groups of young people, but also between police officers and local residents. 
Apparently, physical altercations were flaring-up between police officers and groups of racial 





appears to have been to shore-up the capacity of the Montreal police in neighborhoods where its 
legitimacy and authority were under threat. The following quote from one of the policy-makers 
summarizes this opinion: “In Montreal, there was the war between the Reds and Blues. There 
were street gangs, especially in [Neighborhood A] and [Neighborhood B]. There was the Crack 
Down Posse [name of one group] and the Reds. They were in conflict. We would arrest them and 
put them in detention. A whole range of things was happening. There was a lot of shooting, 
between [Neighborhood A and Neighborhood B], and there were situations where they [local 
youth] would encircle the police. Therefore, there was intimidation towards police officers. That 
was also a concern. It was a whole learning process at the level of intervention, to figure out 
how to intervene correctly. And the firearms as well. The preoccupation was with public 
security, because people were walking around with guns.” A constant refrain in interviews with 
officials from the Ministry of Public Security was the belief that the urban violence in the early 
2000s was entirely new and unfamiliar and that local law enforcement was feeling besieged by 
events it was neither able to comprehend nor bring under control. In the following quotation, an 
official goes as far as to depict the climate in those years as “anarchic,” which says something of 
the fear and bewilderment that authorities were experiencing at the time. The official indicated: 
“Well, the phenomenon of street was very hard. There was a lot of violence. It is worse in the US 
but there were neighborhoods where it was almost anarchy. The neighborhoods were living 
under the reign of street gangs. There was this violence that was beginning to emerge in certain 
neighborhoods of Montreal that was worrying the local population, and on which police officers 
had no control. Because we didn’t know the phenomenon. And the local community sector was 
also confronted with this problem and wanted to react, but they didn’t necessarily know how and 





  The manner in which social problems enter onto the policy agenda is never value-neutral. 
The moral panic about street gangs in the mid-2000s in Montreal coincided directly with the 
timing of the policy change. It helped, among other things, to establish the case for the 
government to proceed with a swift and sweeping response to the violence. In a startling 
revelation published in a French newspaper in 2010, a senior official of the Montreal police 
admitted that the priority accorded to gangs in the mid-2000s had less to do with the actual threat 
of crimes committed by street gangs than with the sense of insecurity they were creating in the 
population. He explained, “[the prioritization of gangs] It is absolutely justified. It is on the 
feeling of public security that we are intervening” (Le Devoir 2010). In the same article, the 
director goes on to state that crimes committed by street gangs happen in public spaces, where 
the safety of the public is viewed as being most at risk. In contrast, the director explained, crimes 
like domestic violence happen behind closed doors and do not arouse the same level of fear and 
public unease. In his own words, the director stated: “people have the impression that street 
gangs are gaining a lot, a lot, and a lot of impact, and probably a bit more than we see on the 
ground. Understandably, when you represent 2,3, or 4% of total crime, yet receive 60-70% of the 
media coverage, people have the impression that, on the ground, street gangs are proliferating 
and it is not necessarily the case.”  
  In interviews, policy-makers in the Ministry of Public Security were prepared to admit 
that the original predictions about the threat of the violence in Montreal at the start of Phase 1 
had been overstated. Already by Phase 2 of the plan in 2010, incidents of gun violence and 
homicide had begun to fall and racial stereotypes about a rise in mostly black youth gangs 





about the dangers posed by street gangs were overblown, and that race was a factor in 
heightening the sense of alarm and the risk assessment of young people’s criminal tendencies: 
 
“Yes, I think the phenomenon has been contained…controlled. Anyway, it does 
not have the same dimension. It lost its character. The worry at the beginning. As 
an unknown phenomenon, we didn’t know where it would lead. We had the 
impression that these kids were hopeless…that they had nothing to lose, and were 
going to develop criminal careers. The worries were undoubtedly unjustified. And 
at the time, there was also a sense of failure in all of this. You know? For the 
society. [There was] A degree of incomprehension. We saw it as an expression of 
revolt [from youth]. The phenomenon of gangs began in 1996, 1997, and in 2000 
we already had the first big conference on street gangs. The concerns were already 
there. We were searching…trying to understand what is this phenomenon. What 
can we do to understand it? Does the fact that it was mainly racial minority youth, 
did that provoke more concern? I would almost have to say yes, maybe yes.”  
  
  In the mid-2000s, the evidence that police units and criminologists were disseminating 
about street gangs was frequently anecdotal, vague, and rife with racial stereotypes. According to 
one police document, an estimated number of 12 street gangs were active in Montreal in the mid-
2000s, with a total of roughly 350 members (Plante 2007). Not only do these figures seem low in 
comparison with the public portrayal of the threat, but they are quite possibly over-estimates, 
given the police’s well-known tendency for inflating crime statistics. Other police reports for the 





the mid- to late-2000s. For example, one report shows that in 2006, 29% of homicides in 
Montreal, or 12 out of 42, were allegedly committed by street gangs. 
 
Street Gangs and the Language of Organized Crime 
 
  One of the most profound implications of the law enforcement’s role in developing the 
Street Gang Intervention was the decision to embrace a concept of street gangs that conflated 
youth delinquency with organized crime. The actual definition of a street gang was one coined 
by the Montreal police. In French, it states (Hamel et al. 2013: 8): 
  
“Le gang de rue est un regroupement plus ou moins structuré d’adolescents ou de 
jeunes adultes qui privilégie la force de l’intimidation du groupe et la violence 
pour accomplir des actes criminels, dans le but d’obtenir pouvoir et 
reconnaissance et/ou de contrôler des sphères d’activités lucratives” 
 
  A translation of the definition in English follows: “A street gang is a network of 
adolescents and young adults that is more or less structured and uses intimidation and violence to 
carry out criminal actors, in the goal of acquiring power and recognition and/or controlling 
lucrative spheres of activity.” The policy document for the Street Gang Intervention also spells 
out three-part typology that describes street gangs as functioning along a continuum from “bands 
of delinquent youth” (“bandes de jeunes”), to emerging gangs (“gang émergents”), and major 
gangs (“gangs majeurs”). Both of these definitions imply that street gangs operate on the same 





more serious cases of law-breaking. Such a slippery slope would seem to have given the police 
wider powers to intercept young people, especially when they are in groups, on the vague notion 
that they were either engaged in gang activity or liable to join one in the future.  
  The decision to associate street gangs with organized crime caused some friction among 
the social service partners involved in the Street Gang Intervention. In a final evaluation of the 
Street Gang Intervention, social service agencies reported that they found the concept of street 
gangs “too restrictive” and believed the Ministry of Public Security should not have conflated 
juvenile delinquency with adult organized crime, because they are much too distinct (Anstett, 
Sauvain, Jacob and Veil 2014: 45). According to community organizations, juvenile delinquency 
generally happens in ways that are spontaneous, fluid, and transient, and anything but organized. 
These disagreements over the definition of gangs plagued the policy from beginning to end and 
bore direct implications for the policy design. Social service departments on the inter-ministerial 
working group expressed reservations about the draft of the first policy in spring 2005, claiming 
it was “too repressive.” Policy-makers were then asked to revise the draft and establish a more 
even balance between enforcement and prevention. Unconfirmed reports about the first 
evaluation of the policy, completed in 2009, indicate that social service partners still found the 
policy too punitive, even after the revisions were supposed to have been made. It would appear, 
therefore, that debates in the early stages of the policy process did not fundamentally alter the 
law enforcement thrust of the policy. In Phase 2, a more serious attempt was apparently made to 
improve the policy’s support for community-based prevention, though the precise changes are 
unknown. One change would appear to have been the funding granted in 2007 for racial minority 
and immigrant youth in Montreal, which the Ministry of Immigration, Diversity, and Inclusion 






Conceptions of Race and Delinquency 
 
In devising the policy, policy-makers asserted that they were cognizant of the need for a 
multi-pronged strategy that would address not just the symptoms of the violence, but also its root 
causes. They explained that the Ministry of Public Security possesses neither the capacity nor the 
mandate to tackle the social dimensions of issues like youth delinquency, and sought out the 
cooperation of fellow social service departments for that purpose. Yet, the social service 
ministries on the inter-ministerial working group wound up playing limited roles, as will be 
explained in more detail later in the chapter. Despite this, the plan was presented in writing and 
publicly as an inter-ministerial effort, even if though the true extent of the partnerships remained 
low. In reality, the Ministry of Public Security remained the policy’s primary author and leader.  
The Ministry of Public Security is essentially the political and administrative arm of law 
enforcement and criminal justice. Its other responsibilities include border security, fire services, 
and disaster relief and management. As one respondent articulated, “we have a function that is 
mostly repressive, and a small role in prevention.” This disciplinary function of the institution 
would translate into a policy that privileges individual, psychological, and cultural explanations 
for delinquency and crime. For example, the policy says nothing about the wider structural and 
institutional contexts that produce urban poverty and racial exclusion. In addition, the document 
remains silent on racism and racial inequality. Social class and poverty are briefly acknowledged 
as causal determinants for delinquency, yet even here the weight is placed on individual and 
family-related factors, such as single-parent status, poor school performance, delinquent peers, 





The Street Gang Intervention is presented as a race-neutral policy, even though it subtly 
and implicitly ties “race” to delinquency. The document for Phase 1 of the policy indicates that 
certain “cultural communities”—the euphemism for racial and ethnic minorities in Quebec—are 
more affected than others by street gangs (Ministry of Public Security 2007). Phase 2 of the 
policy uses a similarly vague term, “ethno-cultural milieu” (Ministry of Public Security 2010). 
The policy does not go further to explain exactly who these cultural communities are, and why 
they might be more affected than others by street gangs. By not clarifying the significance of 
race or racial inequality, the policy effectively reproduces racial stereotypes of youth 
delinquency by implying there is something unique or deficient about these communities that 
makes them more vulnerable to the most violent forms of delinquency, namely street gangs.  
  Policy-makers in the Ministry of Public Security consistently and firmly maintained that 
the policy was race-neutral and that its fundamental objective was to address a crime problem, 
which so happened to involve racial minority youth. According to them, the fact that black and 
Latino males in Montreal were generally associated with street gangs in the minds of the media, 
the public, and law enforcement played no role in the policy-making. A couple of respondents 
did admit, however, that one possible unintended consequence of the policy may have been to 
reinforce racial stereotypes of youth deviance, but that this was no fault of the government, but 
rather of the self-interested behaviors of organizations seeking media attention and funding. 
  When one official was asked if race was considered in the policy-making, the blunt 
answer was, “at the political level, there was no concern with visible minorities.” In the 
following quote, another respondent explains that the prime goal of the policy was to fight crime 
and that the racial identities of young people were only incidental and bore no implications for 





not the youth were racial minorities]. I think of the biker gangs. They were generating an 
enormous amount of concern. It’s not become of who they represented, but because of their 
violence. At that time, there was a fear about these young people…And maybe an additional 
factor was that we knew they [the youth] were disgruntled. We knew they came from poverty, 
that they were living in poverty.” In a third interview, an official was asked if consideration was 
given to the policy’s potential impact on racial profiling, and she insisted if there was any 
profiling it was a profiling of “street gangs.” In her words, s/he indicated, “the issue for them 
[police chiefs] was to say that there is no racial profiling, but profiling of street gangs, in the 
same way that there is profiling of organized crime. They [police departments] work with facts, 
like they do for the Italians, the biker gangs.” In an earlier part of the interview, the same official 
would seem to have contradicted himself or herself by asserting that street gangs in that period 
were made of black youth, s/he expressed, “it is certain that for the population of street gangs, it 
was black people.” 
  In general, questions about race and racial inequality in the interviews with Ministry 
officials elicited uneasy and contradictory responses. One the one hand, officials were prepared 
to admit that black males had become the public face of street gangs in those years, yet resisted 
any notion that the plan was not color-blind. The following quote from an administrator in the 
Ministry reflects the lack of clarity and confusion around the topic of race: “At the level of 
organizations, in the enforcement of the law on street gangs, it was helpful to the cause not to 
point out the fact that we were talking about black youth. Because the branches of organized 
crime, we will talk about Italian crime, Arab crime…but we do not talk about black crime. 
Therefore, street gang was very much…for law enforcement…I am referring to the 2000 





think we could say it was just blacks. But frequently, if there were gun shootings, it was very 
much related to blacks.” 
 
The Americanization of Montreal Street Gangs 
 
In developing their analysis on street gangs and devising the policy, policy-makers in 
Quebec relied significantly on the expertise of criminologists, including American experts and 
Canadian university researchers. Due to the absence of any available research on street gangs in 
Quebec and Canada at the time, policy-makers turned primarily to the American criminological 
literature for answers. Policy-makers and criminologists likely made this association with the 
US, because of their beliefs about the racial identities of youth gangs in Montreal. By drawing 
from the US experience, policy-makers also seem to have formed exaggerated fears about the 
likely threat of the violence in Montreal. In the following quote, a respondent from the Ministry 
of Public Security describe how the concern in the mid-2000s was that black youth Montreal 
were importing a violent culture from the US. He expressed: “in the beginning, the concern was 
with the possibility that this culture would be imported, this fashion, the culture of gangs in the 
way that it was being played out violently in neighborhoods, in ghettos in the United States, in 
California, but mainly in Boston, Philadelphia, Washington, where it was fundamentally…where 
it was on the basis of communities: Haitians, Puerto Ricans, Arabs, and…that was a concern.”  
   In the years leading up to and during the policy-making process, criminologists in 
Quebec played a key role in building up the evidence to support the policy on street gangs, and 
largely by leaving unquestioned the implicit racial biases of the police. Criminologists and other 





conclusions from the US to analyze and even depict the urban violence in Quebec, without ever 
pausing to consider the possible variations in the historical and political context of the two 
regions. Among the examples of state-funded research on street gangs that gave credence to 
racial stereotypes of youth gangs are two reports published not long before or around the same 
the time that the Street Gang Intervention came under discussion. The first study was a 
qualitative investigation requested by the Montreal police in the mid-1990s and carried out by a 
team of Quebec researchers associated with the child welfare department. In the study, 
researchers completed interviews with 31 young people, all whom were said to have been active 
in a street gang either then or in the past (the study is the same one referred to above that was 
commissioned by the Montreal police). The entire sample of respondents was recruited from 
youth detention centers in Montreal, a somewhat unrepresentative group. In the conclusions, the 
authors write that most members of youth gangs belonged to “cultural communities” (i.e., racial 
and ethnic minorities). A more detailed look at the study sample reveals that a majority of the 
youth in the study, 16 to be exact, were actually white. The figures indicate that 12 youth had 
parents who were native-born (this group can be presumed to have been white, because a 
majority of racial minority youth in Montreal are the children of immigrants) and another three 
had parents who were born in Europe. The remaining 15 youth were a highly diverse group. Of 
the 15 youth, only five were identified as black (because their parents immigrated from the 
Caribbean or Africa). The remaining 10 youth included young people whose parents had been 
born in Latin America, the Middle-East, Asia and another region known only as “Other.”  
  Another startling and even more troubling example of racial bias in research on street 
gangs is an oft-cited report commissioned by the Canadian federal government (Chettleburgh 





methodological flaws, it continues to be referred to in federal government publications and even 
academic writings on gangs in Quebec (Dunbar 2017; Hamel, Alain, and Messier-Newman 
2015; Tita 2007). In the report, the author claims that 51% of youth gang members in Quebec are 
“black.” The figure is based entirely on police reports, which have their own inherent limitations. 
In addition, the percentage is drawn from a total of only four questionnaires submitted by four 
different police departments located in unknown regions of the province. The study was based on 
a survey questionnaire that was sent to police departments across Canada, and police officers 
were invited to contribute voluntarily. The response rate in Quebec was one of the lowest. 
The Street Gang Intervention made use of the American knowledge base on gangs not 
just in making sense of the urban violence, but also in determining the set of strategies to 
prioritize. When the policy change was approved in 2004, a team made up of officials from the 
Ministry of Public Security and law enforcement personnel, as well as criminologists from 
Quebec, went on two site visits to observe programs in American cities. This included a mission 
to “Operation Ceasefire” in Boston and one to the “Youth Violence Reduction Partnership” in 
Philadelphia. Both trips were financed by the National Crime Prevention Centre of the federal 
government, which regards the two programs as model interventions (National Crime Prevention 
Centre, 2008). Policy-makers reported that one of the major pieces of advice they retained from 
their discussions with experts in the US was the notion that the policy ought to be, in the words 
of one official, “multi-dimensional” and “multi-sectoral,” if it was to effectively address the 
complex dimensions of the problem. One official recounted the following: “to approach that 
problem [gangs]…we couldn’t just approach it from a unidimensional view. It is a bit what the 
celebrated researchers were telling us, like Spergel in Chicago. That the community must 





essence, it is necessary to work as much on poverty, on employment, and schooling. [It is 
necessary to] work at the level of families, because the family is at the heart. With our limited 
resources, we had to figure out what we could do.”   
Results from the interviews indicate policy-makers incorporated the advice of American 
experts in deciding to build the policy around the four different axes (i.e., enforcement, 
intervention, prevention and research and communication). In the following quotation, an official 
explains the thinking that went into the decision-making on these four axes: “What we did with 
the plan, was to tell ourselves, we can’t just do enforcement. It achieves nothing to do just 
enforcement. It also achieves nothing to do only prevention. It is really necessary to have 
enforcement, intervention, and prevention. And at the level of information, it is also necessary to 
have communication and research. Evaluation was every important to us. Because I saw that in 
the US, you have research that is independent of government. We don’t have that in Quebec. We 
don’t have that in Canada. So, we tried to make sure this was done and that the research was 
disseminated. Often it [the research] stays internally. It has to be helpful to professionals.”   
 
Members of the Organizational Coalition  
    
  In formulating the policy, the policy-makers in the Ministry of Public Security worked 
closely with the inter-ministerial working group on street gangs. As indicated briefly in the 
previous section, the Minister instructed staff in the division for policing and prevention to 
establish an inter-ministerial working group on street gangs in 2004, which would be responsible 
for overseeing development of the policy. The working group was created as a sub-committee of 





against organized crime” (the “Comité de coordination des efforts de lutte au crime organisé” or 
CELCO for short). Unlike the coordinating committee on organized crime, which is composed 
solely of municipal, provincial, and federal law enforcement agencies, the inter-ministerial 
working group involved representatives of social service departments. As indicated earlier, the 
social service departments on the committee include health and social services, employment, 
education, immigration and diversity, and child welfare (known as Centre Jeunesse de Montréal). 
Academics associated with the Institute for Research on the Social Development of Children, a 
unit of the child welfare agency, were also members of the working group in 2004 and 2005.  
  The working group on street gangs was consulted throughout the policy process for Phase 
1, though it appears to have been abandoned by the time Phase 2 arrived. For Phase 2, the 
Ministry of Public Security maintained an inter-sectoral committee to keep its members updated, 
yet, the committee played no decision-making role. In Phase 2, the working group also appears 
to have acted more in an advisory role and the Ministry retained the final decision-making 
power. The day-to-day work of gathering information, consulting with partners, and drafting the 
policy was handled by a team of career bureaucrats in the Ministry of Public Security. As 
described earlier, social service agencies on the working group expressed concerns about the first 
draft of the policy when it was presented to them in spring 2005 and argued it gave undue 
attention to enforcement. They recommended the policy team revise the draft and give more 
consideration to prevention and social development. As already suggested, there is reason to 
doubt their recommendations were fully considered, because the same critiques were leveled 






  The composition of the working group was one indication of the centralized, state-
centered nature of the policy process. Non-state actors were not invited in nor consulted at any 
stage of the process, either in Phase 1 or 2 of the policy-making. The policy process was 
conducted entirely behind closed doors and kept fairly quiet; as indicated earlier, black 
community leaders interviewed in the Montreal site were unaware of the policy’s existence. 
Respondents in the Montreal site for the study could name different parts of the policy, such as 
the controversial anti-gang police squad known as “Eclipse” or the financing available for 
community organizations to work on the prevention of street gangs; yet, they were not aware that 
these activities were part of the same overarching policy. As indicated earlier, the only non-profit 
organization to have had any close connection to the policy process for Phase 1 and 2 is one 
engaged in street outreach in the research site in Montreal. This particular organization was 
described by one official from the Ministry of Public Security as a close and trusted partner. The 
organization appears to have been one of the most prominent NGOs to participate in the 
discussions and fora organized on street gangs in Quebec in the early 2000s. It also seems to 
have cultivated a close working relationship with local law enforcement. Whenever law 
enforcement or the Ministry of Public Security sought a non-profit organization for its public 
meetings and conferences on street gangs, this particular organization was always involved, and 
often the only one. For example, the organization in question was the only NGO represented on 
an organizing committee for a provincial forum the police sponsored on street gangs in 2001. In 
2009, it was the only NGO to have been invited by the Ministry of Public Security to give a 
presentation to a delegation from Belgium that came on a mission to observe what the province 





the Montreal police organized in 2002, not a single black community organization was involved, 
yet the same NGO was present. 
 Coincidentally or not, the practice of “street work” became one of the main strategies the 
Ministry of Public Security recommended most highly for the prevention of street gangs and one 
it came to regard as a “best practice.” When the policy process began in 2004, the Ministry of 
Public Security financed a qualitative study into “street work” (Martel 2008). It subsequently 
hired the “Société de Criminologie” of Quebec to produce a technical handbook for community 
organizations on how to carry out “street work.” In an interview, an official from the Ministry 
indicated the Ministry’s investment in street work had been particularly effective in 
strengthening the cooperation between outreach workers and police officers. It is not clear, 
however, whether (or how) this type of cooperation has been beneficial to young people. The 
respondent explained: “we knew we had to work at the street level. [To support] street work, and 
to improve the referral protocol, for street work. We also succeeded in establishing better links 
between street workers and police officers. Thus, it improved the exchange of information. So, 
we put a lot of attention on street work and “travail de milieu.”” 
 The above evidence suggests the policy process was restricted to a highly selective and 
well-connected group of actors. To be a part of this exclusive network, one had to be integrated 
into the professional and organizational networks of the Montreal police or the Ministry of 
Public Security. Evidently, black community organizations were not privy to these relationships. 
The one NGO with the closest relationship with the Ministry of Public Security, the “street 
outreach” organization, seems to have agreed (or at least been ready to go along) with the 
police’s point of view on “street gangs.” Therefore, the entire policy process was confined to 





from being subject to any serious debate and outside scrutiny, other than in deliberations with the 
inter-ministerial working group, as indicated earlier.  
 The inter-ministerial composition of the working group was supposed to lead to an 
integrated strategy, with different ministries making financial and technical contributions, but 
this did not materialize, to the dismay of officials in the Ministry of Public Security. Throughout, 
the cooperation between the Ministry and social service ministries remained tenuous and weak. 
The most active agencies on the working group were the those who benefitted the most 
financially from the policy: the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Immigration, Diversity and 
Inclusion, and the child welfare agency of Montreal. The ministries of education, health, and 
employment were asked to contribute their own resources to the policy and remained the least 
involved. The Ministry of Employment and Social Solidarity, as it was known then, was 
represented in the policy only in name, because it played no role. The ministries for education 
and for health and social services agreed to add the theme of street gangs and sexual trafficking 
to handful of educational and pedagogical tools created for primary and secondary schools in 
Quebec, otherwise they made no additional contributions. 
 Policy-makers in the Ministry of Public Security claimed they tried and failed to mobilize 
the support of social service ministries in the Street Gang Intervention, and interpreted their lack 
of interest in a variety of ways. In the following quote, an official describes the difficulties s/he 
and his/her colleagues encountered in mobilizing the ministries: “We did the rounds of the 
ministries: education, health and social services, immigration and cultural communities. It 
[immigration and cultural communities] was one of the principal partners. Employment and 
Social Solidarity we had less success. They were more difficult to mobilize. It was very 





how it [the issue of street gangs] concerned them. It was difficult…At the same time, the 
collaboration of other ministries was more formal than anything else.” According to one 
interpretation, the social service ministries showed a lack of interest in the policy because the 
issue of street gangs was a problem of crime that had little to do with their own mandates. Here 
is how one official expressed this view: “it wasn’t resistance so much as incomprehension, to say 
to themselves, what are we doing in there? The phenomenon of street gangs, is a phenomenon 
that is purely criminal…so how does that concern the ministry of health and social services?” 
Another respondent articulated a similar argument, though slightly differently: “they could not 
see how they could involve themselves on the issue of street gangs. It was not in their niche. They 
were sensitized, they were informed. But there were no concrete actions that they managed to do 
in the policy. Therefore, they did not feel concerned.” According to another respondent, 
governmental departments operate with rather well-defined mandates and possess limited 
leeway, financial or otherwise, to adapt their existing policies to issues that do not perfectly align 
with their missions. For the social service departments at the table, the conception of “street 
gangs” may have represented too significant a departure from their mandates and areas of 
expertise. 
 Another explanation put forward for the low cooperation of social service ministries was 
the absence of any financial incentives for them to participate. One official explained that the 
ministries that played little or no role in the policy were the same ones who were not promised 
any external funding under the policy. They had to turn to their own coffers to contribute. When 
the Ministry of Immigration, Diversity and Inclusion was invited to come on board in 2007, it 
was given a budget directly from the Treasury, and did not have to rely on its own reserves, 





 Though it is impossible to determine, the social service ministries may have felt a certain 
unease or skepticism about the policy. In the evaluation of Phase 2, it is reported that some 
partners believed the Ministry of Public Security was making an “emotional decision” in 
deciding to establish the policy and reacting hastily to the media spotlight on street gangs 
(Anstett et al. 2014). Unfortunately, the viewpoints of these agencies were never obtained, 
because it was difficult to locate the individuals and/or offices associated with the policy in 2005.  
 Due to the limited roles played by social service ministries, the Ministry of Public 
Security found itself having to shoulder the major responsibility for financing the community 
prevention activities in the policy. It assigned a budget of $1.5 million dollars per year for the 
entire province, funds that were taken from its “proceeds of crime” (a budget that fluctuates as a 
function of police operations, yet generally rises to several million dollars per year). As indicated 
earlier, the Ministry of Immigration, Diversity and Inclusion (MIDI) was awarded a three-year 
budget of nearly $3 million dollars, once in Phase 1 and again in Phase 2.  
 One of the major players in the conception and implementation of the Street Gang 
Intervention was Montreal’s child welfare department, known as “Centre Jeunesse de Montréal,” 
which had been building its expertise on gangs several years before the policy process began in 
2004. Its involvement originated with a two-part qualitative study on street gangs the agency 
completed for the Montreal police department, including the study cited earlier (Hamel et al. 
1998). The research project, entitled “Jeunesse et Gangs de Rue,” would motivate the child 
welfare agency to set up a special research and clinical branch on gangs in 1999, called the 
“Groupe de Développement Clinique Gangs et Délinquance.” After completing the study for the 
Montreal police, the research team succeeded in obtaining a budget of close to a million dollars 





prevention in Montreal. According to a member of the team, the child welfare agency had 
recently established a special research institute in the 1990s, the “Institut universitaire,” and was 
anxious to build up its funding base. The subject of street gangs was an area in which the 
department saw an opportunity to develop a “niche.”  
 Under the policy, the child welfare department received a substantial amount of funding 
for research and clinical services. One official reported, “we worked on disaffiliation with the 
Centre Jeunesse de Montréal. We put a lot of money into that.” A budget of $18 million dollars 
was granted by the federal National Crime Prevention Centre for the child welfare to implement 
and evaluate a city-wide project aimed at rehabilitating young offenders, a project known as 
“Projet de Suivi Intensif” (PSI). The PSI was based on a tight collaboration between child 
welfare, police officers, and prosecutors. The project was implemented in two neighborhoods of 
Montreal with significant proportions of black families, including the site for the study. Though 
several black community organizations were active in the neighborhood, not one appears to have 
been recruited to participate in the PSI project. Instead, the same well-connected “street 
outreach” organization was centrally involved in the project.  
 According to respondents from the Ministry of Public Security, the child welfare agency 
was a natural partner, because the two agencies had been working closely together before 2005. 
In one interview, an official from the Ministry described the child welfare agency as having been 
very active both in the policy process and in positioning itself as an expert on gangs in Quebec. 
S/he indicated: “They [the child welfare agency] were partners on every table imaginable in 
which the topic was street gangs, to share their expertise, but also to gather input from the field. 
They were very, very engaged. They succeeded in receiving funding from the federal government. 





called the “PSI Montréal gangs de rue,” the “Programme de Suivi Intensif Montréal.” If there 
had not been a plan would they have been able to obtain this funding? I am not sure. When the 
federal government decides to finance a project, it is reassured when it sees that it reflects a 
governmental priority. It is likely to respond by saying you’re not investing in the right place.”  
 One last aspect of Street Gang Intervention that bore the imprint of organizational 
interests was the decision to finance activities against sexual exploitation. One respondent from 
the Ministry reported that the inclusion of sexual trafficking in the policy came as a last-minute 
request from elected officials. Here is how the respondent recalled the experience: “the plan was 
about to be launched, and then at the last minute we had the instruction to add a component on 
sexual exploitation…we did it. It was fast. It is often the case that at the last minute something 
like this happens. I remember how it went. Scorpion happened in 2002 and the convictions took 
place in 2004.” Another official from the Ministry of Public Security described the decision to 
add sexual exploitation literally as an “order.” S/he recounted the following: “I believe there 
were organizations that were very close to authorities in the Ministry of Public Security. 
Therefore, the order came and there was no question of doing a needs assessment, or evaluating 




 Similar to the chapter on Ontario’s policy process, the present chapter has sought both to 
describe and interpret the origins of the policy change in Quebec in 2005. In addition, it has 
analyzed the factors that drove the Quebec government to embrace a disciplinary approach to the 





argued that the policy against street gangs grew out of a historical convergence between 
exogenous events, political institutions, and organizational interests. In contrast with Ontario, the 
episodes of violence did not get pulled into a bi-partisan debate, wherein spokespersons from the 
left and right of the political spectrum advocated for contrasting types of solutions. Rather, media 
coverage of the violence in Montreal was more one-sided and did much to propagate the police’s 
perspective of an escalating problem of street gangs in Montreal led by young disadvantaged 
men of color, mostly black males. While a certain degree of unrest and instability was occurring 
in low-income and immigrant neighborhoods, the extent of juvenile delinquency and gang 
behavior was exaggerated, as crime statistics from the period reveal and as government officials 
themselves admitted in interviews. The moral panic over gang violence and crime grew in 
intensity between 2000 and 2005. During that time, the police chiefs’ association was actively 
trying to persuade the government to approve a provincial strategy against street gangs, modeled 
on the same scheme developed to end a violent conflict between biker gangs in the 1990s. Only 
in the fall of 2005 when the Paris uprisings erupted and the federal government announced it was 
making a million-dollar budget available for the provinces to fight “youth gangs,” did the Prime 
Minister finally endorse the proposal of police chiefs. Thus, the policy shift in 2005 was the 
outcome of the lobbying by police chiefs, the electoral incentives of the Liberal government, 
high-profile focusing events and a moral panic over supposed deviant black youth.  
  In the policy process that unfolded between 2005 and 2006, the Ministry of Public 
Security and police chiefs’ association remained in the driver’s seat. Efforts to form an inter-
ministerial coalition and mount a comprehensive response to street gangs largely failed. Social 
service ministries largely stayed out of the picture, possibly because of institutional barriers and 





justice policy and social provision. Within a few short years, the social service ministries 
completely withdrew from the inter-ministerial committee. Only the organizations with already 
established policies on youth gangs and a financial and organizational stake in the policy—law 
enforcement, criminal justice, and youth detention—participated fully and voluntarily in the 
decision-making. As a result, the policy was strong on enforcement, detention, and clinical 
intervention, yet weak on prevention. On prevention, the government’s preferred strategy was to 
finance “street work” in low-income neighborhoods. The Ministry of Public Security defended 
this approach by relying on empirical research, yet, it is also peculiar that it was a strategy 
advocated by one of the Ministry’s closest non-profit allies, an NGO engaged in “street work” in 
Montreal. Black community organizations were surprisingly under-represented throughout the 
policy process for Phase 1 and 2 of the Street Gang Intervention, and for reasons that remain to 
be determined.  
 The composition of the institutions and organizations that came together in 2005 to shape 
the policy process explains why the policy placed the priority first on enforcement, followed by 
detention and rehabilitation. The chapter has also described how the policy process in Quebec 
was centralized and highly state-centered, with only one well-connected NGOs invited to the 
table. During 2005, there was little or no black political mobilization around the urban violence. 
At the time, black community organizations in Montreal were likely busy meeting the urgent 
needs of black families and youth in low-income neighborhoods; unlike Toronto, however, black 







Chapter 5: Racial Politics and Public Policy in Quebec and Ontario 
 
The present chapter engages in a more theoretical exploration of the study’s finding and 
places in contrast the impact of historical institutionalism, constructivism, social movements, and 
interest groups on the contradictions in the policy trajectories of Quebec and Ontario in 2006. 
Chapters Three and Four showed that the causal diagnosis and proposed solutions to the urban 
violence were dramatically different across the two provinces, despite the seeming similarities in 
the symptoms of the crisis. In Quebec, the gun violence was blamed on the actions of criminal 
bands of black youth in Montreal who were said to be posing a grave threat to public security 
and liable to grow if left unchecked. The solution was then to arrest offenders and stop would-be 
gang members from getting into the fray by deploying the police, strengthening youth detention, 
and promoting gang prevention. In Ontario, two separate branches of the state came up with two 
contrasting types of solutions. The Toronto police launched an anti-gang enforcement squad in 
low-income neighborhoods, similar to Quebec. In addition, the Ministry of Children and Youth 
Services (MCYS) drew up a long-term strategy that sought to make up for the neo-liberal cuts to 
social provision imposed by the previous Conservative administration and connect young people 
in low-income neighborhoods to jobs, internships, after-school programs, and adult mentors and 
counsellors. In totality, Quebec’s approach to the urban violence was more singularly 
disciplinary and racially stigmatizing than in Ontario, where policy-makers in the MCYS sought 
to create a youth policy was that was overtly inclusive and non-stigmatizing.  
The present chapter wrestles with the contradictions in the provincial policies by 
examining them within the context of local political institutions, ideas, social movements and 





appeared, and bear a certain continuity with the history of race policy and politics in the 
province. As the chapter will reveal, the very forces that brought into being Quebec’s progressive 
welfare state—i.e., minority nationalism, corporatism, and centralization—have posed barriers to 
race-conscious policies and the political mobilization of black constituencies in Montreal. In 
Ontario, a long history of multi-racial movement-building and black political mobilization has 
sustained an active political debate on racial and economic justice in Toronto, brought to light 
the limits of multiculturalism policy, and established anti-racism as an acceptable framework for 
municipal and provincial policy. In both provinces, the policies of 2006 were the outcome of 
historical and path-dependent processes, namely political institutions and policy legacies. In 
addition, the two policies bore the imprint of emerging new ideas about social policy in Canada 
in which the social rights of citizenship are being replaced with strategies of social investment 
and public security (Bernard 2016; Brodie 2009; Jenson and Saint-Martin 2003). 
In Chapters Three and Four, the dissertation described the differing stages of the policy-
making process as they unfolded within each province between 2005 and 2006. The present 
chapter explains why the process moved in a such opposing directions across the two provinces. 
The table below provides a graphic illustration of the multiple factors that contributed to the 
policy divergence and are elaborated in the present chapter. As shown, the provinces stood at 
odds with each other on nearly every dimension. For example, the conceptual frame for the 
policy process in Quebec was color-blind, whereas in Ontario it was race-conscious. In Quebec, 
the policy-making process was centralized, while in Ontario it was decentralized. Finally, the 
coalition of policy actors in Quebec was comprised solely of state agencies, led and governed by 





actors, including an important contingent of black community organizations and black Liberal 
politicians, played direct and indirect roles in the policy-making process between 2005 and 2006. 
 







- Police enforcement, with some 
prevention. 
- Embraced concept of “street 
gangs” proposed by the police. 
- Race-conscious 
- Prevention and “youth 
development” 
- Left- and right-wing 
perspectives on the urban 




Coercive institutions of the state 
(police, prisons, child welfare) 





- State-controlled and 
centralized, with little input 
from non-state actors. 
- No black political 
mobilization. 
- Decentralized and conceived 
with input from philanthropies 
and community organizations. 
- Lobbying by black Liberal 







 The sections that follow begin with a discussion of the relevant political institutions and 
ideas in Quebec that drove the policy process in the direction of an action plan against street 
gangs in 2006, with a particular focus on minority nationalism, centralization, and corporatism. 
The second part of the chapter shifts the attention onto Ontario and analyzes the combined 
effects of multiculturalism and anti-racism, decentralization in policy-making, and black political 
mobilization on the course of policy-making in that province between 2005 and 2006. 
 




Quebec’s Francophone nationalist movement has no parallel in the rest of Canada and 
constitutes a major driving force in provincial politics, shaping everything from political 
ideologies, policies, institutions, and social movements. On any given issue of policy, one cannot 
disentangle the aims of sub-state nationalism and nation-building in Quebec from the precise 
content of policy (Barker 2010; Béland and Lecours 2001). This applies just as well to social 
policy as it does to race policy, though in ways that are unique. On social policy, the nationalist 
movement has been regarded largely as a progressive, left-wing force. From its inception in the 
late 1960s, Québécois nationalism was founded on a belief in a strong state, as a way both to 
preserve the French minority language in Canada and to raise the socio-economic status of 
Francophones, who had been oppressed for generations by the conservative Catholic church and 
Anglophone elites (Béland and Lecours 2008). The welfare state’s largest period of growth in 





coalition it forged with business, unions, and social movements to devise the most ambitious 
package of social policies in the province’s history, thereby establishing Quebec’s reputation as 
the most progressive province in the country. Though scholars seem to disagree on the relative 
importance to ascribe to Québécois nationalism as a driving force in the 1996 left-ward turn in 
social policy (Noël 2013; Béland and Lecours 2008), it may be reasonable to suggest that it acted 
as the glue that held the disparate coalition of actors together, many who were not used to 
cooperating together and who had divergent ideological and political orientations. 
 When the attention turns onto race policy, Québécois nationalism has frequently operated 
as a more conservative (certainly restricting) than progressive force. When questions of racial 
and ethnic diversity rise to the fore, debates become dominated by a politics of “us and them” 
rather than solidarity. In political discourse, the main fault line is drawn between the province’s 
white Francophone majority and immigrants and racial minorities. Very often, the two groups 
are portrayed as if they comprised opposing and monolithic blocs (Labelle 2015). In one recent 
illustration of this phenomenon, the Liberal government announced in the fall of 2017 that it was 
cancelling a government inquiry into racial discrimination, because, it argued, the process would 
only amount to a “trial” on Quebeckers (“un procès sur les Québécois” in French). Only a week 
earlier, the Liberal party lost an election in a riding outside of Montreal and local party activists 
alleged that publicity about the inquiry on racial discrimination had alienated white 
Francophones who feared it would become a platform for minority groups to brand them as 
racist. The inquiry was then taken completely off the policy agenda, a year after the government 
had had to be prodded and persuaded by a multi-racial coalition of activists and civil rights 
organizations to approve it. The Liberal government’s resistance (or outright refusal) to act on 





issues of racial inequality and racism are either kept off the political agenda, silenced, and 
dismissed, or handled quietly behind closed doors in the form of ad-hoc, temporary, and group-
specific projects. Scholars who have studied Quebec’s record of policy on racial diversity and 
immigration describe it as ambivalent, reticent, fragmented, “ethnicized,” and culturalist (Jacob 
2002; Leroux 2012; Potvin 2008; Salée 2007; Symons 2002). 
Though scholarly analysis linking minority nationalism and race policy in Quebec 
remains scant, the present chapter contends that it constitutes the main ideological and political 
framework within which issues of racial inequality and racism are debated, sorted out, and 
managed. In general, the historical record shows that minority nationalism has generated more 
obstacles than opportunities for race-conscious policy in Quebec. The chapter makes two claims 
that are elaborated in the following pages. First, it proposes that minority nationalism in Quebec 
constructs language and culture as the major axes of the province’s collective identity and 
political struggle; as a result, issues of race are supplanted by (and reduced to) debates over 
culture and ethnicity, leaving questions of racial inequality and racism aside. The resurgence of a 
conservative nationalism in Quebec in recent years has intensified the resonance of cultural 
conflicts in the province and further reinforced the symbolic divide between a seemingly 
homogeneous group of white Francophones and racial and ethnic minorities, who may be 
immigrant or native-born. A second profound and under-studied consequence of minority 
nationalism in Quebec is the effect it has had in inhibiting and constraining political mobilization 
around race.  
Racial income inequality is perhaps the most glaring and persistent blind-spot in Quebec 
policy. To date, the provincial government has enacted policies to address immigrant integration, 





nothing explicit to address racial inequalities in income, poverty, and social mobility (Bosset 
2005; Eid and Labelle 2013; Garon 2015; Marhraoui 2005; Potvin 2008, 2010; Lendaro and 
Goyette 2013). Even the province’s highly-lauded policy against poverty remains color-blind, as 
it refers to racial and immigrant disparities in poverty only in passing and does not link these 
observations to any corresponding actions. As scholars have remarked before, public ideas and 
discourses provide policy-makers with moral and cognitive maps to sort through and resolve 
complex social problems (Bleich 2003; Bloemraad 2005). On the subject of racial inequality in 
Quebec, no coherent set of guidelines has ever been made explicit or public. 
The inclination to overlook racial inequality and racism and turn instead to culture as a 
proxy for race was evident in the policy on street gangs. As indicated in Chapter Four, the policy 
document states that certain “cultural communities” in Montreal are more susceptible than others 
to street gangs, and yet it remains virtually silent on racism and racial inequality. Well over two 
decades ago, Jacob (1992) summed up the state of institutional practice on racial and ethnic 
diversity in Quebec by describing it as “culturalist.” The same conclusion could be drawn today. 
Indeed, cultural notions of belonging and citizenship have only loomed larger in recent years, 
due to the revival of a conservative strain of nationalism in Quebec. The following pages discuss 
how the culturalist bias in Quebec race policy is manifested in public discourses about the 
province’s collective identity and in the government’s stress on policies of diversity 
management. 
 Debates about Quebec’s collective identity have continually swerved between a civic 
form of nationalism, in which belonging is defined by territorial residence and citizenship, and a 
conservative nationalism that hinges on culture, ethnicity, and colonial ancestry. Throughout 





nationalism, yet this has not stopped certain sectors of the intelligentsia and political elite from 
openly defending a more ethnically and racially exclusive view of the province’s collective 
identity. Race (or whiteness) has always been, and remains, the silent and ever-present marker of 
the Québécois identity as French-speaking and Euro-descended. Traditionally, the boundary-
making process revolved mainly around the French language, Catholicism, and descent from 
French colonial settlers. In recent years, new cultural symbols have been added, namely “laicité” 
(secularism) and gender equality, in direct response to growing fears about the impact of 
immigration and cultural diversity on the survival of the Francophone majority culture. Various 
scholars have pointed out that the new cultural tropes of laicité and gender equity are really code 
words for race, because they are only ever mounted opposition to   immigrants from non-western 
and Islamic countries, whose values are made to appear as if they were in fundamental conflict 
with the norms of Quebec society (Bilge 2011; Leroux 2010). There are multiple problems with 
the homogeneous view of Quebec’s historical identity, not least of which is its exclusion of First 
Nations as the original peoples of the province, and the erasure of racial and ethnic groups who 
have long been a part of the province’s social fabric, including the early waves of immigrants 
from Europe, the Caribbean, Middle East, and Asia. What this discourse does, however, is 
maintain a seemingly neat, symbolic dichotomy between two major groupings in the society: 
white Francophones, who constitute the majority, and a multifarious group of “others,” who may 
be Anglophone, people of color, or immigrants (Labelle 2015; Potvin 2008). Two opposing 
visions of Quebec’s collective identity, one civic and one ethnic, continue to compete with each 
other in political debate and popular discourse (Dupré 2012; Iacovino 2015; Lecours 2000; 
MacClure 2004). These enduring tensions, real or perceived, between cultural pluralism and 





attention to racial inequality and racism as fundamental facts of Quebec society, rather than as 
marginal problems.  
The rebirth of conservative nationalism in Quebec in the last couple of decades has 
heightened the salience of cultural and racial conflicts in the public arena and further reinforced 
the perceived schism between white Francophones on one side, and racial minorities and 
immigrants on the other (Labelle 2015). For a relatively brief period, the nationalist Parti 
Québécois had engaged in a determined effort to do away with ethnic nationalism after its party 
leader, Jacques Parizeau, was roundly condemned of racism when he blamed the loss of the 
referendum vote on sovereignty in 1995 on “money and the ethnic vote.” From that point on, the 
Parti Québécois firmly endorsed a civic form of nationalism; yet, it did not take long before 
ethnic nationalist sentiments would explode again on the political scene, starting in 2003 with the 
arrival of an anti-immigrant nationalist party, the Action Démocratique. The surge in ethnic 
nationalism was also sparked by a well-publicized controversy over “reasonable 
accommodation,” that started to build in the early 2000s and reached a high point during 2006 
and 2008 (Potvin 2010). The furor over “reasonable accommodation” erupted after the media 
published a handful of cases in which racial and ethnic minorities in Montreal had requested 
special religious accommodations from public and private institutions. In one case, a male 
student had asked his school in 2001 for permission to wear a kirpan, which was rejected by the 
school’s governing board and eventually examined by the Supreme Court of Canada, which 
ruled in favor of the student (Sarrouh and Banting 2017). Other cases involved the Quebec 
Soccer Federation (QSF) refusing to grant young soccer players the right to wear Muslim hijabs 
and Sikh turbans during games, even though the Canadian Soccer Federation (CSA) had ruled 





Banting 2017). The controversy over reasonable accommodation dominated the news headlines 
for months and the media coverage was frequently complicit in stoking racial hostility (Potvin 
2010). The government would quiet the dispute by launching a government commission to look 
into the issue and come up with recommendations.  
When the controversy over reasonable accommodation broke out, the leader of the 
Action Démocratique, the young and charismatic Mario Dumont, criticized what he said were 
the excesses of “political correctness” and defended the right of white Francophones to protect 
their cultural heritage. In his own words, Dumont implored white Francophones to “drop 
political correctness and fervently and unequivocally protect their European heritage” (Bilge 
2013). Though the Action Démocratique was unexpectedly dissolved a few years after the 2007 
elections, other conservative nationalists have continued to be outspoken public figures, 
including several academics, journalists, and high-profile authors (Belkhodja 2008). During its 
heyday, the Action Démocratique drew a significant wedge in the established balance of power 
between the two other major parties and would drive both the Liberals and Parti Québécois to 
shift their positions on immigration in an apparent attempt to capture the votes seized by 
Dumont’s party. The Liberal party abruptly ended the recent shift in immigration policy of 
speaking of immigrants in terms of citizenship and turned back to a language of culture and 
ethnicity. In 2004, the Liberal government changed the name of the Ministry responsible for 
immigration, which went from being called the “Ministry of Relations with Citizens and 
Immigration” to the “Ministry of Immigration and Cultural Communities.” The Parti Québécois 
reacted by electing a leader in 2007 who had long been a prominent member of the party’s ethnic 
nationalist wing, Pauline Marois. Marois embodied the left-right contradictions within the party: 





Under the Liberal government of Jean Charest between 2004 to 2012, the state responded 
to the heightened conflicts over diversity and immigration by engaging in a balancing act; on the 
one hand, it capitulated to ethnic nationalism by enforcing new cultural codes in immigration 
policy; on the other hand, it devoted some increased resources to addressing racial discrimination 
and facilitating the settlement and integration of immigrants (Garot 2015). One of the first signs 
of a swing to cultural nationalism in immigration policy came in 2004, when the then Liberal 
government introduced a new cultural contract for immigrants. From that point on, immigrants 
receiving citizenship in Canada were obliged to sign a non-binding agreement in which they vow 
to protect the basic values of Quebec society, namely secularism, gender equity, democracy, and 
the French language. Salée (2007) described the new cultural contract as a sign of the “re-
ethnicization” of immigration policy, because it represented a move away from the civic 
nationalism espoused by the government after the 1995 referendum. These Liberal party reforms 
to immigration would go largely unnoticed until 2012, when Pauline Marois of the Parti 
Québécois proposed a more far-reaching set of rules aimed at immigrants, known popularly at 
the Charter of Values bill, which sought among other things to ban the wearing of religious 
symbols in public offices such as, the hijab, kirpan, Jewish skull cap, and Christian cross (Bakali 
2015). The bill sparked a heated public outcry and was soon shelved. In the aftermath of the 
scandal, the Parti Québécois held by-elections in 2014 in which Marois and the party were 
roundly and unexpectedly voted out of the office. Once the Liberal party took over, it succeeded 
in passing a bill not unlike the Charter of Values, yet less sweeping, that bars women from 
wearing the niqab or burka while working in or receiving public services (Hamilton 2017). For 
reasons that remain unclear, the bill was quickly approved and with little public notice. The 





to voters who were attracted to the Action Démocratique’s conservative rhetoric. It is also worth 
noting that Quebec has not been alone in turning back to cultural nationalism in immigration 
policy, as new citizenship contracts for immigrants have become common around the west, 
including at the federal level in Canada and in France and Britain (Lasalle 2011). Whether these 
immigration reforms are permanent or transient remains to be seen. It is likely, however, that 
concerns about the preservation of the French language and culture in Quebec will continue to 
overshadow policy-making on immigration and racial diversity in the foreseeable future. 
Another way in which the cultural perspective on race is maintained in Quebec policy is 
through the emphasis on diversity management as opposed to equity and anti-discrimination (Eid 
and Labelle 2013; Salée 2007). In 2004, the government announced it was launching a 
consultation to develop an anti-racism policy, after the federal government had enacted its own 
policy a year before. However, the effort was quickly abandoned once the controversy over 
reasonable accommodation erupted (Potvin 2010). When the authors of the commission on 
reasonable accommodation submitted their report in 2008, the government released a new policy 
on diversity and immigration in which it outlined actions to address racial discrimination. 
According to one observer, the new policy was a step forward, because it was the first time the 
government spoke of the need for anti-racism initiatives (Potvin 2010).  More recent assessments 
of Quebec policy maintain that anti-racism remains a weak spot and that the bulk of the 
government’s attention goes towards diversity management (Eid and Labelle 2013). 
 The major platform for Quebec’s diversity management policies is what is called “inter-
culturalism.” Quebec came up with inter-culturalism in direct response to the federal 
government’s introduction of a multiculturalism policy in 1971. The belief at the time, and still 





and would place Quebec’s Francophone majority on the same plane as other racial and ethnic 
minorities in the country (Nugent 2005). Not only was multiculturalism thought to be unsuitable 
for Quebec, but the prevailing view was that multiculturalism was likely to foster disintegration 
and cultural isolation, rather than cohesion. The premise at the heart of inter-culturalism is that 
the French language and culture in Quebec ought to be the hub around which all groups in the 
society converge (Banting and Soroka 2012). One oft-cited synonym for inter-culturalism is 
“cultural convergence,” as a process in which citizens rally behind and actively participate in, 
and contribute to, a common culture. According to the ideal of inter-culturalism, the culture of 
the receiving society is constantly evolving and being transformed anew by the arrival of 
newcomers. As commentators have noted, however, there are significant gaps between the 
rhetoric of inter-culturalism and its actual practice (Labelle 2015; Salée 2007). Like 
multiculturalism in Canada, inter-culturalism in Quebec has been critiqued for paying 
disproportionate attention to cultural dialogue and integration at the expense of structural 
problems of racial inequality and racism. In practice, inter-culturalism in Quebec has also been 
tilted more towards getting immigrants to adapt to Francophone society, rather than facilitating 
an equitable exchange of views and experiences between the majority group and racial andn 
ethnic minorities. Salée (2007) concludes that the form inter-culturalism has taken in Quebec 
actually maintains the supremacy of the French language and culture, because it does not 
challenge the political and socio-economic disparities that keep Francophones in a dominant 
position and prevent racial and ethnic minorities from participating equally in the society.  
A concrete example of the ways in which inter-culturalism may, unintentionally or not, 
keep racial and ethnic minorities in a subordinate position relative to the Francophone majority is 





organizations from continuing to receive state funds unless they geared their services to a multi-
cultural clientele. The argument was that the existence of ethno- and race-specific organizations 
was contrary to inter-culturalism, because it allowed groups to remain in silos rather than 
participate in a common culture. Though no systematic data have been collected on the impact of 
the funding ban, anecdotal evidence suggests it had immediate and long-lasting effects and likely 
weakened the organizational bases that various racial and ethnic groups and immigrants in 
Montreal had formed and come to depend on. The ban may also have had the effect of depriving 
racial and ethnic minorities not only of the resources, but also legitimacy to organize collectively 
and defend their unique interests. Over time, the number of black community organizations in 
Montreal has steadily and dramatically fallen, from a few dozen in the 1990s to less than a dozen 
today. The few black-run organizations in Montreal that survive to this day operate services for a 
racially and culturally diverse population. A report by a federation of immigrant organizations in 
Montreal indicates that immediately after the Parti Québécois introduced the ban, ethno- and 
culturally-specific organizations completely altered their names and identities such as, the Latin 
American Center of Montreal (Centre Latino-Américain de Montréal) which became the Center 
for Liaison and Multi-Ethnic Assistance (Carrefour de Liaison et d’Aide Multi-Ethnique), and 
the Portuguese Center, which turned into the Center for Social-Community Action in Montreal 
(Centre d’action sociocommunautaire de Montréal) (TRCI, 2016). 
Proponents of inter-culturalism in Quebec like to argue that the approach is preferable to 
multiculturalism because it encourages citizens to participate in a common culture, whereas 
multiculturalism fosters cultural fragmentation and isolation. Such claims have so far not been 
borne out by reality; indeed, the evidence shows that racial minorities in Quebec feel a weaker 





Soroka (2012) report that second-generation racial minorities in Quebec express significantly 
less attachment to the province than their peers in other Canadian provinces. For first-generation 
racial minorities, attachment to Quebec is slightly lower than in other provinces. For years, it has 
been known that racial and ethnic minorities in Quebec identify more strongly with Canada than 
they do with Quebec, a pattern that appears to hold to this day (Magnan, Darchinian, and 
Larouche 2017). In addition, research has shown that white Francophones in Quebec are more 
apprehensive and feel less positively towards racial and religious minorities than whites in the 
rest of the country, although they express similar levels of support for or opposition to increases 
in immigration (Bilodeau, Turgeon and Karakoç 2012; Turgeon and Bilodeau, 2014). In one 
study, Bilodeau et al. (2012) found that on a scale of 100, with 100 being the most positive 
feelings towards racial minorities and 0 the lowest, the mean score for Francophone whites in 
Quebec was 60%, versus 73% for Anglophone whites in the province. In Ontario, the mean score 
for whites was 69%. The record of inter-culturalism in Quebec indicates that it has not proven so 
far to be superior to multiculturalism in fostering feelings of inclusion among racial minorities 
and immigrants. One likely cause of the weaknesses of inter-culturalism would appear to be 
minority nationalism and the constant tug of war between civic and ethnic nationalism, which 
only further alienate racial and ethnic minorities in the province.  
 The preceding paragraphs have suggested that the contradictions between pluralism and 
minority nationalism in Quebec remain at the heart of the struggles over immigration and race 
policy in the province. According to scholars of sub-state nationalism in Quebec, these tensions 
are likely to persist for some time to come and for reasons that are both structural and cultural 
(Gagnon and Iacovino 2007). To borrow a concept from Jeram, Van Der Zwet and Wisthaler 





paradox.” To assert their right to political autonomy, sub-state nations may seek to defend their 
right to preserve a minority ethnic identity within the larger nation-state, yet, to retain legitimacy 
as a sub-state government and on the world stage, political elites must also show a commitment 
to individual rights and pluralism. Sub-state nations may resolve this paradox either by openly 
embracing multiculturalism or by setting stricter limits and obligations on immigrants. In 
general, states in this predicament have typically incorporated elements of an inclusive and 
exclusive nationalism into their policies on immigration and diversity (Jeram et al. 2016). 
Gagnon and Iacovino (2007) assert that the structural dilemmas of minority nationalism in 
Quebec are further compounded by the refusal of the Canadian federal government to grant any 
special constitutional status to Quebec. As long as the Quebec state remains in a precarious 
status, they argue, it will continue to be veer between ethnic and civic nationalism. 
 It is also important to note that ethnic and racial divisions in Quebec may often be 
exaggerated, but they are also real. As public opinion surveys show, feelings of cultural 
insecurity remain high among white Francophones and strongly influence attitudes towards 
immigration and diversity (Bilodeau et al. 2012; Turgeon and Bilodeau 2014). Popular anxieties 
about immigration in Quebec grabbed national attention in 2007 when the town of Hérouxville, a 
small agricultural village in the north of the province with only 1300 inhabitants, enacted a 
xenophobic “Code of Conduct” for immigrants. Even though the town had no known 
immigrants, the City Council came up with a set of regulations that were clearly targeted at 
Muslim and non-western immigrants. The Code included prohibitions on stoning, burning 
women with acid, face coverings, ceremonial daggers in school, female genital cutting, and 
gender-segregated swimming facilities (Mookerjea 2009). The City came up with the Code in the 





the City of Gatineau, would go onto to introduce a similarly racially inflammatory code of 
conduct in 2011, even after the Hérouxville Council had been widely condemned for its actions 
(Stasiulis, 2013).  
  For the time being, policies on racial inequality in Quebec seem to be stuck at an 
impasse. Compared with Ontario, where diversity is understood as an integral feature of the 
society, in Quebec, the public debates seem to be trapped between two poles: one accepting of 
diversity and the other wary of its impact. As long as these political tensions persist and racial 
diversity continues to be seen as external to (rather than constitutive of) Quebec’s Francophone 




Comparative studies have shown that coalition-building is often the key to any successful 
effort at changing public policy, especially when it mobilizes groups of actors who work from 
within and outside the state to sway political opinion and build the case for reform (Lieberman, 
2002). In Quebec, the dramatic turn to social democratic policies in 1996 was the outcome of a 
historic alliance between the Parti Québécois and the women’s movement and anti-poverty 
coalitions in the province (Jenson 1998; Noël 2013). For years, the Parti Québécois had 
collaborated with business and unions in setting economic policy, yet social movements 
remained outside of these corporatist networks. In 1996, the Parti Québécois invited women’s 
organizations and anti-poverty coalitions to join the national summit along with unions and 
business associations, after these groups had staged a massive protest against poverty in Quebec 





non-profit sector would become a formal and integral partner of the state and would be given 
official recognition in institutional bodies such as the Secrétariat à l’Action Communautaire 
Autonome (SACA). Studies comparing Quebec and Ontario have concluded that the system of 
corporatism partly explains the province’s greater support for progressive social policies 
(Haddow 2015). This is not to deny the independent influence of provincial social movements; 
their success in entering into formal relations with the state came about as a result of the power 
base they built on the back of well-coordinated grassroots campaigns (Noël 2003; Dufour 2004). 
One aspect of the cooperation between the state and civil society in Quebec that gets 
overlooked is the significant under-representation of immigrants and racial and ethnic minorities. 
Organizations representing racial and ethnic minorities seem to be absent from the provincial 
anti-poverty coalitions. There is one well-known federation of immigrant organizations that is 
part of these networks and involved in negotiations with the state, the “Table the Concertation 
des Organismes aux Services des Réfugiés et Immigrants” (translation in English, Roundtable of 
Organizations Serving Refugees and Immigrants). The TRCI has been one of the few 
organizations to be outspoken on issues of racial inequality and racism, yet, its mandate remains 
focused on immigrants and not native-born racial minorities. The under-representation of racial 
and ethnic minorities in provincial coalitions and structures of interest representation may partly 
explain why black political actors and organizations were not present for the meetings and 
deliberations on the Street Gang Intervention. As Chapter Four showed, only one well-placed 
NGO with an already established relationship with the Montreal police was ever consulted about 
the issue of street gangs and invited to any meetings. At the time, no known black community 





The reasons for the under-representation of racial and ethnic minorities in state-civil 
society relations remain largely unknown, because the issue has never been empirically 
investigated. One observation that can be made from the literature is that the Parti Québécois 
sought the cooperation of women’s organizations and anti-poverty coalitions in the historic 1996 
summit by appealing to a politics of class solidarity (Noël 2013; Gagnon and Lachapelle 1996). 
Neither one of these groups was used to cooperating closely with the state prior to 1996, and the 
Parti Québécois persuaded them to come on board by claiming it shared their commitment to a 
caring and equitable society (Gagnon and Lachapelle 1996). The Parti Québécois was able to 
strike a kind of class compromise between business and civil society, by getting the anti-poverty 
coalitions to agree to deficit control, in return for legislation on universal day care, the social 
economy, parental leave, and subsidies for low-income parents. Hence, the left-wing alliance that 
brought about the explosive growth in the welfare state in Quebec in 1996 placed class and 
gender stratification in the center of the analysis, yet ignored racial inequality. Still today, social 
movements in Quebec tend to operate with a nationalist and class-conscious framework that 
overlooks racial inequality. This is visible, for example, in the mainstream women’s movement, 
which has frequently been accused of taking pro-nationalist positions that infringe on the rights 
of immigrant and racial minority women. Several prominent Francophone feminists declared 
their support for the controversial Charter of Values bill in 2012, which was denounced by 
women of color who argued it would only further stigmatize Muslim women who wear the veil 
(Dobrowolsky 2017). In another case, the Council on the Status of Women, a provincial body, 
opposed a bill introduced by the Liberal government in 2009 that would have required public 
institutions to implement standards and practices of “diversity management.” The Council 





inviolability of certain basic values, namely secularism, gender equity, and the promotion of 
French (Potvin 2008). The bill never succeeded in getting passed and was abandoned. 
 
Political Mobilization and Representation 
 
 Generally speaking, levels of political mobilization among black communities in 
Montreal are low, especially when compared to Toronto. The same can be said of other racial 
and ethnic minorities in Toronto, such as South Asian and Chinese communities, who are 
considerably larger and more politically organized at the grassroots in Toronto than Montreal 
(Siemiatycki et al. 2003). The political representation of blacks and other racial minorities in the 
municipal and provincial governments in Quebec is also low (Black 2011; Simard 2002). The 
only black politician to ever have held a seat in Cabinet in Quebec was Yolande James, who ran 
for the Liberal party in the 2003 election and was appointed Minister of Immigration and 
Cultural Communities in 2004. A few years later she was also appointed Family Minister, a 
position she held until her retirement from politics in 2014. It is no coincidence that Yolande 
James ran for and was elected as a candidate for the Liberal party, because the party has 
historically attracted more support from racial and ethnic minorities than the Parti Québécois 
(Salée 2007). Research has long shown that racial and ethnic minorities identify more with the 
Liberal party than they do the Parti Québécois, and this division has only been exacerbated by 
moments in which Parti Québécois politicians have been heard making racist and xenophobic 
remarks (Potvin 2008). On the whole, racial and ethnic minorities in Quebec tend to view 
themselves first as Canadians, and only secondly as Quebeckers, whereas white Francophones 








 Another factor that may account for the absence of black political actors in deliberations 
on the policy on street gangs is the centralization of policy-making in Quebec, which can be 
traced back to sub-state nationalism. When social movements and policy coalitions seek to 
influence policy in Quebec, they turn their attention towards the provincial government in 
Quebec City, which represents, both symbolically and in practice, the “national state” (Laforest 
2005). Unlike other Canadian provinces, the provincial state in Quebec, not the federal 
government, is viewed as the seat of political power and the expression of the population’s 
collective identity and aspirations. In a comparative study of Quebec and Ontario, Mahon (2013) 
finds that the grassroots campaign for day care was ultimately more successful in Quebec 
because it concentrated all of the pressure on the provincial government, whereas in Ontario, the 
campaign sought to lobby the three levels of government: federal, provincial and municipal. In 
general, social movements in Ontario tend to set their eyes on changing federal policy first, in the 
hope that it will trickle down to the provinces. However, this left the movement for day care in 
Ontario with a much higher and harder goal to attain than if it had sought only to influence 
provincial policy. In the end, the provincial state in Ontario did take the initiative to introduce a 
form of subsidized day care, in spite of the lack of federal policy. The question remains whether 
the superior importance of the provincial state in Quebec is more beneficial for some causes than 
others. As indicated above, the provincial NGO coalitions and structures of state-society 
relations in Quebec currently under-represent racial and ethnic minorities and immigrants.   
The centralization of policy-making on the street gang policy and the lack of black 





Ministry of Public Security, which tends to be a more secretive agency than most and one that 
prefers to rely on its own internal expertise and intelligence-gathering methods to form policy, 
rather than seeking public input. It is also true that black communities in Montreal have had a 
historically fraught relationship with the Montreal police and would likely have raised objections 
to a policy that intended to increase the already high level of police surveillance of black youth. 
It is not impossible to imagine that the Montreal police purposely avoided approaching the black 
community, because it would almost certainly have raised concerns about the policy. As 
indicated in Chapter Four, black-run organizations were not present for the public conferences 
the Montreal police organized on the subject of street gangs during the 1990s and early 2000s, 
even though black youth were the ostensible face of the “gang” problem in those years. 
 
Political Institutions and Ideas in Ontario 
 
Multiculturalism and Race Relations 
 
 In stark contrast with Quebec, political battles over racism and racial inequality have 
been front and center for decades in Ontario, and especially in Toronto, where a multi-racial 
movement for social justice has been active for years and expanding continually since the 1970s. 
Black organizations and politicians in Toronto have been among the early and leading 
proponents of the fight for racial justice, yet, they have never performed this role alone and have 
always labored alongside or in collaboration with a variety of other concerned groups and 
communities. South Asian immigrant organizations, for example, were among the early 
campaigners for the fight against hate crimes in Toronto and racial discrimination in the police 





attached to local public and philanthropic institutions (Stasiulis 1989; Siemiatycki et al. 2003). 
As early as 1975, a collective of individuals and organizations established the Urban Alliance for 
Race Relations, an independent think tank and lobbying group now in its 43rd year. As time 
progressed, many other immigrant, indigenous, and racial and ethnic minority groups would join 
the multi-racial coalitions as well as set up their own advocacy organizations. Examples include 
the Canadian Hispanic Congress, the Canadian Tamil Congress, the Jamaican Canadian 
Association, the Canadian Arab Federation, the Chinese Canadian National Council, and the 
Council of Agencies Serving South Asians (Siemiatycki 2011; Siemiatycki et al. 2011; 
Viswanathan 2010). Many of these agencies owe their existence to funds awarded to them or to 
their members by the multiculturalism policies of the federal and provincial government. 
Though the story of coalition-building around racism and racial inequality in Toronto has 
yet to be told in full, the few publications on the subject indicate these movements have had 
profound short- and long-term repercussions on the policies of the Toronto municipality and 
Ontario government (Rees 2018; Siemiatycki et al. 2003; Viswanathan 2009). It is not an 
exaggeration to say that the innumerable government inquiries, policies, committees, and offices 
established on race equity and anti-racism over the years arose due to bottom-up pressures from 
multi-racial coalitions. One of the most well-known and influential government inquiries is the 
Stephen Lewis report (1992) on systemic racism in the criminal justice system, which the left-
wing National Democratic Party launched immediately after the most dramatic and angry public 
protest in Toronto’s history, sparked by the police shootings of two black men in Toronto and the 
acquittal of the officers in the Rodney King beating in Los Angeles (Lewinberg 1999). Between 
1988 and the publication of the Lewis report in 1992, eight black men had been shot and killed 





ambassador to the United Nations, stated that “what we are dealing with, at root, and 
fundamentally, is anti-black racism…Just as the soothing balm of multiculturalism cannot mask 
racism, so racism cannot mask its primary target” (Croucher 1997).  
Judging from the record of anti-racism activism in Toronto, it would seem that one of the 
major effects it has had on political discourse in Ontario is to push the discussion beyond 
multiculturalism and to force the state acknowledge the importance of racial inequalities in 
power, income, and opportunity. If one compares Toronto with Montreal, the movement has 
turned concepts like anti-racism and anti-black racism into everyday language and objects of 
policy to an extent that would be unheard of in Quebec. Within the last year, both the provincial 
government and municipality of Toronto adopted specific policies on anti-black racism. Though 
progress in race policy in Ontario has waxed and waned in tune with changing political 
circumstances, one can conclude that is has evolved through a constant feedback loop between 
the state and social movements in Toronto. Three distinct perspectives, emerging from below 
and above, seem to have interacted over time in determining the shape of race policy in Ontario: 
federal multiculturalism, the Anglo-American race relations model, and a militant anti-racism.  
 When the federal government enacted the multiculturalism policy in 1971, Ontario and 
other English-speaking provinces followed the lead. The federal 1971 Multicultural Act basically 
affirmed the centrality of cultural pluralism to the social, economic, and political order of the 
country. Since 1971, the policy has moved through several iterations and has never remained 
static. In its early phase, the Act sought primarily to promote the cultural integration of 
immigrants and racial and ethnic minorities. Funding went into supporting ethno-cultural 
organizations and language acquisition for recent immigrants. Starting in the 1980s, the focus 





barriers to integration facing immigrants of color. The revised Multiculturalism Act of 1988 took 
these issues into account and focused more on countering racism in the public and institutional 
spheres. Later iterations of the policy would shift the attention onto social cohesion and cultural 
belonging, as a result of the rise of right-wing movements opposed to immigration and cultural 
diversity and the threat of independence in Quebec (McAndrew et al. 2008). In Ontario, a 
provincial multicultural policy was put into effect in 1982, with the installation of the Ministry of 
Citizenship and Culture, today known as the Ministry of Citizenship and Immigration. In 
principle, the Ministry is responsible for “recognizing the pluralistic nature of Ontario society, to 
stress the full participation of all Ontarians as equal members of the community, encouraging the 
sharing of cultural heritage while affirming those elements held in common by all citizens” 
(Brosseau and Dewing 2009). 
 In Canada, few policies have been debated, criticized, and mulled over more than 
multiculturalism. Criticisms of the policy have been levelled continuously from the right and left 
of the political spectrum. One of the most well-known conservative critiques of multiculturalism 
is that it will only foster cultural fragmentation and disunity, rather than binding people to a 
common culture. Left-wing critics have long argued that the policy deals inadequately with 
racism and institutional discrimination and the power inequalities that keep racial minorities and 
indigenous peoples in subordinate positions (Henry 2002). Despite the policy’s inadequacies, 
one positive effect it has had in a province like Ontario is to create a normative context within 
which racial minorities and immigrants can legitimately make claims on the state (Bloemraad 
2005). As Bloemraad (2005) has written, the federal funding for multiculturalism had for years 
enabled immigrant organizations to provide crucial services to communities; in addition, it 





of immigrants. When the Conservative government of Stephen Harper won the federal elections 
of 2006, it proceeded to cut the funding for race- and ethno-specific organizations, according to a 
respondent in the study. The same respondent explained that the black community organization 
he was involved in Toronto had learned to survive mainly on grants provided by the United Way 
of Toronto. Even before the Harper regime, scholars had reported that neo-liberal cutbacks to 
immigrant organizations were making it increasingly untenable for these organizations to 
maintain services and remain politically active (Richmond and Shields 2005). 
 The race relations approach—informed by the American experience with race relations 
and the 1960s breakthroughs in civil rights legislation—arose briefly in the 1980s in Toronto 
before being replaced by anti-racism in the 1990s (Kempthorne 2013). The race relations model 
operates with a Liberal conception of individual equality and views racism as a problem of 
human relations that can be remedied though inter-racial contact and understanding. This was the 
perspective of the Urban Alliance on Race Relations when it first opened (Siemiatycki et al. 
2003). As the Alliance embarked on a series of independent studies into racism in policing, 
education, employment and media in the 1970s, it took on a more systemic view of racism as a 
structural and institutional problem (Siemiatycki et al. 2003). The Alliance subsequently turned 
its attention towards changing organizational policies and practices and began carrying out 
advocacy activities aimed at public and private institutions such as, schools, the police, media, 
and employment. 
 Unlike multiculturalism and the race relations paradigm, anti-racism follows the premise 
that racism is a structural problem reproduced daily through unequal power relations and 
disparate access to resources and opportunities. It believes that real change must come through a 





Anti-racism got its first significant boost in 1991 in Toronto, when the left-wing New 
Democratic Party (NDP) took everyone by surprise by winning the election in a province that 
tended to lean Liberal or conservative. Prior to the election, the NDP had vowed, if elected, to 
create a special agency to tackle racism. According to Harney (2002), the impetus for such a 
policy came from two sources: Caribbean and Indian professionals in school board 
administration who had been involved in the implementation of anti-racism in local education 
authorities in Britain before migrating to Canada; and anti-fascist activists who had been fighting 
against skinheads and Neo-Nazis in the city’s east end (Harney 2002; Stasiulis 1989).  
The Anti-Racism Secretariat’s lifespan was unexpectedly short-lived, as it was 
summarily abolished by the Conservative party once it won the elections of 1995. Throughout its 
few short years, the Secretariat rose to be staffed by a team of 50 full-time professionals and had 
been busily producing educational materials, writing handbooks and guidelines on anti-racism 
policy and practices, creating the province’s first employment equity policy, managing a special 
youth placement program, and distributing millions of dollars in grants for community 
organizations to lead anti-racism initiatives (Harney 2002). The abolition of the Secretariat 
represented a major setback for the anti-racism movement in Toronto. Between 1995 and 2003, 
the Conservative government not only dismantled the Anti-Racism Secretariat, but also repealed 
the NDP’s Employment Equity Act and slashed the budgets for community organizations. A 
report by the United Way documented that a total of 54 social service agencies were forced to 
close during 1995 and 1996, compared to only 7 in the previous two years (Evans and Shields 
1998). Though the Conservative government sought to discredit the push for anti-racism, the 





2009). Nevertheless, it took another twenty years for the provincial government to revive the 
anti-racism policies of the former NDP leadership.  
In 2016, the Liberal government in power decided to re-establish the Anti-Racism 
Secretariat. In 2017, it approved new legislation an anti-racism strategic plan and established a 
special Anti-Racism Directorate. The new Directorate is responsible for overseeing 
implementation of the anti-racism plan across the many branches of the provincial government 
as well as directing two separate sub-components of the plan, one on anti-black racism and a 
second on racism against indigenous peoples. Either independently or in communication with the 




 In direct juxtaposition with Quebec’s centralized system of policy-making, Ontario 
operates in a way that is more decentralized and fragmented and where power is concentrated in 
Toronto, the province’s largest city and its most urban, culturally diverse, and wealth-generating 
region. Mahon (2010) and Hudson and Graefe (2011) write that most social policy innovations in 
Ontario begin in Toronto and reflect the ideas of the city’s many progressive grassroots networks 
and social movements. While it has been said that Ontario as a whole tends to be politically 
conservative, the central city of Toronto has long had a vibrant and sizeable left-wing made up of 
social democrats in the city’s municipality, educated professionals and homeowners from 
historic neighborhoods in the downtown core, and the countless non-profit organizations and 
advocacy networks clustered in the city. Over the years, the city of Toronto gained a reputation 





transit, poverty and more (Sellers 2015). These progressive forces were assembled mostly in the 
downtown area of the City and were a driving force in municipal politics. Once the downtown 
municipality was merged with its more conservative-leaning suburban neighbors in 1997, the 
balance of forces shifted decidedly in favor of the city’s economic elites, yet the spirit of 
activism that thrived in Toronto stayed alive and would be part of the resistance to the post-1995 
neo-liberal transition of the Harris regime. To this day, movements for progressive social policy 
in Toronto draw their strength from the sheer density of NGOs and networks in Toronto and the 
cooperation of municipal officials and private foundations. In 2007, it was precisely such an 
alliance—aided financially and administratively by the municipality and private foundations and 
led by a well-established group of non-profit service providers, churches, labor associations, and 
social policy think tanks in Toronto—that succeeded in getting the Liberal provincial 
government to ratify a new poverty reduction strategy (Hudson and Graefe 2011).  
Relative to a city like Montreal, events in Toronto resonate more powerfully at the 
provincial level. After amalgamation in 1997, the municipality of Toronto even began to see 
itself as a national player, going as far as to make a request for provincial status. There are 
several reasons for the superior political clout of Toronto’s municipality and civil society. 
Among them we can cite: the city’s unique legal status vis-à-vis the provincial state, its rise as a 
city-region since amalgamation and the resulting high concentrations of people, wealth, business, 
and cultural diversity in the metropolis. In the years after amalgamation, the municipality 
successfully fought for and won the right to collect its own taxes and govern certain areas of 
policy independently. As the province’s capital, Toronto is also the headquarters for the 
provincial government. The physical proximity between advocacy networks in Toronto and the 





officials to a greater extent than their counterparts in the regions (Hudson and Graefe 2011). 
Toronto also derives its political strength from the impressive size and density of its population, 
its enormous geographic scale, its position as a regional economic powerhouse, and the 
exceptionally high percentages of recent immigrants and racial and ethnic minorities. Estimates 
indicate that in 2008, 43% of the City of Toronto’s population was a person of color and close to 
50% was foreign-born (Siemiatycki 2011). While other Ontario municipalities have even higher 
proportions of immigrant, Toronto remains the city in Canada with the highest degree of ethnic 
heterogeneity. As Siemiatycki (2011: 1226) has suggested, municipal and provincial authorities 
can ill afford to ignore the interests of Toronto’s immigrant and racial minority communities, 
because of their growing electoral strength. At this point, Toronto’s identity has become so 
intertwined with immigration and cultural diversity that any politician who opposes it risks 
defeat. Indeed, diversity has literally become part of Toronto’s brand name and the city’s 
marketing strategy to outsiders, captured in the official motto, “Diversity is our Strength” 
(Ahmadi 2017; Croucher 1997; Siemiatycki 2011). 
The legal and political autonomy of post-amalgamation City of Toronto creates two 
unique conditions that are relevant to the present study. First, it grants the Mayor and municipal 
councilors a certain degree of discretion and leeway to direct urban policy in ways they see fit, 
even if this deviates from provincial policy. Secondly, it has prompted local social movements 
and advocacy networks to organize politically at the city-regional level and transcend the old 
neighborhood and municipal boundaries (Boudreau et al. 2006). Prior to amalgamation, non-
profits and coalitions would be isolated in their respective municipalities; now, Toronto-based 
coalitions will span the entire city, thus enlarging the scope, reach, and numerical strength of 





municipality (Boudreau et al. 2006). As the municipality of Montreal has less of a say on the 
political and financial fortunes of the local non-profit sector, policy networks and grassroots 
coalitions try instead to influence the policies of the borough and the provincial state. Non-profit 
organizations in Montreal depend quite heavily on the provincial government for funding, which 
increases the incentive to engage in province-wide, rather than city-wide, advocacy coalitions. 
Unlike Montreal, the City of Toronto also maintains a greater interest in developing its bi-lateral 
relationship with the federal government and provincial government.  
Chapter Three of the dissertation illustrated how the Mayor of Toronto, social democrat 
David Miller, resisted for months the pressure coming from conservative city councilors and 
media pundits during 2004 and 2005 to take a tougher and more aggressive stance on crime. 
When the gun violence peaked in the summer of 2005, he turned down the Toronto police’s 
requests for funding to hire new police officers. When the uproar over the urban violence 
gathered pace after the Boxing Day shooting in December 2005, he was the last to claim that 
policing was the answer, after federal politicians had already begun proclaiming the necessity of 
tougher sentencing and gun laws. Throughout, the Mayor maintained an independent opinion and 
never gave up his argument that the solution to the violence ought to be crime prevention, rather 
than policing. As quoted in Chapter Three, Mayor Miller openly asserted that, “the police can 
deal with guns…but jobs are not something the police can produce” (International Observer 
2005). Miller was also not shy about holding the provincial and federal governments 
accountable, by insisting they do more to strengthen social programs in low-income 
neighborhoods (De Sakar 2005). This was the post-Harris period when a consensus, certainly in 
left-wing corners, was emerging that the upsurge in violence among the city’s disadvantaged 





effects on an already serious crisis of poverty. In addition to poverty and youth, Mayor Miller 
championed the cause of immigrants and refugees during his time in power and chaired the city’s 
“Immigration and Refugee Working Group” in addition to sitting on the Toronto Regional 
Immigrant Employment Council (Good 2004). On some issues, however, such as women and 
gender equity, Mayor was not found to be especially progressive and pro-active (Bashevkin 
2005). 
The political postures taken by Mayor Miller during the crisis period of 2005 are 
indicative of the municipality’s autonomy and suggest that what the City of Toronto says or does 
has meaningful consequences for policy. If one compares the situation to Montreal, the local 
Mayor was never heard speaking publicly about the violence or declaring any policy positions. 
Furthermore, the municipality of Montreal holds limited power to shape its own policies. For the 
action plan against street gangs, City of Montreal officials interviewed for this study claimed 
they essentially acted as a “sub-contractor” for the provincial state, by distributing the funds for 
“gang prevention” to deserving community organizations across Montreal. On the whole, the 
City of Montreal appeared to have worked in lock-step with the Ministry of Public Security.  
The independence of the City of Toronto seems to bear direct implications not only for 
actual policy, but also for the public and closed-door deliberations that take place when the 
policy agenda is being set. One could argue that the Toronto Mayor’s independent stance on the 
violence widened the debate about the causes and solutions and kept the policy process from 
being reactive or usurped by one view or one set of partisan interests. Two completely opposing 
views vied for attention in the political and public arena in Toronto: one supportive of 
community prevention, and the other calling for policing. In Montreal, the city’s police became 





violence were portrayed and talked about. No other perspectives were ever given a hearing in the 
Montreal press (or rarely). As a result, the press and local police shaped the agenda-setting on the 
urban violence by making “street gangs” out to be the primary problem. 
 For black community organizations and coalitions in Toronto, the physical location of the 
provincial government in Toronto has allowed them to stay in relatively close and continuous 
contact with politicians and Ministry officials. Politicians belonging to the black Liberal caucus, 
for example, would convene regularly during the difficult period of the early 2000s and consult 
with leaders of black community organizations in Toronto. As reported in Chapter Three, Dr. 
Alvin Curling, a black Liberal politician, was part of a group of senior leaders who approached 
the provincial Premier in 2005 about conducting an inquiry into the violence, which became the 
Roots of Violence Report (2008). For the black community coalition in Toronto, which has been 
active since the 2005, one strategy it has used to engage and negotiate with policy-makers is to 
request formal meetings with officials at all levels of the government, including municipal, 
provincial, and federal. Since the Ministry of Children and Youth Services (MCYS) launched its 
new provincial action plan for black youth in 2017, the coalition has been sponsoring and 
facilitating regular meetings with Ministry officials to discuss the policy’s execution. An official 
of the MCYS interviewed for this study also claimed his agency has long depended on, and 
benefitted from, the expertise of black community organizations in orienting and evaluating 
policy. As explained in Chapter Three, the MCYS replicated the youth employment program of 
Tropicana Community Services, a black community organization, in modelling its own program 
for the Youth Opportunities Strategy of 2006. The same Ministry official volunteered that he had 
begun holding regular informal meetings with black community organizations as a way for the 





having their intended effects or not. It appears, therefore, that both the MCYS and black 
community organizations in Toronto have taken the initiative to improve the channels of 
communication between them. It is not known what tangible results these consultations have 
produced; according to interviewees on both sides, the two-way communication between the 
state and front-line agencies is essential if policies are to be culturally appropriate and effective.  
In the literature, Toronto is regarded as a leader and exemplar in municipal 
responsiveness to diversity and immigration (Good 2004; Siemiatycki 2011). No other Canadian 
city has gone as far as to make inclusion and equity overarching goals of policy and governance. 
The City created a special unit called “Diversity Management and Community Engagement,” 
which is attached to the office of the Chief Administrative Officer (Good 2004). In 1999, the 
municipality set up the Task Force on Access and Equity, which led to the creation of the Race 
and Ethnic Relations Advisory Committee, a body whose role is to advise City Council on 
questions of “access, equity and human rights” (Good 2009). In 2000, the city commissioned a 
study on racial and ethnic inequality in Toronto and the highly damning results of the statistical 
report (Ornstein 2000) served as ammunition for anti-poverty and anti-racism coalitions to 
mobilize. The network “Colour of Poverty” emerged directly as a result of the research report 
(Shakir 2011). Over the years, the municipality would adopt various other policies to increase 
diversity and equality of access, including an employment equity policy, an action plan against 
racism and discrimination, an immigration and settlement policy framework, a human rights 
policy, and a hate activity policy (Good 2009; Siemiatycki 2011). The paradox, according to 
Siemiatycki (2011), is that these progressive policies have been introduced by an administration 
that remains largely white and native-born and where people of color and immigrants continue to 





newly elected city councilors in Toronto, even though they represented more than 40% of the 
city’s population (Siemiatycki 2011).  
Though limited empirical work has been done on the subject, scholars claim the Toronto 
municipality’s more pro-active stance on diversity and immigration can be ascribed to several 
factors, namely its population make-up, the leadership by municipal councilors and Mayors, the 
mobilization of advocacy groups working on immigrant settlement and anti-racism, and the 
interests of economic elites (Good 2009; Siemiatycki 2011). The old Metro Toronto had a 
progressive core of civil servants such as those attached to the municipality’s Social Planning 
Unit. Once the unit was absorbed into the amalgamated municipality, it retained its original 
identity and continued to advance social justice and pro-equality policies (Horak 2010). Hudson 
and Graefe (2011) also write that left-wing city councilors in Toronto have voluntarily given 
their support behind-the-scenes to assist grassroots coalitions in campaigning for progressive 
social policies, such as the province’s poverty reduction strategy. In 2007, the municipality 
seconded two professionals to support the still fledgling anti-poverty coalition and equip it with a 
small secretariat, office space, and some administrative overhead (Hudson and Graefe 2011). As 
a whole, the non-profit sector in Toronto is large, vibrant, politically engaged, and deeply inter-
connected. Within Toronto alone, a total of 197 organizations were found to be active in 
immigrant settlement in 2005 (Lim, Siemiatycki, and Doucet 2005). If one were to count the 
numerous ethno-specific organizations in Toronto, the list might very well surpass 300. In 
general, coalition-building among immigrant organizations, ethno-cultural associations, and anti-
racism groups in Toronto has been frequent and smooth (Good 2009; Shakir 2011). Private 
foundations and the business community in Toronto have also taken visible steps to promote 





Foundation have both provided financing for community organizations delivering services to 
immigrants in Toronto and sought to improve the research and technical knowledge base on 
immigrant integration and racial equality (Good 2009). Among its innovative strategies, the 
Maytree foundation founded the Funders Network on Racism and Poverty. The Toronto Civic 
Action Network, an alliance formed by business leaders to help shape urban policy in the city, 
has sponsored various initiatives to strengthen services for immigrants and to improve the 
representation of racial minorities and immigrants in the local economy and polity. 
It must be noted that not everyone is as quick to celebrate the Toronto municipality’s 
record on diversity (Ahmadi 2017; Croucher 1997; Boudreau et al. 2009). Some scholars claim 
the city’s policies lack teeth and remain more superficial than real (Ahmadi, 2017). Local 
community organizations report that the city’s policies are generally not matched with the 
requisite financial resources. In her study, Good (2004) found that the Ornstein (2000) report had 
been shelved and it took pressure from community organizations for the city to come up with the 
Action Plan Against Racism and Discrimination. Even this particular plan was not matched with 
any firm financial commitments. Critics further point out that racial inequality and exclusion 
have shown limited signs of progress (Boudreau et al. 2009). Thus, in the eyes of many, the 
municipality’s actions on racial equity and integration leave much to be desired. 
 
Political Mobilization  
  
One of the most remarkable differences between Toronto and Montreal is the character 
and intensity of black community mobilization. In Toronto, it began in the 1960s and has 





showing a decline since the mid-2000s. As has been already suggested, the gradual 
disappearance of black-led organizations in Montreal may partly be due to the 1989 ban on 
funding for ethno-specific organizations, which remains in effect to this day. In Toronto, black 
organizations have access to funding from several sources, including the three levels of 
government (i.e., municipal, provincial, and federal), the United Way, and private foundations. 
The United Way has been a dependable source of funding for groups such as the Jamaican 
Canadian Association and Tropicana Services. In interviews, directors of both of these 
organizations expressed grave concern about the new funding format the United Way was 
considering, in which organizations would have to seek funding as part of a collective rather than 
individually. They believed such an outcome would drive a significant hole into their budgets 
and make it harder to operate. In Montreal, black organizations have no access to provincial or 
federal funding, unless those funds are intended to serve an immigrant or multicultural clientele. 
While figures are hard to come by, there may well be over 100 non-profit organizations whose 
mandate it is to serve the black community in Toronto. According to records for 2015, the 
Coalition of African-Canadian Community Organizations had 30 non-profit organizations as 
members, along with dozens of other individuals from the private and public sector. A coalition 
for African organizations alone, the Council of African Organizations in Ontario, had as many as 
40 organizational members in 1999 (Lewinberg 1999). Another interesting aspect of black 
community mobilization in Toronto is the number of individual activists, academics, public 
sector professionals, and journalists who have played leadership roles. The Anti-Black Racism 
Network, for example, was founded by tenured black professors working in public universities in 
Toronto. Desmond Cole, an independent journalist, became the public face of the Black Lives 





“The Skin I’m In,” in which he painfully recounts the 50 times he has been randomly stopped by 
the police (Cole, 2015).   
 The activities of black organizations in Toronto have ranged from protest to collaboration 
with the state. Individuals, groups, and coalitions from the black community in Toronto have 
advocated for changes to policy on everything from policing, child welfare, education, racial 
discrimination, urban violence, young people, poverty, and jobs (Gooden 2008). The ability of 
black communities in Toronto to form non-profit organizations seems to have provided a space 
and a means for them to mobilize politically and to advocate for race-conscious policies. Plus, 
the presence of such a dense and varied network of black organizations has likely strengthened 
the capacity of the sector as a whole to win the attention and support of government institutions. 
Moreover, black organizations have not been alone in fighting for racial justice: they have been 
joined by organizations representing a variety of other constituencies, including members of the 
South Asian, Chinese, Latino, Arab, and Jewish diasporas and First Nations in Toronto. 
 A veteran community organizer interviewed for this study did caution that the 
dependence of community organizations on state funding does compromise their ability to speak 
freely and independently. The interviewee, a former member of the now defunct Black Action 
Defense Committee, an organization set up in the 1980s to respond to police killings of black 
males, explained that the organization had consciously refused to rely on government funding, 
because it wanted to maintain its freedom to speak critically and to protest. The black 
organizations that have chosen to take the route of protest and contestation have done so at 
considerable cost. According to reports, the most radical and outspoken groups such as, the 
Black Action Defense Committee and the African-Canadian Legal Clinic, have had their phones 





It is important to note that black community organizations and activists are hardly a 
homogenous group. Differences in generational status, background, national and cultural origins, 
political orientation, and religious beliefs abound (Lewinberg1999; Rose 2015). In an interview 
with a director of a long-standing Afro-Caribbean organization in Toronto, it was remarked that 
having political differences among black organizations can, in some ways, be productive for 
political debate and policy. As head of an agency involved in service delivery, who could not 
declare any strong political allegiances and who had to be careful not to upset donors, she 
believed that it was helpful to have some groups out there actively protesting and holding the 
state accountable. In her view, critical voices were necessary to raise awareness of the issues, to 




 One final factor that explains why the policy-making in 2005 took a race-conscious 
direction in Ontario and not in Quebec is the higher representation of black politicians in 
provincial political parties. The periods in which most advances have been made in race policy in 
Ontario have been under the Liberal administration of the last 14 years and the brief period of 
rule by the left-wing National Democratic Party during 1990 and 1995. In Ontario, blacks are 
more likely to vote for and run for office with the Liberal party and NDP than the Conservative 
party. It is noteworthy that under Liberal and NDP administrations, senior black civil servants 
and appointed Ministers played significant, if not direct, roles in steering the implementation of 
race-conscious policies. Between 1992 and 1995, senior black civil servants were close advisors 





into operation (Lewinberg 1999). Fast forward to 2005 and we have Mary Ann Chambers, a 
black female and Minister of Child and Youth Services who acted as the policy entrepreneur for 
the Youth Opportunities Strategy. Mary Ann Chambers was born in Jamaica and immigrated to 
Canada in the 1970s, after which she built a successful career in the private sector and as a 
philanthropist. She did not choose to run for election in 2003 and was recruited by the Liberal 
party who had asked her to run for a seat in the district of Scarborough. Ms. Chambers’ career in 
politics was short-lived and she left in 2007, in part because of her dismay with politics. In an 
interview for the present study, she refused to explain what caused her to leave, though she did 
say that she never saw or considered herself a politician. She accepted to run for office only to 
fulfill a mission to serve the public. In her own words, she explained: “I served for 4 years and I 
was determined to have an impact. I never expected to be a career politician.” In another part of 
the interview, she described the role that she had to play, and that any Minister must play, in 
getting policies off the ground: “Every new policy has to have a champion. It doesn’t just 
happen. The role of the bureaucrats is to make proposals based on what the political lead (the 
Minister) has identified as important. The bureaucrats are not supposed to be political. An 
effective Minister will say, “this is what needs to be done.” And the Ministry officials are 
supposed to basically develop the policies the Minister has identified. The bureaucrats are led by 
the Deputy Minister. He or she says “this is what we are working on, and what are your 
priorities.” As already indicated, Dr. Alvin Curling is another black Liberal MP who played a 
pivotal role in the policy process in 2005 and who became co-author of the province’s first and 
only major study on youth violence, the “Roots of Violence Report.” That report has gone on to 
become a significant source of information and guidance for the province’s youth development 





Liberal politician, was appointed Minister of Child and Youth Services and head of the new 
Anti-Racism Directorate. Under his leadership, the Ministry of Children and Youth Services 
introduced a new action plan specifically for black youth in Ontario in 2017, a strategy never 
attempted before. One interviewee who was close to the scenes claimed that Michael Coteau had 




 The comparison of Quebec and Ontario reveals the many layers that must be pulled apart 
to understand the root causes of the differences in their policy responses to the urban violence. 
The basic factor comes down to the culture and structure of local political institutions and the 
extent to which they integrate racial minority actors and perspectives. At the core of the 
divergence is the contrast between multiculturalism in Ontario and minority nationalism in 
Quebec. While one province has come to recognize racial and cultural diversity as a central fact, 
the other is still negotiating the tensions between minority nationalism and pluralism. These 
different political conditions have given rise to uneven levels of racial political integration. Even 
though black political representation remains low in Ontario, it has long been higher than in 
Quebec. As findings showed, black political actors located within and outside the government 
were mobilized in 2005 and advocated forcefully for systemic solutions to the violence. In 
Quebec, they were neither mobilized nor involved in any of the discussions around the action 
plan against street gangs.  
A secondary explanation for the divergence would be the composition, ideas, and tactics 





prominent for decades and received official recognition from high-level government inquiries 
such as, the 1992 Stephen Lewis report. Black political actors have had many allies among other 
groups and organizations working for racial and economic justice in Toronto. In Quebec, 
minority nationalism and a politics of class and gender equity have marginalized issues of racial 
equality and diversity. Policies in support of multiculturalism in Ontario and inter-culturalism in 
Quebec have also created seemingly unequal political opportunity structures for racial minority 
groups to organize, form coalitions, and lobby government. Despite its well-known weaknesses, 
multiculturalism seems to have provided a more favorable context than inter-culturalism in 
Quebec for black communities to form grassroots organizations that are then in a position to 
exert political pressure on the state and build an independent political platform. Through a 
combination of symbolic and material constraints, sub-state nationalism in Quebec has had the 
effect of discouraging racial minority groups from mobilizing on the basis of race.  
 The class and cultural slant in Quebec policy is reinforced through institutional 
mechanisms that leave racial and ethnic minorities under-represented in political office and in 
spaces where non-profit coalitions engage in negotiations with the state. These mechanisms 
include centralization and corporatism. In Ontario, decentralization has created more openings 
for grassroots movements in Toronto to affect the policies of the provincial state. In addition, 
black professionals in Toronto have long been courted by and engaged with the National 
Democratic party and the Liberal party in Ontario, seized opportunities to become elected 
representatives, and been appointed to positions of authority in government.  
 In sum, the key to the puzzle lies in the interaction between provincial political 
institutions and the political power of black constituencies. In Quebec, the absence of black 





Ministry of Public Security. Even though certain members of the Ministry’s inter-departmental 
committee expressed concerns about the law enforcement thrust of the policy, their 
recommendations went unheeded. In Ontario, black political actors within and outside the state, 
together with their left-leaning allies in Toronto, kept the agenda-setting from being steered 
solely in the direction of law enforcement, by continually bringing the attention back to the 
systemic causes of the urban violence and placing the fault on the neo-liberal cuts and the 
deepening crisis of urban poverty and racial inequality. The wider range of opinions in Ontario 
and the ability of black political actors to articulate policy proposals attentive to racism and 
racial inequality, at a time when the Liberal party was busy experimenting with social investment 
strategies, ultimately laid the conditions for a more appropriate and effective response to the 







Chapter 6: Conclusions 
 
The objective of the dissertation has been to wrestle with and make sense of the seeming 
contradictions in the responses of provincial governments in Ontario and Quebec to incidents of 
urban unrest in 2005. It has done so by weaving together findings from qualitative interviews and 
archival material and matching them with the relevant empirical and theoretical bodies of 
literature. The first and most obvious place to begin in analyzing the contrasts is in the causal 
diagnosis of the urban violence, which was dramatically different across the two contexts. In 
Quebec, the violence was said to be the work of violent street gangs, composed mainly of black 
and Latino youth from economically distressed neighborhoods of Montreal. In Ontario, the fault 
was laid not on youth, but on the state, and the crisis set in motion by the neo-liberal rollback of 
the welfare state in the 1990s, which had coincided with and aggravated already serious 
problems of rising inequality, deepening poverty, and racial residential segregation in Toronto.  
As the dissertation has shown, the proximate reasons for the disparate causal diagnosis of 
the urban violence can be found by examining the precise constellation of actors, coalitions, and 
institutions that came together to affect the course of the policy-making in 2005. Yet, a deeper 
understanding of the root causes of the policy deviations must look farther back in time to the 
history of race policy and social policy within each province. As discussed in Chapter Five, the 
policy process in Ontario in 2005 was more racially-conscious due to several historical factors, 
namely: a tradition of multiculturalism, decentralization in policy-making, black political 
mobilization, and vibrant multi-racial movements for social justice located in Toronto. In 
Quebec, the policy process remained color-blind and conceptualized race as a function of culture 





marginal to the policy process from beginning to end, even though the policy was written with 
black youth in mind. By excluding black and Latino constituencies from the policy process, the 
Montreal police department was able to push through a punitive law-and-order agenda under a 
relative cloak of secrecy and safe from public scrutiny. In Quebec, policy-makers placed their 
trust in the police’s expertise on the urban violence; in Ontario, black political actors and their 
allies focused the attention not on youth delinquency, but on the role of the state in allowing 
problems of racial inequality, poverty, and racism to deteriorate and reach crisis levels.  
The dissertation has concluded that Ontario’s policy has represented a more constructive 
solution to the urban violence than Quebec’s approach to date. Since 2005, Ontario’s youth 
policy has lasted and been expanded, while Quebec’s anti-gang action plan was abandoned in 
2015, in part because the issue of street gangs was no longer as newsworthy or as politically 
salient as it was in 2005. For reasons that are not hard to grasp, the causal diagnosis of social 
democrats, black Liberal politicians, and black community coalitions in Toronto was more 
accurate and closer to the realities on the ground than the police’s version of events in Quebec. 
In managing complex social problems, it is not uncommon for public institutions to look 
for ways to condense complicated issues into terms that are legible, manageable, and politically 
suitable such as, the “gang” concept in Quebec (Schneider and Ingram 2005). The idea of “street 
gangs” appears to have done more to satisfy the interests of a state and a police service eager to 
re-establish a sense of public security, than to meet the real needs of black youth struggling to get 
by and succeed in low-income settings. Prior research has shown that the political preoccupation 
with “street gangs” ignores and displaces the complex causes and manifestations of urban 
distress and youth delinquency in settings marked by chronic poverty, high unemployment, racial 





 In setting out to understand the reasons for the policy variations across Ontario and 
Quebec, the dissertation has offered a two-part analysis of the immediate causes of the policy 
change in 2006 and the broad range of forces that drove the two provinces not only to move 
down alternative paths, but to break with their own traditions of social policy. Each question 
brought up a different set of variables and required its own analytical and theoretical lens. One of 
the more remarkable findings is that the causes of the policy change in each province were 
roughly the same, and involved a combination of exogenous pressures (prompted by high-profile 
“focusing events”) and the electoral incentives of the government in power. Surprisingly, both 
provinces initiated the abrupt policy change after explosive and dramatic incidents of gun 
violence in urban areas that were regarded as direct threats to public safety. Both in Montreal and 
Toronto, episodes of gun violence rose to the top of the policy agenda when they spilled over 
from low-income neighborhoods into mainstream public spaces. Shifts in federal policy also 
played an indirect role in the policy changes, as both provinces boosted their operations on 
“youth gangs” after the federal government released a multi-million-dollar budget in October 
2005, specifically to prop up the capacities of police departments to fight youth gangs. Upon 
receipt of the funding, both provinces established new anti-gang squads that would later be 
accused of racial profiling (Charest 2009; Rankin 2012). It is worth noting that police 
departments of Toronto and Montreal have both followed in the footsteps of American-inspired 
practices of “broken windows” policing, in which patrol officers are given additional powers and 
discretion to stop, question, and arrest young people on the street (Sylvestre 2010). Compared 
with Quebec, however, Ontario did not just expand law enforcement but also made significant 





communities of Toronto and across the province, first with the Youth Opportunities Strategy of 
2006, followed by the Youth Action Plan in place today.  
 Upon reflection, the study for the dissertation may have adopted a vision of the two 
provincial social policy regimes that was overly general and perhaps even stereotypical. In the 
mid-1990s, the two provinces did diverge dramatically, with Quebec becoming more like a 
social democratic state, and Ontario undergoing its most sweeping neo-liberal turn in history. 
However, in both cases, the 1990 reforms were fairly unprecedented and not deep-rooted. 
Moreover, traditions of Liberal, social democratic, and Conservative politics have co-existed and 
competed with each other within each province. Thus, the dissertation concludes that caution is 
warranted in ascribing any single label to the two provinces; Ontario is neither fully neo-liberal, 
and nor is Quebec wholly social democratic. It does remain true that the provinces have 
developed contrasting political regimes, except, the “neo-liberal versus social democracy” 
typology may not be the best way to capture the differences. As the dissertation has shown, the 
variations between nationalism and multiculturalism, and centralization and decentralization 
were both real and consequential for the policy process in each process. Whether these political 
differences constitute distinct “regimes” remains to be determined and is worth considering. 
  By comparing the interplay of institutions, ideas, actors, and social movements across 
the two provinces the dissertation concludes that the one variable that most distinguishes the 
policy process across the two provinces is the participation of black political actors. Black 
political actors occupied institutional positions through which they could try to and did influence 
the policy process, yet they were also pro-active in inserting themselves into the public 
conversation and in behind-the-scenes negotiations with state representatives. The leadership of 





centering the policy agenda on the systemic causes of the violence was decisive in Ontario in 
2005. Had they not been mobilized and vocal both before and during 2005, it is quite possible a 
different outcome would have arisen. In Quebec, black political actors were conspicuously 
absent throughout the policy process. The policy coalition that formed in 2004 was made up of 
state agencies who kept the policy process centralized in Quebec City and hand-picked the 
NGOs they already knew and cooperated with to come on board as partners. In Ontario, the 
organizational coalition was looser and more expansive and featured a significant core of non-
state actors, including representatives of the large network of black community organizations in 
Toronto. Consequently, the policy debates in Ontario were considerably broader in perspective 
and more public, with actors from the philanthropic sector, business, the Toronto municipality, 
and black activists and service providers all voicing the same argument about the need to undo 
the yawning gaps in the public and social infrastructure of low-income suburbs.  
The finding that the combination of black political mobilization and a decentralized state 
was responsible for moving policy in a more race-conscious direction in Ontario bears a striking 
resemblance with previous comparative research. In one study, Lieberman (2002) concluded that 
the existence of an infrastructure of African-American civil rights organizations, together with 
the decentralized structure of policy-making in the United States, explains why the United States 
has gone farther than Britain and France in introducing civil rights and affirmative action 
legislation. A decentralized state like the United States creates more loopholes and openings for 
interest groups and social movements to shift policy in a favorable direction, by enabling them to 
exert direct pressure on politicians, legislators, and bureaucrats. In the centralized systems of 
France and Britain, where decision-making is kept under the control of politicians and 





legislative-making process. In addition, neither Britain nor France has had a black civil rights 
movement on the same scale as the United States. In Britain, for example, social movements 
have been organized more along the lines of class than race (Teles 1998).  
Provincial political institutions in Ontario and Quebec did not just determine which actors 
and interests had access to, and influence over, the policy-making process, but also which ideas 
and policy solutions were favored over others. As the dissertation has argued, the standard way 
of interpreting race relations in Quebec is through a prism of culture and ethnicity. Policy-
makers in Quebec maintained that the policy was color-blind, even while they asserted that black 
and Latino youth were the primary participants in “street gangs” in those years. While they were 
prepared to admit that racial inequality and racism were causes of the urban violence, they had 
neither the tools nor the ability to integrate this into the policy. In Ontario, concepts of 
multiculturalism, race relations, and anti-racism have co-existed and been interwoven in public 
debates and policy. In interviews, policy-makers in Ontario spoke as though it was taken for 
granted that racial inequality and racism ought to be integral to the policy deliberations. 
 Contrary to Ontario, Quebec does not have (and never has had) an explicit and coherent 
policy frame on racial inequality; rather, questions of racial inequality are obscured and kept 
marginal to policy. Whether by accident or design, the policy of inter-culturalism and sub-state 
nationalism in Quebec have reproduced a hierarchical relationship in which the interests of racial 
and ethnic minorities are kept subordinate to the needs and aspirations of the white Francophone 
majority. With the return of a conservative nationalism on the political scene, the symbolic 
division between the two groups has been further intensified. Compared with Ontario, Quebec 
has been reluctant to acknowledge racial inequality as a constitutive feature of Quebec society. 





cultural outsiders (or “cultural communities”) in contrast with a monolithic bloc of white 
Francophones who are the carriers of the province’s collective identity. Obstacles to social 
mobility for native-born racial minorities in Quebec naturally go unnoticed. 
 To borrow a concept from Favell (1998), the core philosophies of the Quebec state (i.e., 
minority nationalism and inter-culturalism) set the stage for a policy on the urban violence that 
placed culture, ethnicity, and class in the foreground and took little or no account of racial 
inequality. It is also interesting to note that in looking for technical solutions, policy-makers in 
Quebec turned to the United States rather than France, even though Quebec has previously 
followed France on issues such as immigration. For the policy on street gangs, the Quebec 
Ministry of Public Security and its partners turned to the province’s Anglophone neighbors. As 
shown, the federal government actually came up with a strategic plan on “youth gangs” a full 
year before Quebec. For months, officials from the Ministry of Public Security in Quebec were 
attending meetings of inter-provincial and national committees in which one of the major topics 
under discussion was “youth gangs.” At the time, few Canadian publications existed on the 
subject of youth gangs; consequently, Quebec criminologists went in search of answers by 
consulting the American literature on gangs and observing model programs in major US cities. 
Findings grounded in US experience were adapted unquestioningly into the Montreal context, 
further reinforcing racial stereotypes of youth gangs, even as the empirical evidence was lacking 
in Montreal to support any definitive claims about the racialization of street gangs.  
In Ontario, the combination of path-dependent national (or provincial) political 
philosophies and grassroots policy frames were also at play in the making of the youth policy. As 
indicated, race policies in Ontario have evolved through a mix of federal multiculturalism, race 





the state. Yet, the determined efforts of anti-racism activists working in the public sector and 
multi-racial grassroots coalitions seemed to have had an impact on mainstream policy discourse. 
One of its achievements appears to have been to shine a light on the limits of multiculturalism 
policy and compel authorities to do more to address the systemic causes of racism and racial 
inequality. The decision by the Ontario provincial government and Toronto municipality to enact 
an anti-black racism policy in 2017 can only have resulted from pressures from below and the 
relentless activism of multi-racial coalitions and black grassroots movements in Toronto. As 
Lieberman (2002) has argued before, policy reforms do not just embody the traits of national 
models, they also emerge out of political conflicts in which different visions and interests collide, 
and the tensions between competing groups of actors and agencies must be worked out. 
To some extent, the youth policy in Ontario reflects a long history of grassroots 
mobilization and advocacy on racial inequality and racism, and the multicultural policies of the 
Liberal party in power. At the same time, certain features of the policy were not so clearly path-
dependent and more emblematic of the emerging Canadian social investment paradigm. As 
discussed in Chapter Three, the decision to focus on youth and employment was partly in 
response to an objective appraisal of the causes of the urban distress; yet, it also conforms to a 
general shift in Canadian policy of moving away from universal welfare towards targeted 
approaches that aim, among other things, to promote human capital development and economic 
integration, prepare children and young people for the future, and delegate responsibilities for 
fixing social problems to neighborhoods (Dobrowolsky 2002; Dobrowolsky and Saint-Martin 
2005; Sukarieh and Tannock 2011; White 2003). In general, the social rights of citizenship have 
steadily given way to neo-liberal ideas of individual responsibility, self-reliance, and economic 





In sum, findings from the study reveal that the nexus between political institutions and 
black political mobilization was the crucial factor that drove the two provinces to move apart on 
urban policy in 2006. The balance of power between state institutions and black political actors 
in each province determined which policy frames and ideas were given consideration and which 
ones were voted out. In Quebec, where black political mobilization was low, the Montreal police 
assumed the role of expert on the urban violence. In Toronto, black community organizations 
and politicians did everything they could to contest and prevent the state from approving a harsh 
law-and-order response to the violence. Contrary to what one would have predicted from their 
social policy regimes, Ontario’s approach to the violence was more progressive than Quebec. 
The study confirms that the relationship between social policies and race policies is 
neither direct nor straightforward: indeed, the two types of policy are frequently contradictory 
and inconsistent, as previous studies have shown (Dikec 2011; Lieberman 2005). More crucial to 
the outcome of policy-making on racial inequality is the extent to which political institutions 
integrate and attend to issues of racial diversity and inequality. Just as progressive social policies 
have arisen due to the strengths of mobilized constituencies, strategic coalitions, and amenable 
institutions, so do race-conscious policies. In Ontario, all three of these conditions were in place 
to activate a race-conscious policy, not so in Quebec. 
Though multiculturalism policy has its share of critiques, it can be said to have granted 
racial and ethnic minority organizations a certain degree of financial and symbolic capital to 
mobilize politically and defend their interests. When we compare Quebec and Ontario, we see 
that black community organizations in Toronto have utilized the financial resources available to 
them to form advocacy coalitions, frame and articulate policy agendas, participate in regular 





provincial comparison are consistent with Bloemraad’s (2005) account of the higher political 
engagement of immigrant organizations in Canada than in the United States, which the author 
connects to Canada’s multiculturalism policy and its financial support for immigrant settlement 
services. As Bloemraad (2005) articulates, state policies in any given setting effectively “crowd-
out” some activities while making others possible. Unfortunately, the future of race- and ethno-
specific organizations remains uncertain since the Conservative government slashed federal 
funding in 2006. In Quebec, ethno- and race-specific organizations have been deprived of the 
financial support and legitimacy to operate like their counterparts in Ontario. Indeed, the 
argument has been that ethno-specific organizations are incompatible with, and 
counterproductive to, Quebec inter-culturalism. Such an assumption seems to have been 
unfounded. If anything, ethno- and race-specific communities in Montreal have been further 
marginalized politically by the ban on funding. The goals of inter-culturalism will never be met 
as long as public policies do not enable minority communities to engage on an equal playing 
field with the majority group. If black communities in Canada are to have their interests 
represented in policy-making, they must be able to form independent bases of political power, 
participate in policy networks, and rise up the ranks of political parties and bureaucracies, as the 
evidence from Ontario has shown. The potential for black political integration to meaningfully 
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